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Water markets are often regarded as the most promising method of managing this increasingly 
important natural resource, but the literature on water market concepts is only emerging. Most of the 
focus is on physical trading arrangements, but financial property rights appear both conceptually and 
practically appealing, as a way to develop commercial and organizational arrangements to improve 
liquidity and ultimately increase efficient resource use. This thesis focuses on market arrangements to 
manage hydrology dependent surface water supplies, where consumptive and/or non-consumptive use 
occurs in a network with storage. Binding resource constraints create temporal and locational price 
differences. Moreover, the uncertainty about price differentials creates barriers to trade. Participant 
bids, reflecting their marginal use values, are assumed to be cleared by a benefit-maximising 
optimisation, such as Stochastic Linear Programming. This also creates price differences between 
locations, and time periods, and causes the market to accumulate a “settlement surplus” of rents 
associated with resource constraints. This thesis draws on the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) 
concepts developed for electricity markets to outline a general structure of financial hedging 
instruments that could be used to deploy this settlement surplus to hedge against price risks, across 
space and time. We also consider a swing option based approach, which bundles the above rights to 
create a virtual “slice of system” model that could be practically and conceptually appealing to both 
aggregated and disaggregated hydro reservoir systems. While only preliminary, our discussion of these 
options suggests that developments along these lines may be important in creating a water market 
environment that is acceptable to potential consumptive and non-consumptive participants. 
The remainder of this thesis is about the problem of intra-period consumptive and non-consumptive 
water allocation in a mixed-use catchment. We develop a deterministic nodal Constructive Dual 
Dynamic Programming (CDDP) procedure which implicitly clears a market determining both 
consumptive and non-consumptive water allocations, across all nodes in a catchment with a single 
reservoir. Consumptive users extract water from the system, so each unit of water flow can only be used 
for a single consumptive use. A non-consumptive user transfers water from one node to another, 
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extracting some benefit, or incurring some cost. Arc flow bounds may limit the opportunities for using 
water at the nodes. Costs can be associated with arc flow bounds and distributary demands to represent 
in-stream and environmental reserve flows enforced using penalty costs. The algorithm constructs the 
intra-period demand curve for release by sequentially forming marginal water value curves at each 
node, passing these curves towards the reservoir.  
This approach can generate net demand curves representing all possible market-clearing solutions at 
nodal and user levels. It can also be used to construct net demand curves for water release from the 
reservoir, in each period, which could then be used in a stochastic inter-temporal CDDP model to 
construct marginal water value curves stored in the reservoir over an appropriate time horizon. Several 
variants on this approach are explored.  
We discuss extending the procedure to assess the marginal value of water stored in two inter-connected 
reservoirs in a mixed-use catchment. A “lower level” intra-period CDDP is applied to construct a two 
dimensional “demand surface” for transfer, representing the marginal benefit from net release into 
either end of the inter-reservoir chain between the two reservoirs. Then a higher level inter-period 
CDDP demand-curve-adding method could be deployed to strike the optimal trade-off between the 
current release demands for the inter-reservoir chain and other sub-trees leading from the two reservoirs 
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1.1. Missing markets for power and water  
The inspiration for this study pertains to the problem of efficiently allocating and valuing storable 
surface water among hydroelectric, environmental, urban and irrigation uses in time and space. Water 
supply and demand both vary based on location and time of year, and significant mismatches are 
common. As a result, reservoirs and water distribution systems are operated to distribute to different 
consumptive and/or non-consumptive uses in most parts of the world, often under some form of water 
sharing rules. Moreover, ideally, reservoirs are expected to fully meet inter-temporal consumptive 
and/or the non-consumptive demands. A consumptive user (beneficiary) “permanently” removes water 
from the supply system. This includes water for agricultural purposes, urban water treatment and supply 
plant, or re-hydrating wetlands.1 A non-consumptive user (beneficiary) derives value from water 
flowing in the system without “consuming” it. Typically, this is water used for hydropower generation, 
but there are other (typically environmental or recreational) benefits to be derived from in-stream flow.  
Water markets are often touted as the most promising way of managing this increasingly critical 
resource. However, the literature on water market concepts is only now emerging. Market initiatives 
have been reported in literature in various parts of the world (Bauer, 2004; Easter et al., 1998; 
Bjornlund & Mckay, 2002; Bjornlund et al., 2007; Wheeler et al., 2010). Nevertheless, a standard 
																																								 																				
1  We will ignore the complication that some such users may return some proportion of the water “consumed”, 
perhaps indirectly and with some delay.   
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market design that involves participants bidding to buy and sell water stored in a common storage, now 
and in the future, with structured contractual mechanisms, has not yet fully emerged. Thus, the broad 
goal is to develop a set of market mechanisms, including spot and financial products, to support trading 
of storable surface water in such multi-use catchments, carefully re-interpreting traditional 
understandings, in this new situation. 
This study takes, as its principal analogy, those wholesale electricity markets which are now actively 
traded based on constraint-based pricing theory. Generally, these electricity markets are cleared using 
deterministic optimisation models. Water storage may play a significant role in electricity systems with 
a significant hydro component. In most cases, though, the storage infrastructure is owned by a market 
participant, effectively outside of the market. Thus, it is common to find hydro-dominated electricity 
markets with separately managed hydro-reservoir systems under different ownership regimes. As a 
result, there is an offset between the profit-maximising and welfare-maximising solutions. However, 
well-structured contract mechanisms at the reservoir level to trade water could improve the operation of 
the electricity market to get closer to welfare-optimization outcomes.  
In a water system though, water may move through both natural and artificial channels, and storage 
may be available in both natural/artificial reservoirs, and natural aquifers. Any or all of these may be 
“owned”, or at least managed by the agency responsible for determining water allocations. As a result, 
in a water market, the operation of water storage might, instead, be managed as a part of the market. 
Since the hydrology cycle of the catchment creates a stochastic environment in which the market 
designer faces the intra-period problem of how much water should be allocated within a period of time, 
and also the inter-period problem of how much should be stored from one period to the next. As a 
result, an inter-period water management model must account for storage and supply (inflow) 
uncertainty as it constantly evolves over time. While the physical nature of water (for example, fugitive 
and uneven flows and other externalities) may make it difficult to define tradable “commodities” 
participants are likely to demand at least indicative future water allocations to be produced by inter-
temporal market clearing models. In that context, dealing with uncertainty becomes a major issue for 
market clearing. Moreover, there are delays within the surface water transportation network, over which 
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the market operates. This leads us to consider a number of pricing and hedging issues that may be 
disregarded in the case of electricity. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The primary goal of this thesis is to explore a situation in which market arrangements are used to 
manage hydrology-dependent surface water supplies, where multiple consumptive and/or non-
consumptive uses occur in a tree network, with storage. This research is a theoretical study on 
conflicting consumptive and non-consumptive uses in a single catchment, where consumptive and non-
consumptive participants are both assumed to express their willingness to buy water (or flow) through 
market bids. As such, it expands on the work of Starkey (2014), which represented the entire intra-
period market using a simple constant elasticity demand curve. The present study largely ignores the 
inter-period optimisation issues addressed by Starkey and merely assumes one of the market designs he 
studied. The scope has also been limited in other ways. The issue of gaming incentives cannot 
ultimately be ignored because it significantly impacts on participant bidding strategies, and hence, real 
life outcome. But while it was initially intended to be a primary focus area, a detailed study has proved 
to be beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, it is only briefly discussed in the literature survey of 
Chapter 2 and in relation to the hedging instruments of Chapter 4, which can be used to significantly 
ameliorate problems of that kind. Auction design, trading water under uncertainty, locational and 
temporal management of storages, infrastructure investment and asset ownership/management are also 
outside the scope of this study. 
The current research contributes to the literature on this large and complex topic by studying some 
aspects of the market situations which have not yet been explored by previous authors. In particular, the 
present research focuses on intra-period market arrangements to manage surface water supplies, where 
consumptive and/or non-consumptive use occurs in a network, and also studies, aspects of risk 
management, by developing a general structure of financial instruments to hedge against price risks 
across space and time.  
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1.3. Manuscript Organisation and Thesis Contributions 
This manuscript is organised as follows.  
The first section of Chapter 2 discusses existing water issues such as scarcity, valuation, and pricing, 
describing water as a commoditised natural resource. The second section looks at existing markets for 
natural resource allocation, followed by a survey of electricity and natural gas markets. The third 
section describes the background of reservoir optimisation models. The chapter then concludes by 
highlighting gaps in the existing research. 
Chapter 3 describes market arrangements to manage hydrology-dependent surface water supplies where 
consumptive and/or non-consumptive use occurs in a single catchment network, represented as a tree, 
with storage. Participant bids, reflecting their marginal use values, are assumed to be cleared by a 
benefit-maximising optimisation. 
Section 3.3 formulates a detailed deterministic LP model for that market-clearing problem. This section 
adds to the literature (for example Starkey (2014)) in the following ways:  
§ A trading mechanism is developed for a mixed-use catchment, based on constraint based 
(primal/dual) pricing theory, using deterministic Linear Programming (LP) optimisation to 
clear markets, while ignoring (long-term) inter-temporal linkages. This model includes 
representation of physical limitations such as arc capacity limits (for example, minimum in-
stream flow levels and spill bounds) in a networked water system, as well as demand-side 
(private) restrictions (such as maximum consumptive and non-consumptive bid levels). 
§ A Shapley value-based method is described to apportion infra-marginal benefits between 
multiple non-consumptive users on the same arc in the water market context, so as to minimise 
incentives for some users to take advantage of their physical positioning in the network relative 
to users who are prepared to pay more to increase flows. 
Section 3.5 then goes on to briefly describe a stochastic market model in which bids for future water 
use determine the demand for stored water for the deterministic spot market. Section 3.5’s contribution 
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is to set the stage for the following chapter, and to extend Starkey’s formulations by including 
constraints that describe surface water transportation, storage, and operational limitations.  
Chapter 4 examines the formulation and interpretation of financial rights and obligations in a market 
context. In particular, it describes and explains their possible role in establishing the framework of 
contracts required to manage inter-temporal storage marginal price differences and the interplay 
between consumptive and non-consumptive values. The benefit-maximising LP/SLP described in 
Chapter 3 creates price differences between locations and time periods, and causes the market to 
accumulate a “settlement surplus” of rents associated with resource constraints. Uncertainty in the rents 
associated with resource constraints (for example, channel capacities, storage bounds) may make some 
participants unwilling to engage in trading unless insurance is available. As with Financial 
Transmission Rights (FTRs) in electricity markets, financial “hedge” products, defined with respect to 
spot water market prices, would provide users with the required insurance, and could be traded in 
secondary markets, or in an integrated market. 	
Chapter 4’s contributions are to develop and discuss the support and practical use of: 
§ Financial Water Rights (FWRs) as a generic form of market trading instrument, for a fixed 
volume of water.  
§ Financial Inflow Rights (FIRs) giving rights to a proportion of future inflows, but leaving the 
holder facing volume uncertainty.  
§ Financial Storage Options (FSOs), and obligation-inclusive rights (FSRs), to hedge against 
inter- temporal price risks associated with the storage system constraint rents.  
§ Arc Capacity Rights (ACRs) and node-to-node Arc Capacity Options (ACOs) to hedge against 
transportation congestion rent risks on arcs with, and without, non-consumptive costs/benefits, 
or leakage losses. 
§ Node-to-node path rights formed by combining obligation-inclusive ACRs. 
Finally, this chapter extends the work of Barrosso et al., (2012) by describing an alternative “virtual 
reservoir” approach to creating a water market, in situations where common resources must be shared 
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between several parties who want to act independently of each other, rather than accept solutions 
produced by a central market-clearing optimisation model. 	
In Chapter 5 we shift our focus to algorithm development. The chapter commences with a description 
of the relationship between intra-period and inter-period reservoir optimisation problems highlighted in 
Chapter 3. Then it discusses how to optimise intra-period consumptive and non-consumptive water use 
in any river catchment that can be represented as a tree radiating from a single reservoir. This chapter 
then develops an intra-period pre-computation method to efficiently clear the intra-period water market 
and describes how to construct an intra-period “demand curve for release” that can be used to construct 
beginning-of-period marginal value curves for water stored in the reservoir over an appropriate time 
horizon, using Starkey’s (Starkey, 2014) inter-period stochastic Constructive Dual Dynamic 
Programming (CDDP) model. This chapter adds to the CDDP literature in the following ways: 
§ The intra-period CDDP procedure is developed to clear a networked water market under 
deterministic setting. Unlike the previous CDDP versions, this CDDP pre-computation 
procedure processes over space rather than time. 
§ A net demand curve for water release from the reservoir in each period is constructed in a 
recursive manner and the CDDP explicitly includes both consumptive and non-consumptive 
demands. The intra-period CDDP applies over a general tree network and not just an ordered 
sequence of stages. 
§ The intra-period CDDP implementation is described in terms of the general operations of 
vertical and horizontal curve addition allowing a range of demand curves structures. 
Chapter 6 then shows how the multi-nodal CDDP market model of Chapter 5 can be extended to cover 
situations where flow must be split between parallel arcs, e.g., to meet cooling and in-stream 
temperature control mixing flow requirements. Chapter 6’s contributions are: 
§ To adapt the intra-period multi-node CDDP algorithm by enforcing node/arc level 
manipulations to address uses with water-mixing requirements. 




Chapter 7 further expands the intra-period CDDP algorithm described in Chapter 5, developing a 
framework for creating the demand surface for release from two inter-connected reservoirs in a tree 
network. The intra-period problem is decomposed into a set of sub-problems, corresponding to market 
clearing on a spot basis.   
The demand surfaces corresponding to the sub-problems for each reservoir are shown to be only one-
dimensional, and easily produced by the one-dimensional CDDP algorithm of Chapter 5.  But, the 
demand surface for “transfer” between the two reservoirs is two-dimensional, and could be constructed 
in several different ways. This chapter develops a general structure of a two-reservoir intra-period 
CDDP procedure and then shows how to implement the procedure.    
Chapter 8 then explores some further intra-period CDDP model extensions. At the outset, the issues of 
modelling transportation and release delays in a water market setting using an LP formulation are 
explained. The chapter discusses a time-of-use CDDP procedure to model the release delays, and shows 
that this implies a requirement to construct multi-dimensional nodal marginal value surfaces describing 
the incremental sub-period flow arrivals under the intermediate storage capacity constraints. Chapter 
8’s contributions are: 
§ To develop a time-of-use intra-period model that includes multiple cyclic (non-sequential) sub-
periods. 
§ To explain how to include short-term storage, and its application in CDDP. 
Chapter 9 then provides a summary of the present research, conclusions, areas for further research, and 





2. Literature Review 
Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the premise of this research and outlined the research goals. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to review some literature relevant to our research themes. This chapter is laid 
out as follows:  
§ Section 2.2 focuses on consumptive and non-consumptive use of water in a catchment. 
§ Section 2.3 provides a catalogue of research articles on the classical reservoir benefit 
maximization problem of allocating water among various uses in a river catchment.  
§ Section 2.4 discusses literature on hydro reservoir planning and optimization models. In 
particular, we focus on stochastic reservoir optimisation models used to solve the hydroelectric 
scheduling problem, with a focus on the kind of techniques used in this thesis. 
§ Section 2.5 reviews smart market models for electricity, and gas, and catalogues articles about 
contracting and hedging, and agent behaviour in electricity markets. 
§ Section 2.6 reviews the limited literature on model based natural gas markets.  
§ Section 2.7, reviews literature on some existing water market arrangements. Then we shift our 
focus to model-based water market proposals.  
§ Finally Section 2.8, discusses lessons learnt from electricity markets and water market 
proposals, and highlights open research issues and opportunities.	
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2.2. Consumptive and Non-consumptive Use of Water 
A consumptive or “off-stream” user (e.g., agriculturalist, urban water supply plant) “permanently” 
removes water from the natural supply system. A non-consumptive user extracts value from the water, 
but returns water2 into the system without “consuming” it (Young & Loomis, 2014). These include 
hydropower generators, but also recreational and environmental (e.g., wildlife) minimum flow type 
water requirements.  
In some cases, non-consumptive users are competing with consumptive users. In others, the two are 
complementary, as non-consumptive use extracts value from the water as it flows down the river chain 
to be consumed eventually by the consumptive users such as urban consumers and agriculturalists, for 
example producing “the joint product of irrigation water and hydropower” (Howitt et al., 1998).  
This problem of allocating water among consumptive and non-consumptive users becomes even more 
complex in the presence of the hydrological uncertainty of inflows, and various socio-economic 
complexities (Berger et al., 2007).  
2.3. Combined Benefit Maximisation Problem 
This section briefly discusses literature on integrated basin-wide modelling. Several authors have 
considered the problem of multi-objective optimization of non-consumptive use. For example, Shane & 
Gilbert (1982) outline a set of operating objectives such as flood control, transportation, 
urban/agricultural water supply, power generation and recreational use for the Tennessee Valley Basin. 
This literature is relevant to some later sections, which are chiefly concerned with allocating water for 
non-consumptive hydro-power production. But the bulk of this thesis is concerned with maximizing the 
combined social benefits of consumptive and non-consumptive use. So this section reviews several 
reservoir optimization models that seek to provide non-consumptive versus consumptive trade-offs (in 
particular energy versus irrigation trade-offs). Ideally, a convex social welfare maximization problem 
equalises the marginal benefit from the use of water resource for all uses. If the marginal benefits are 
																																								 																				
2 In general, this thesis assumes that a non-consumptive user returns all water ‘used’ to the water system and all 
water is returned to the same location. However, later in the thesis we relax the idea of water used by a 
consumptive user all being lost by investigating models that include partial or delayed return flows. 
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not equalized, the resource may be redirected to the highest value unmet use in order to improve benefit 
maximization solutions (Dinar et al., 1992). The issue of welfare gains from reallocation of water using 
various mechanisms has been extensively studied by a number of researches (e.g., see Rosegrant & 
Binswanger (1994), Becker (1995), Hearne & Easter (1995) Miller (1996) and, Garrido (1998).  
In general, the optimization studies in this area mainly highlight potential welfare gains from diverting 
water from low valued use to high valued use during low inflow periods. For example, Oven-Thomson 
et al. (1982) studied agriculture versus hydropower trade-offs at the High Aswan Dam in Egypt. 
Allocation of water between hydropower generators and agriculturalists in the Snake Colombia River 
system has been studied by McCarl & Parandvash (1988) and Hamilton et al. (1989).  
Howitt et al. (1998) model intra-year water release in a long-term planning model to determine a 
suitable trade-off between irrigation and hydropower production. They reported that provisioning water 
for agriculture in the spring can lower the hydropower benefits because of the loss of reservoir head for 
subsequent releasing. More recently, Tilmant et al. (2009) applied a stochastic programming (SP) 
method to assess agricultural-to-hydropower water transfers in a multipurpose system of reservoirs in 
the Euphrates river basin. Tilmant et al. propose dynamically adjusted water allocation across time and 
space so some catchment users could be temporarily re-allocated with downstream water. According to 
their findings, dynamic allocations can increase the economic efficiency if downstream uses have 
sufficiently high values. Goor et al. (2010) investigate provisioning of water from energy production to 
irrigation use under hydrological inflow uncertainty in a long-term reservoir planning problem. Their 
model seeks to maximize the net benefits from non-consumptive, consumptive use and penalties for not 
meeting a list of other constraints. In addition, river basin level hydrologic-economic models could be 
used to analyze issues such as infrastructure expansion, competitive water [re]allocation, and the design 
of institutional policies, and/or used as a basis for implementation (Harou et al., 2009; Goor et al., 
2010). 
2.4. Hydro Reservoir Planning and Optimization Models 
The water resources literature to a great extent focuses on long term reservoir planning studies. 
Although much more could be added here, we have chosen to review the literature on optimising hydro 
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reservoir operations, because the long term reservoir planning problem (e.g., planning horizon of five 
years) is outside the scope of this study. The most studied reservoir optimisation problem, by far, has 
been the maximisation of benefits from hydroelectricity production over time, assuming known 
electricity demands for each period.  
In this section, we trace the evolution of optimisation models, for hydro-reservoir scheduling. The 
majority of such models have been used to perform centralised optimisation of system. But, in an area 
so filled with marginally varied techniques, the main objective of this section is to briefly review the 
most relevant water resource economic and optimisation literature as a modelling tool to set up a water 
market. In particular, the focus is on stochastic dynamic programming and stochastic programming 
based techniques, with a focus on duality.  
Hydroelectric optimization models have different optimisation objectives, long and short term planning 
horizons, different system sizes and configurations, and different treatments of uncertainty. Loucks et 
al. (1981) have reviewed general reservoir management models and techniques. Yeh (1985) and Wurbs 
(1993) review optimization and simulation modelling approaches. In Wurbs (1993), reservoir 
optimization models have been evaluated on the basis of their usefulness in various decision-making 
contexts, so as to help reservoir managers select the appropriate technique. More recently, Labadie 
(2004), presented a comprehensive survey of reservoir optimization approaches.  
Generally, these optimization models determine optimal periodic releases to minimise expected 
operating costs. In simple terms, the reservoir operator has to decide the optimal trade-off between 
releasing now and saving for later release. These decisions are made in a stochastic environment with 
spatially and temporally correlated tributary flows and capacity-constrained reservoirs. A convex 
maximization problem equalizes the marginal benefit from all water uses. This means that the manager 
of a single hydro-reservoir should release water if, and only if, the marginal value of releasing it is at 
least equal to the expected marginal value of storing it. More generally, the marginal value of releasing 
should generally equal the expected difference between upstream and downstream marginal water 
values. 
A network reservoir optimization model typically allocates water across the distribution network 
satisfying buyer-seller water delivery relationships. Again, Labadie (2004) provides, a useful and 
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succinct network representation, and emphasises the importance of explicit stochastic modelling of 
hydrology uncertainty for better estimation of the system performance. According to Cheng et al., 
(2009), these network structures represent distribution systems implicitly (Israel and Lund, 1999; 
Hollinshead & Lund, 2006; Lund et al., 2008) or explicitly (e.g., Labadie, 2004; Wang et al., 2007; 
Barros et al., 2008; Hsu et al., 2008). Seyam (2002) used a simulation-based nodal “value-flow 
concept” and this was used to drive marginal water values. In Harou et al., (2009), a node represents 
confluences, reservoirs, abstraction points etc. Arcs denote inflows to the system, canals, and river 
reaches.  
2.4.1. Stochastic Dynamic Programming  
2.4.1.1. History and Focus 
Dynamic Programming (DP) has been widely applied to derive time-sequential optimal decisions. The 
DP, based on Bellman’s optimality equation (Bellman, 1957), breaks down a multi-period decision 
problem into a finite set of “stage” sub-problems, each having only a few decisions. A state variable 
fully describes the current state of the system at a stage without any knowledge of a system’s past 
behaviour. An optimal policy implies a set of future cost functions for a number of state variables at 
each stage or sub-problem. The system state can change as a result of each decision made. As described 
by Stedinger et al. (1984) and recently by Nandalal and Borárdi (2007), Massé & Boutteville (1946), 
Little (1955), and Hall & Buras (1961) applied DP in water resource systems studies in the early period. 
Harboe et al. (1970) derive an optimal single reservoir operating policy using deterministic DP to serve 
multiple purposes: power generation, urban water use, and flood control. Young (1967) generated 
synthetic inflows using Monte Carlo simulation and implicitly used a deterministic DP optimisation 
with regression methods to construct an optimal reservoir operation policy. Later, DP and DP-like 
methods were extensively used for water resource systems analysis because they could handle non-
linear objective functions and constraints (see Reznicek & Cheng, 1991). Labadie’s (2004) overview 
and studies by Yakowitz (1992), and recently Nandalal and Bogárdi (2007), on SDP based hydro 
reservoir optimisation techniques are referred to in the following discussion. Unlike deterministic DP, 
the cost/benefit function in an SDP is uncertain. Yet, an SDP based release policy can be useful as a 
guide for decision making under uncertainty. 
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Note that this thesis is not about the theory of SDP, and nor does it develop or use classical SDP 
models3. So we are really only interested in three specific aspects of the large SDP literature, namely: 
§ Stochastic CDDP reservoir optimisation models of the type developed by Starkey et al. in as 
much as they form a context in which our own models may be applied, 
§ The CDDP concepts themselves, which are here re-interpreted and applied to form optimal 
deterministic intra-period release policies for a catchment with no-cyclic topology, and  
§ The insights provided by Stochastic CDDP about the relationships between current and 
expected future marginal water values, and prices.    
2.4.1.2. Classical SDP Formulation  
This section formulates the classical SDP formulation. We will refer to this formulation in later 
chapters when we discuss the intra-period optimization problem. Typically, the reservoir optimisation 
formulations assume Markov process-dependent serial correlation of inflow probabilities (e.g., see 
(Loucks et al., 1981)). For example, a temporal link between the current period inflows and the 
previous period inflows can be formed using a lag-one Markov model. 
Let 𝑓>,? denote the stochastic inflow (a random variable at each stage) which is described using a 
stochastic process. Here, ℎ and 𝑡 represent hydrology state and time indices. Now the optimal release 
might depend on the Markov state as well. 𝑟?,> is the release volume in period 𝑡 corresponding to 
hydrology state ℎ.  
Generally, SDP reservoir optimisation models use a first order Markov chain: 
Prob 𝑓>E,?FG|𝑓>,?, 𝑓>,?IG, … . . 𝑓>,L = Prob 𝑓>E,?FG|𝑓>,? . This means that the inter-temporal information 
is carried forward to the next stage through an extra dimension. Inflow to the reservoir in any time 
period is related to the preceding inflow. The SDP breaks inflows and the storage into a number of 
discrete states. Let ℎ and ℎM be the inflow states in periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1. Given the inflow state ℎ in 
period t, the probability of inflow state ℎM in the next period 𝑡 + 1 is written as: 𝜌>>E . This is known as 
																																								 																				
3 Instead, the models used in this thesis are first formulated as LP models and then effectively apply CDDP to 
optimise the LP models. 
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the Markov state transition probability. Thus, 1-lag Markov chain based beginning-of-period SDP 
objective function 𝑉?,>Efor current inflow conditioned by the previous period inflow is:  
𝔼RSTU|RS 𝑚𝑎𝑥YS,Z 𝑁𝐵
?,> 𝑠?, 𝑟?,> 𝑓?,> + 𝑉?FG,> 𝑊? 𝑠?, 𝑟?,>, 𝑓?,> 		∀𝑡 [2-1] 
Subject to: 
Flow balance at the storage, 
𝒔𝒕 = 𝒔𝒕I𝟏 + 𝒇𝒕,𝒉 − 𝒓𝒕,𝒉							∀	𝒕, 𝒉 [2-2] 
Here, inflows in the current period could be assumed to be known at the beginning of the period. This 
could be either stored or released to meet demand within that period. This is known as the “observation-
first” type of release policy or “informed” inflow allocating policy (Starkey, 2014). So the planner 
looks forward from the beginning of period storage level. In a stochastic setting, there will be multiple 
inflow realizations for a period. Then each of the above realizations leads to a specific release decision. 
Unlike the deterministic case, there will be different end-of-stage storage levels, one for each inflow 
realization. In Equation [2.1], the release decision is unique for each hydrology state. Alternatively, a 
single release decision 𝑟? in the continuity equation can apply for all hydrology states as follows:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥YS,ZE 𝔼RSTU|RS 𝑁𝐵
?,> 𝑠?, 𝑟?,>E 𝑓?,> + 𝑉?FG,> 𝑊? 𝑠?, 𝑟?,>E, 𝑓?,> 			∀𝑡 [2-3] 
This can be thought of as a “look ahead” or decision-first type of release policy which is similar to the 
conservative release policy (e.g. Read, 1982; Archibald, 1995; Starkey et al., 2012).  
An end-of-horizon Marginal Water Value (MWV) function is used in the above problem. By doing this, 
it is ensured that enough water is carried over into the subsequent ‘year’ as a value is assigned to water 
stored beyond the end-of-horizon (e.g., end of the year). In general the marginal water value reflects 
how much water to be released and/or stored in each period and the expected marginal water value 
depends on time, reservoir level, and inflow. This observation forms the basis for the CDDP technique 
originally developed in 1983 for the PRISM model described by Read (1989). 
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2.4.2. Constructive Dual Dynamic Programming 
Read (1976) considered the first derivative of the future value function of the backward recursion SDP 
to construct the marginal water value function. Read (1979) discussed applying mixed LP/DP dual 
methods to produce marginal water value functions given that benefit and value functions are 
continuous and differentiable. Later, the works of Boshier et al., (1983) and Read & Boshier (1989) on 
a marginalistic iterative variant of SDP lead to the development of the constructive dual dynamic 
programming technique. Read & Hindsberger (2010) summarize the CDDP literature since then, which 
mainly focusses on the development of (expected) marginal water value functions under uncertainty. 
However, our focus in Chapter 5 is on the construction of an intra-period marginal benefit function of 
the CDDP. That is, determining the marginal value of release for a single period. 
Constructive dual dynamic programming (CDDP) solves the dual of the standard DP reservoir 
optimisation problem. It implicitly optimises an operating policy similar to SDP for the planning 
horizon, but focuses on determining the primal storage state levels corresponding to a pre-defined grid 
of dual “state space” variables, typically marginal water value levels (and inflow states). With no 
bounds, the marginal value of water at the beginning of period is equal to the marginal value of 
releasing water during that period, which equals the marginal value of storing water at the end of 
period. Using this, a backward recursive CDDP procedure constructs the marginal value for water 
function for the current period using the end of period marginal water value curves. As a result, there is 
no need to search for optimal solutions to each sub-problem as in standard DP. The marginal water 
value for release and marginal water value for storage can be thought as the primal variables in the dual 
DP problem. Read (1989) describes an early implementation of dual DP in a two reservoir optimisation 
model (RESOP), embedded in the PRISM planning model of Read et al. (1987). Read shows that, 
provided the intra-period benefit function is convex and differentiable over a continuous state space, the 
SDP transition function can be re-cast as a dual problem to determine the beginning-of-the-period value 
function.  
The original PRISM model relied heavily on running an intra-period model, independently of the DP 
optimisation, to pre-compute optimal releases for each critical combination of marginal water values. 
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Read & George (1990) show that the DP formulation could be “implicitly defined as a whole set of LP 
problems starting from each possible initial storage level in each period”. The beginning-of-period 
marginal water value curve is formed by augmenting the end-of-period marginal water value curve and 
marginal value curve for releasing water in the current period. Read et al. (1994) formed expected 
beginning-of-period marginal values for storage by considering the step-wise change in the end-of-
period marginal value curve as a result of discrete inflow probabilities. Yang and Read (1999) further 
developed the above CDDP approach by accounting for inflow correlation. Casseboom & Read (1987) 
applied similar method to optimize the coal stockpiling problem. 
According to Read & Hindsberger (2010), initial CDDP models constructed monotone piece-wise 
linear derivatives of intra-period and future value functions. These were denoted as the marginal value 
of releasing water, and the marginal value of storing water, as functions of release and storage 
respectively. This type of CDDP can be very efficient, provided the structure of the intra-period 
optimisation produces relatively wide “flats”. That is storage /release ranges over which the marginal 
value of releasing water is constant. This is typically true where water is being used to generate power 
in competition with a limited set of thermal stations.  
This kind of CDDP produces an optimal release policy as a set of time dependent guidelines for 
maintaining storage levels. The marginal value of water in storage equals the marginal thermal fuel 
costs. Baninister & Kaye (1991) performed a very similar deterministic single reservoir optimisation 
using a similar technique. Travers & Kaye (1998) generalised the theory, so as to apply to more general 
multi-dimensional economic dispatch problems, and introduced the term “constructive” DP to 
distinguish this approach from the popular “Stochastic Dual DP” method of Pereira & Pinto (1991) 
described in the following section.  
Later models typically dispensed with the piece-wise linear assumption, though, and used a process 
referred to as the “demand curve adding” approach in (Read & Hindsberger, 2010). Scott & Read 
(1996) introduced this approach in a context where marginal water value curves were no longer piece-
wise linear, because participants were assumed to be “playing games” in an electricity market.  So they 
employed a Cournot gaming model to pre-compute intra-period marginal benefit functions, and then 
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used the inverse function of the end-of-period marginal water value curve to incorporate the 
hydrological uncertainty to compute expected end-of-period marginal water value curves. In general, 
CDDP can employ any type of intra-period sub-model that produces a monotone marginal benefit 
function for the current period (Scott & Read, 1996).  
Chapter 5 of this thesis contributes to the CDDP literature in two ways. First, it develops a methodology 
for the intra-period problem. This pre-computation procedure constructs an integrated “demand curve 
for release” for a set of consumptive and non-consumptive users interacting in a single catchment. 
Using this demand curve for release in Starkey’s inter-period stochastic CDDP formulation, the inter-
period market clearing model can assess market benefits, and expected market prices. Second, it 
produces this demand curve for release by developing a deterministic nodal CDDP intra-period model, 
working towards the storage reservoir(s) along river chains, rather than backwards through time. Like 
all DP models, though, it does suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” if multiple reservoirs need to 
be considered. 	
2.4.3. Stochastic Linear Programming  
2.4.3.1. History and Focus 
Stochastic Linear Programming (SLP) was originally developed by Dantzig (1955), and is discussed in 
detail by Kall & Wallace (1994). Jacobs et al. (1995) developed an SLP based power generation 
scheduling system for PG&E. Watkins et al. (2000) developed a multi-stage SLP reservoir optimization 
model for the Highland Lakes, Lower Colorado River Authority. Yeh (1985) and later Wallace & 
Fleten (2003) have reviewed several applications in the field of reservoir management. The water 
resource literature mainly refers to the SP models with recourse.  
This thesis is not about the theory of SLP, and nor does it develop a computational SLP model. So we 
have no intention of discussing SLP computational routines. But SLP concepts are relevant inasmuch as 
Chapter 3 formulates a basic multi-nodal reservoir benefit maximization model as an SLP, in order to 
exploit its dual (pricing) structure in defining and analysing inter-nodal and inter-temporal hedging 
options for water markets.  
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2.4.3.2. SLP Representations 
The central feature of an SLP model is a “scenario tree”, starting from a single point and showing how 
the uncertainty evolves over time. Unlike SDP, SLP does not suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” 
because it only constructs solutions for this scenario tree, which effectively represents a limited sample 
of possible future flow/storage/release states, rather than constructing solutions for every point in the 
multi-dimensional flow/storage/release sate space potentially available. See Høyland & Wallace (2001) 
for a full discussion about constructing multi-stage scenario trees for SLP modelling. 
For a reservoir optimization problem, starting storage and inflows in the first period are assumed to be 
known, thus decisions can be made with certainty. Future period decisions can be conditional on 
observed random inflows. In a two-stage decision problem, the first stage performs the action, the 
outcome of uncertainty is revealed then the second stage suggests the corrective action. A multi-stage 
problem alternates between performing actions that adjust for past revelations and having more 
uncertainty revealed. The SLP objective function maximizes the first stage net benefits, plus the total 
expected net benefits associated with future decisions subject to stochastic future inflows, as described 
by Kall & Wallace (1995).  
Sen & Higle (1999) provide a simple tutorial, showing how to formulate a problem using both “event 
tree” and “path based” representations. See also Labadie (2004). This discussion focuses first on the 
former representation as we follow the event tree formulation approach to formulate the stochastic 




Figure 2-1: Scenario tree and scenario path representations  
Following Gassmann & Ireland (1995), primal variables are indexed by event node, (𝑡, ℎ), where each 
node in period 𝑡 has a unique hydrology index, ℎ4. The set of event nodes immediately subsequent to 
event node (𝑡, ℎ) for 𝑡	 = 	1,2, … . 𝑇 − 1 are the set of child nodes 𝕔(𝑡, ℎ) at level 𝑡 + 1. Each node 
(𝑡, ℎ) at level 𝑡	 = 	2, . . . , 𝑇 is linked to a single ancestor 𝕒(𝑡, ℎ) node at level  𝑡	– 	1 (see Diagram A in 
Figure 2-1)5. The scenario tree divides into branches corresponding to different realizations of the 
random inflow events. In this formulation the historical path from root to node (𝑡, ℎ) in stage 𝑡 in the 
event tree can be denoted by ℎG, ℎl, … . . ℎ?IG , omitting the period indices. 𝕡 ?,>  denotes the 
probability of reaching event node 𝑡, ℎ . The nodal probability is the product of corresponding 
conditional probabilities along the historical path. ℋ? denotes the set of all event nodes in time period 
𝑡	, ∀𝑡 = 1,2,3, … . 𝑇. If we let 𝑁𝐵?,>(𝑟) be the benefit derived from the release made at event node 
(𝑡, ℎ) and 𝑉o,> end-of-horizon value function, then the stochastic reservoir optimization objective 
function can be written as: 
																																								 																				
4 Note that the indices are not the same as in the SDP above. Later in the tree there could be different nodes with 
the same inflow (and so the same hydrology state) but a different ℎ.  
5	𝕒 𝑡, ℎ , 𝕔(𝑡, ℎ)	notation are required as every combination of ℎ and 𝑡 do not appear in the event tree. 𝕒(3,3) 	=





𝕡 >,? 𝑁𝐵?,> 𝑟?,>? + 𝑉o,> 𝑠o,>>,? ∈ℋS 		∀𝑡 [2-4] 
And, the storage balance constraint as: 
𝑟?,> − 𝑠L
𝕒 ?,> + 𝑠L
>,? = 𝑓L
?,>	, ∀	(𝑡, ℎ)  [2-5] 
Here the information process within the decisions making sequence is explicitly modelled by the 
scenario tree representation. Both the scenario tree information structure and the data difference 
contribute to the optimal solution. 
The path-based formulation instead starts by defining “paths”. For example, in Figure 2-1, path 
1,1 , 2,1 , 3,1 , 4,1  and path 1,1 , 2,1 , 3,1 , 4,2  represent scenario 1 and scenario 2 
respectively. Note that these paths need to go to the last stage The two scenarios share a common 
scenario path and also the same information until 𝑡 = 3 giving identical decisions for the two scenarios 
through to period 𝑡 = 3. Many scenarios share a common sequence of outcomes and decisions for some 
periods, in this way. In order to ensure the decisions are the same for these shared outcomes, the 
formulation requires a set of the “non-anticipativity” (implementability) requirements. These can be 
stated in various forms, see, for example, Dempster (1988), Rockafellar & Wets (1991) and Mulvey & 
Ruszczynski (1995). This “non-anticipativity constraint ensures that decisions honor the information 
structure of the problem” (Higle, 2005). One form of these requirements is as follows: 
𝑠?,> − 𝑠?,>E = 0	∀	ℎ ∈ ℋ?,>E		𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇, ℎ = 1,2, … . 𝐻  [2-6] 
ℋ?,> denotes the set of scenarios that pass through node 𝑡, ℎ . The former formulation is used in 
Section 4.3.1 to model the inter-temporal FSRs. Section 4.3.3 refers to the path based formulation for 
an alternative representation in its discussion of “retrospective” rights.  
2.4.3.3. Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming 
Irrespective of the representation, solution of SLP problems can be challenging, because the 
straightforward LP formulation of the multi-stage problem has a large state-space to represent all the 
scenarios. In reality, techniques such as Bender’s decomposition, Monte Carlo sampling, and nested 
decomposition are generally used to reduce the problem into a manageable set of sub-problems. For 
example, refer to Pereira & Pinto (1985), Jacobs et al. (1995) and Seifi & Hipel (2001), Nemirovski et 
al. (2009), and Shapiro (2011). 	
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In particular, stochastic dual dynamic programming (SDDP) has been utilised for a range of problems 
such as reservoir optimization, hydro-thermal coordination and capacity planning. Broadly similar 
methods have been developed and applied by others, including De Matos et al. (2015).  
Pereira & Pinto (1991) applied SDDP to a hydro scheduling problem with an objective of minimizing 
the hydro-thermal system operational cost (Pereira & Pinto, 1985, 1991; Gorenstin et al. 1991; 
Granville et al., 2003). The SDDP as described by (Pereira & Pinto, 1991) splits the optimization 
problem into a series of master problems and sub-problems. A sub-problem can have further sub-
problems because of the hydrologic uncertainty. The model determines the expected value of the dual 
of a sub-problem and a corresponding Bender’s cut. Pereira & Pinto approximate the expected value of 
the original sub-problem using the Bender’s cuts6 of sub-problems. The value function can be 
approximated using values of the sub-problems subject to bounds (Pereira & Pinto, 1991). In this way 
an approximate solution is determined for the future cost. SDDP then successively refines this 
approximation within the likely state-space.   
Lee & Labadie (2007) considered SDDP as another variation of SLP with recourse. But, while SDDP is 
clearly not just a variation on classical SDP, it may be seen as similar in the sense that it deals with 
water value functions that reflect expectations with respect to future water values. In fact its piecewise 
linear future water value functions are conceptually equivalent to the (step-wise) “demand curves for 
storage” built up by some implementations of the CDDP technique discussed in Section 2.4.27. But 
SDDP avoids some of the dimensionality issues associated with the classical DP, or CDDP, by 
determining marginal water value curves that are only accurate near the storage levels reached in some 
assumed scenario tree, and then iterating to improve those approximations of the future value functions, 
(Velasquez et al., 1999). SDDP reduces the issue of excessive scenario branching in classical SLP. 
Recently, Löhndorf et al. (2013) employed a modified SDDP method to solve a multi-reservoir 
optimization problem when hydropower generators participate in a wholesale electricity market. 
																																								 																				
6 Benders decomposition can be thought of an outer approximation method as it adds linear constraints to reduce 
the search region while safeguarding the original feasible region. 
7	Other CDDP variants build up piece-wise linear marginal water value curves, corresponding to derivatives of 
piece-wise quadratic water value curves.		
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SDDP has been used extensively to optimise and/or analyse hydro systems around the world. In 
particular it is used to clear “cost-based” markets operating in many Latin American countries with 
hydro dominated power systems, as discussed in Section 2.6.2.   
In this thesis, we apply both SLP and SDP techniques. Chapter 3 discusses deterministic, and then 
stochastic, LP-based water market clearing formulations whose dual solutions can be used to explore 
water market pricing implications spatially and temporally. Chapter 4 then uses those formulations to 
develop water market hedging instruments.  
The rest of the thesis deploys CDDP based methods to model the intra-period problem. A practical 
water market development would most likely employ an SLP formulation like this, because SLP can 
readily deal with a general catchment configuration involving multiple reservoirs. But each SLP 
solution only provides a decision policy starting from a single starting storage pattern. But the original 
motivation for this development was to provide a sub-model that could be used to perform pre-
computations for the longer term stochastic CDDP developed by Starkey (2014). And that, in turn was 
to provide a modelling environment within which an agent-based simulation model could be developed.   
2.5. Smart Markets for Electricity and Gas  
2.5.1. Background 
This thesis is about the development of model-based “smart” market approaches to improve 
coordination of some aspects of the water sector beyond what has been achieved, to date, by traditional 
optimization. So, having surveyed the achievements of traditional optimization in the sector, we now 
turn to consider what has been achieved by the model-based smart market approach to other sectors, 
particularly electricity and then, to a lesser extent, gas. The privatization/market reform process (see 
Gilbert & Kahn, 1996; Newbery, 2002; Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005, Sioshansi & Pfaffenberger, 2006, 
Joskow, 2008), institutional design (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1994), and market design issues (Bunn, 
2000; Green, 1996; Day et al., 2002) lie outside of the scope of this thesis. Here we focus on the core 
model-based market clearing processes, in an attempt to take advantage of what can been learnt from 
market reforms in those sectors to develop relevant models for water markets.   
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Both sectors have developed competitive “optimisation” markets which are configured as auctions and 
cleared using a mathematical program (Bichler et. al., 2010). McCabe et al., (1989) describe these 
auction-based commodity/natural resource markets as “smart markets”. A smart market model reduces 
transaction costs by increasing the amount of information available to the bidders and omitting the need 
to search for partners for pair-wise trading. The purpose of a smart market is to allocate commodities to 
maximize some social objectives. A market is created with price offering agents and a market clearing 
agent maximizes the economic surplus at the offered prices.  
This maximization problem is typically solved using mathematical optimisation techniques such as 
Linear Programming (LP), and improved computational facilities have enabled authorities to develop 
smart auction markets to efficiently allocate non-traditional commodities in a centralised pool. 
Generally, in the optimisation world, a non-linear optimisation problem with linear constraints may be 
approximated using a convex piecewise objective function, and solved in an LP fashion. Piecewise 
linearization has been commonly used to obtain feasible solutions in natural resource markets, too. For 
example, LP based commodity markets or electricity and gas determine dispatch schedules and 
locational marginal prices that maximize the benefits from trade while satisfying a set of physical 
network and economic constraints. These markets generally operate in networks, within which supply 
must equal demand at each node (Hobbs & Helman, 2003).  
2.5.2. Model-based Electricity “Spot” Markets  
Electricity is a public commodity often subject to uncertainty in supply, and transportation. Today, 
electricity in many countries is traded in competitive markets as a result of the recent thrust towards 
industry liberalisation and market reforms. Modern electricity market prices are generally determined in 
real-time, and self-adjusted to balance supply and demand. So load patterns, supply characteristics, 
network constraints and market forces influence these electricity “spot” prices.8 But electricity markets 
have distinct differences to other commodity markets. This is mainly due to non-storability of 
electricity and the way in which electricity flows strictly in accordance with physical laws, within 
																																								 																				
8 The current market price at which a commodity is bought or sold for immediate payment and delivery is known 
as the spot price.  
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transmission networks. In that context, markets can be cleared using deterministic optimization models, 
but they must correctly model the physical nature of the network, and flows within it. 
These complexities have drawn the attention of many research communities to analyzing the issues 
related to electricity sector. Schweppe et al., (1988) incorporate physical laws into the transmission 
pricing to form an economic dispatch model that allocates energy, accounting for losses and network 
constraints. In electricity markets, laws of electricity movement and the market must closely interact as 
a result of non-storability, the need for instantaneous physical transportation from a source to one or 
several load points, and the need for near real-time coordination (Ventosa et al., 2005; Hogan & 
Toulouse, 2008). Thus, physical supply and demand must balance in real time for a reliable grid 
operation. However, there could be real-time and/or ahead of time trading of power in the market9. 
Read & Chattopandhayay (1999) describe the structure of LP based electricity market clearing models.  
Buyers and sellers at each node in the network express offers and bids. An LP based auction model 
clears current, or near future (e.g. day-ahead) bids and offers across the network. Typically these 
markets are cleared at fixed time intervals. The LP solution matches the offers and bids submitted for a 
particular market clearing period and this provides both the optimal dispatch schedule and the nodal 
prices. The locational prices indicate the system marginal generation costs, marginal losses, and 
congestion. Wu et al., (1996) and Hsu (1997) describe the principles of nodal pricing, while Stoft 
(2002) and Kirschen & Strbac (2004) discuss the economics of such markets. All current electricity 




y|G − 𝑃}𝑞}~}|G   [2-7]	
Here 𝑏 and 𝑏 denote demand index and supply index respectively. 𝑃 and 𝑞 denote offer/bid price and 
quantity expressed by participants. The above objective function seeks to maximize the net benefits 
from trading in a spot market and will be subject to both physical and economic constraints such as 
generator capacities, consumption, transmission line capacities, and system security and reliability 
																																								 																				
9 Here we describe a typical “gross pool”, “uniform price” market. Other variants exist, such as the “pay-as-bid” 
UK (net) balancing market (Dettmer, 2002), but these lie outside the scope of this thesis.  
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requirements (Hogan, et al., 1996; Alvey et al., 1998; Ma et al, 1999). For the interest of simplicity, it 
was chosen not to express the constraint equations. Market settlement usually takes longer time 
intervals (e.g., end of month account balancing). 
Several recent studies discuss stochastic market clearing mechanisms. The need for an efficient 
stochastic market clearing mechanism has been discussed in the presence of a relatively large fraction 
of renewable capacity such as wind (Khazaei et al., 2013) and hydro. An SLP based market clearing 
model would consider the future clearing scenarios in the current decision. Such a market clearing 
model would depend on agents agreeing on probability distributions of future outcomes to yield the 
expected value of the solution (Wong & Fuller, 2007; Pritchard et al., 2010). The welfare maximization 
problem remains equivalent to a perfectly competitive market cleared using a multi-stage SLP when all 
participants are risk neutral and they have perfect access to information about the future hydrology 
conditions.  
2.5.3. Contracts and Hedging Mechanisms in Electricity Markets 
2.5.3.1. Trading Future Electricity  
The electricity prices produced by spot markets of the type described above can be quite volatile.  The 
desire to avoid being exposed to spot price variations has led to the development of forward markets 
and various contracting mechanisms. Hull (2006) and Wystup (2007) provide a detailed description of 
options and various other structured products/derivatives applicable for stock markets and commodity 
markets. Stoft et al., (1998), Deng & Oren (2006), provide details on electricity futures and derivatives. 
Perez-Arriaga (2010) explains various forms of financial contracts traded in electricity markets such as 
forward and futures, financial swaps, and contracts for difference (CfDs).  
Here we focus on CfDs and option products as we will develop analogous instruments for water 
markets in Chapter 4.  
A call option gives a participant the right, but not the obligation, to buy a pre-specified amount of 
power, 𝑄?, at an agreed “strike”, (or exercise) price, 𝑆𝑃?. If 𝜆? denotes the spot price, mathematically, 
the payout in time period 𝑡 is   
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆? − 𝑆𝑃? , 0 𝑄? [2-8] 
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Diagrammatically this option may be represented as in Figure 2-2A. Here the holder is not exposed to 
the risk of market clearing price rising above the strike price.   
 
Figure 2-2. Graphical illustrations of a call option pay-out and a CfD pay-out 
Second, a “put” option gives the holder the right to sell a given amount of MW at the strike price. 
Mathematically, the payout is:   
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑆𝑃? − 𝜆? 𝑄?, 0  [2-9] 
Then, a contract for difference (CfDs) can be thought of as a combination of a call and put option. 
Participants negotiate a strike price and a quantity. The buyer pays the seller the difference between 
strike price (𝑆𝑃?) and the spot price, (𝜆?) times the quantity, (𝑄?), if the former is higher. Otherwise the 
seller pays the buyer the difference between the two prices times the quantity.  
Mathematically, the payout is:  
𝜆? − 𝑆𝑃? 𝑄? [2-10] 
Diagrammatically, this option may be represented as in Figure 2-2B. 
Note that there is no physical delivery of energy associated with any of these financial products. They 
operate in parallel with the spot market, which can be cleared without any knowledge of who has 
contracted with whom, for what quantity, or at what price. Valuation and settlement follow normal 
capital market processes, and this attracts more participants into the market which helps to increase the 
liquidity.  But the commercial effect of a CfD is essentially the same as if the buyer actually took 
physical delivery of the agreed quantity, at the strike price, then traded the difference between that 
quantity and their actual consumption at the spot price. Mathematically we have: 
𝑆𝑃? − 𝜆? 𝑄? + 𝜆?𝑞?  [2-11]  
27	
	
By re-arranging the above we can see that the commercial effect for the seller is essentially the same as 
if they actually had to trade the difference between the agreed quantity and their actual output at the 
spot price, as on the RHS below: 
𝑆𝑃? − 𝜆? 𝑄? + 𝜆?𝑞? = 𝑆𝑃?𝑄? + 𝜆? 𝑞? − 𝑄?   [2-12] 
The key contribution of CfD-type instruments is that they can be traded, valued and settled without 
requiring a precise alignment with real-time physical reality. Economic equivalence does not mean that 
financial products deliver the physical energy. Thus Starkey (2014) discusses a range of wholesale 
water market design options, in which participants could also trade financial products informed by a 
centralized market-clearing. In Chapter 4, we assume the existence of a CfD-type market for water. We 
investigate deploying CfD-type instruments to hedge against inter-locational and inter-temporal price 
risks. But those instruments are more akin to the Financial Transmission rights discussed in the next 
section.   
2.5.3.2. Financial Transmission Rights  
Like any other tradable property right, a Financial Transmission Right (FTR) can be employed in 
variety of ways to raise market liquidity, provide security or hedge risk associated with the locational 
marginal prices (LMPs) (see Wu et al. (1996) and Hsu (1997)). When clearing the spot market, the ISO 
(Independent System Operator) typically receives a “settlement surplus” as there is a positive difference 
between consumer receipts and the generator payments. That surplus can be decomposed into loss 
rentals associated with convex rising marginal loss functions, and congestion rents generated by 
binding transmission capacity constraints are normally collected by the ISO during transmission 
congestion.  
A common approach to manage these surpluses is by defining virtual property rights such as FTRs 
(Hogan, 1992), stakeholder “shareholdings” (Read & Sell, 1989) or virtual shares (slices) of the system 




In particular, Hogan (1992) introduced the concept of “Financial Transmission Rights” (FTRs) defined 
on a point-to-point basis to enable participants to hedge against inter-locational price risks in a 
constrained electricity spot market.  
FTRs are path independent, but direction dependent. That is, an FTR defined from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 is of 
equal value, but opposite sign, to an FTR defined from node 𝑗 to node 𝑖. The FTR pay-off is for the 
entire contract quantity and thus independent of actual “usage”. They can be either obligation-inclusive 
(that is the FTR holder has the right to receive compensation but at the same time has an obligation to 
pay compensation when the locational marginal price difference is negative) or of (call) option type.  
That is10:  
𝐹𝑇𝑅 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 𝑄 [2-13] 
An FTR is a financial instrument that provides the holder no priority in physical transaction scheduling. 
Allocation of FTRs could be done in various ways (Lyons et al., 2000). Generally, FTRs are sold in a 
periodic auction (primary auction) and provide congestion insurance for a period sometime in the 
future. The need for revenue adequacy is a major consideration when allocating FTRs. That is, the 
revenues collected with locational marginal price differentials in the form of congestion payments in a 
particular period should be sufficient to support the payments to the FTR holder in that period. The 
simultaneous feasibility test11 ensures revenue adequacy of the re-configured FTRs (Harvey et al., 
1996). Hogan (1992) proves revenue adequacy for simultaneously feasible FTRs for lossless 
networks12. Bushnell & Stoft (1996) extend those results for quadratic losses, in which case the new 
feasible dispatch feasibility is determined using the appropriate “lossy flow equation” (Bushnell & 
Stoft, 1996). Later, Hogan (2000) includes non-linear constraints.  
FTR prices are updated continually as trading occurs in secondary markets. But there can be a large 
number of potential point-to-point combinations in an electricity network, and it will often be 
																																								 																				
10 An FTR option is defined as: 𝐹𝑇𝑅𝑂 	= 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄, 0  	
11 This ensures that all FTR issuances never exceed the physical capabilities of the transmission system.   





impossible to match buyers and sellers for rights between exactly the same pairs of points. Fortunately 
any set of FTRs may be decomposed into, and replaced by, any other set of FTRs, as long as the 
aggregate MW power flows are matched. Revenue adequacy can be guaranteed provided a net 
balancing of flows across the network can be achieved. To do this, the SO solves an LP to determine 
successful offers and bids for FTRs ensuring that the transmission system can support all FTR issues 
under normal system operating conditions.  
Chao & Peck (1996) later introduced the related concept of Flow Gate Rights (FGRs), which allow the 
holder to recover (some part of) the rents collected as a result of congestion for a specified line, or other 
“flow gate”13 (see, Chao et al., (2000)). The value of the FGR is determined by the “shadow price”14 
associated with the maximum transmission capacity of the physical flow gate.  
In chapter 4, we draw on these FTR and FGR concepts developed for electricity markets to describe 
and discuss similar water market hedging instruments. 
2.5.4. Agent Behaviour in Electricity Markets 
Although outside the scope of this study, issues such as the exercise of market power, market 
incompleteness, and risk aversion are somewhat related. So we briefly review some recent literature on 
these areas.    
2.5.4.1. Classical Market Power Modelling  
Researchers have used classical economic equilibrium models, and, more recently, agent based models 
to analyse market power issues, particularly the ability of a generating company to produce and 
dispatch supply offers above its marginal cost of generation. In this section, our focus is on economic 
equilibrium models.   
Day et al., (2002) provide a nice discussion on the use of equilibrium models for power markets. These 
models attempt to define a market equilibrium considering supply/demand bids and quantities, and 
sometimes transmission network conditions, subject to the first order conditions of each participant’s 
net benefit maximization problem. Day et al use a numerical method to analyze market power issues in 
																																								 																				
13  They are, in fact, closely related to the line-by-line shareholdings proposed by Read and Sell (1989). 	
14 This is the marginal benefit (cost) of relaxing (strengthening) the constraint. 
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large networks. Classical equilibrium models are based on different economic conjectures of 
competitive behaviour between a firm and its rivals. Widely used are pure competition (no market 
power), Bertrand (game in prices), Cournot (game in quantities), collusion, Stackelberg, and supply 
function equilibria (Tirole, 1998; Day et al., 2002; Li et al., 2004). Cournot models are commonly used 
because they are relatively tractable. Read & Chattopadhyay (1999) conclude that useful 
approximations to market behaviour can be obtained, even though the assumptions are clearly quite 
unrealistic.  
Transmission constraints make Cournot modelling more difficult, but models have been developed to 
study the exercise of market power at particular locations in a constrained power network (Oren, 1997; 
Rudkevich, 1999; Hobbs, 2001; Momoh, 2008). In particular, Rudkevich (1999) and Hobbs (2001) 
discuss strategic interaction on networks as the market power issues that can be caused by transmission 
limits.   
Hobbs & Helman (2003) provide a detailed tutorial on complementarity-based energy commodity 
market models and then compare alternative specifications of oligopolistic power markets subject to 
transmission constraints. These models represent the constrained optimization problems of electricity 
generators, consumers, and transmitters. The authors discuss the mixed complementarity problem 
(MCP) by defining the first-order optimality conditions for participants and market clearing conditions. 
Supply function equilibria provide a better conceptual model of market behaviour, but are much more 
difficult to solve. Still, Klemperer & Meyer, (1989) investigated this using continuously differentiable 
supply functions, in the presence of uncertain demand, while Green & Newbery (1992), Green (1996), 
and Anderson & Philpott (2002), studied the existence of supply function equilibria.  
We see considerable scope for future studies to develop similar models to analyze water market 
behaviour. But we do not attempt any such development in this study, because it seemed premature in a 
situation where more basic issues such as the mathematics and mechanics of market clearing and 
hedging have not yet been established. 
2.5.4.2. Hydro Generator Behaviour  
Given that this thesis is about water markets, the treatment and behaviour of hydro generators in 
electricity markets seems particularly relevant. Section 2.7.3 below discusses centrally-optimized or 
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cost-based” market structures, in which all hydro storage is effectively managed by the market operator, 
much as in the water markets discussed by Starkey et al (2012). But, in many deregulated electricity 
markets, hydropower firms generally manage their own storages in electricity market that is water 
storage being outside the market. Such a firm’s decision to trade depends on hydrology conditions and 
spot market prices and, of course, water storage levels. While the modelling and analysis of agent 
behaviour lies outside the thesis scope, we briefly survey the literature on two topics which will 
eventually prove relevant, if water markets of the kind discussed in this thesis are to be implemented.  			
Market Power 
Scott & Read (1996) appears to be the pioneering article that incorporates the optimal reservoir 
scheduling problem into a market context, where hydro firms possess significant market power. In a 
competitive market, the marginal value of storage is determined through electricity spot market prices 
subject to long-term contract prices. Scott & Read model Cournot game equilibrium strategies for 
generating firms in the presence of uncertain inflows allowing water demands to be represented by 
monotone non-increasing “demand curves”. Bushnell (1998) shows that the hydro generator enjoys a 
competitive advantage as a result of its storage capacity. Later Crampes & Moreaux (1999) proposed a 
model of competition between a thermal power station and a hydro generator. More recently, Garcia et 
al., (2001) have focused on the issue of strategic competition in electricity markets. Lino et al., (2003) 
noted that different ownership/management of price taker hydro firms in the same river cascade can 
distort the net welfare.  
Risk Aversion 
Steeger et al (2014) provide a literature review on the bidding problem in hydro-dominated electricity 
markets. They observe a few studies on the problem for price-taker hydro producers, but risk 
dimensions, and price-maker hydro producers, have attracted little attention. Read & Kerr, (1996) and 
Kerr (2003) adapted the CDDP model to deal with risk aversion by adding a dimension for accumulated 
wealth. This development was then incorporated, along with the gaming model of Scott and Read, into 
the two reservoir RAGE optimization model developed for ECNZ (see Read & Hindsberger, 2010). 
Pritchard et al., (2005) apply a dynamic programming approach to model a price taking hydro firm in a 
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pool electricity market. They represent each stage with many trading intervals to manage the time-step 
gap between the market trading periods and the reservoir planning periods.  
As noted above, there has been less attention paid in the literature to the issue of competitive 
equilibrium in hydro-dominated markets with risk-averse agents. But Philpott et al discuss the social 
welfare problem when the agents are risk averse with respect to hydrological conditions, concluding 
that hedging instruments could reduce welfare losses in a competitive equilibrium (Philpott et al., 
2013). They discuss some of the consequences of risk aversion on market outcomes, using a simple 
two-stage competitive equilibrium model with three agents. An agent’s attitude to risk is formed 
according to the theory of coherent risk measures. However, this approach may not fully represent 
situations such as high inflows favouring hydro-power agents and low inflows favouring thermal 
generators. As a result, agents must be willing to trade off risks, possibly through contracts, in order to 
bring the social planning problem closer to its optimality, Baker (2014). However, Philpott et al argues 
that the market for risk is incomplete in a similar way to the case identified by Lino et al., (2003), so 
actual market solutions will remain sub-optimal, from a societal perspective. 
2.5.4.3. Agent-based Methods 
During the last decade, several authors have attempted to model electricity markets using agent-based 
approaches. Our own interest in surveying this literature was motivated by the observation that, while 
agent behaviour would be an important issue in any future water market implementation, large scale 
game theoretic models were likely to prove intractable for systems involving complex interactions over 
both space and time. Thus it was originally intended to develop a simulation model along these lines, as 
part of this thesis. That has not proved possible, though, given the complexity of the issues uncovered 
in analysing the basic structure of market-clearing solutions, and potential hedging arrangements. 
Agents are autonomous decision-making units, who are assumed to behave strategically within their 
rational boundaries. Agent based models reveal interactions between agents who are often assumed to 
know nothing about other agents and the state of the market at the start. They are assumed to learn and 
adapt to new environment settings created by other agents. Thus agents may themselves select bidding 
strategies, rather than rely on those provided by the researcher. 
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For example, Tully & Kaye (1996) developed an algorithm based on agent-based techniques to select 
reservoir management strategies for generating companies. Visudhipan & Illic (1999) demonstrated an 
agent-based simulation for a spot market with uniform-price market clearing. They used a price-elastic 
demand curve to model electricity demand. Bower & Bunn (2000) performed an agent based simulation 
of the England and Wales electricity market. They compared various market mechanisms such as pool 
versus bilateral trading, daily versus hourly bids, learning through repetition and availability of market 
information. Generating agents bid on a single electricity market. A price-inelastic aggregate demand 
curve was used to determine the electricity demand. Bunn & Oliveira, (2001) assumed that agents were 
capable of assessing their market share, contract cover, retail price, and forecasting errors. Bower & 
Bunn, (2000) and Bower et al., (2001) demonstrated the ability of generating agents to achieve 
maximum profits at a given plant utilization using a simple reinforcement learning algorithm. Micola, 
et al., (2008) used an agent based simulation approach to model natural gas and electricity markets. 
Weidlich & Veit (2008) reviewed different agent learning algorithms developed by Richter & Sheblé, 
(1998), Richter, et al., (1999), Sun & Tesfatsion, (2007), and Tellidou & Bakirtzis, (2007) used in the 
electricity market literature to analyze agent behaviour. However, they highlighted that no clear 
justification was given for using certain algorithms, while most agent-based studies employed 
simplified system models, such as neglecting transmission grid constraints, and treating demand as 
fixed.   
Why have researchers searched for alternatives to the classical modeling approach? One criticism of 
existing models was not being able to capture system dynamics. Static models are ill-suited to model 
intelligent behavior of participants (agents) in the market. Furthermore, traditional economic models 
“tend to look at an industry in aggregate, from the ‘top down’” (Bower, et al., 2001). On the other hand, 
Weidlich & Veit (2008) emphasized the need of more rich and flexible models to capture network 
complexities and market dynamics. Saguan et al (2001) compared game theoretic and agent based 
economics approaches for assessing market power in electricity markets, concluding that the agent 
based approach is a “useful tool to evaluate and compare results with other approaches”.  
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2.6. Model-based Markets with Storage and Delays 
Our discussion of model-based electricity markets in Section 2.5 focussed solely on “spot markets”, in 
which electricity, as the product being traded, is transported instantly, and cannot be stored.  In that 
context, a deterministic market clearing model is clearly adequate. While long term trading is 
important, it can be accomplished by trading financial instruments, independently of the spot market. 
The situation is clearly different for water, though, because it is not transported instantly, and can be 
stored. Before we consider water markets, though, there are already two types of model-based market in 
which inter-temporal optimisation is performed: the Victorian gas markets, and several Latin American 
hydro dominated electricity markets. 
2.6.1. Model-based Gas Markets 
There has been much less development, or analysis, of model-based markets for gas than there has for 
electricity. But we briefly survey the limited literature because, like water but unlike electricity, gas 
flows through both space and time. Like electricity, compressed gas flows through a network according 
to a set of physical laws, in this case from higher to lower pressure.  And the flow may even split, at 
uncontrolled junctions, in a manner similar to electricity. But, unlike electricity, the transportation 
system itself can become a storage medium for gas (Bushnell, 1998), and this “line-pack” is used 
extensively to control the way in which gas is delivered when and where required, just as in water 
storage systems. The equations also imply that there can be uncontrollable time delays for gas flows 
between nodes, just as on channels between nodes in a water transport system. For both reasons, we can 
and must relax the real time coordination requirement usual in electricity systems.   
According to Zheng et al. (2010), previous research studies on natural gas market models have focused 
on issues such as regulation (O’Neill et al. 1979), social welfare maximization in natural gas 
equilibrium models (Gabriel et al. 2003), gas system analysis models (Brooks, 2003), gas pricing 
(Tzoannos, 1977; Pepper & Lo, 1999), gas production optimization, gas transportation network 
development and operations. Several articles study problems such as gas compressor operation 
optimization and physical gas flow transportation optimization. For example, De Wolf & Smeers 
(2000) and Pepper et al. (2012) discuss a range of linearization approaches to be applied to physical gas 
flow dispatch problem.  
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The Australian state of Victoria seems to have been the only jurisdiction to introduce a model-based gas 
market, similar to those described above for electricity, and proposed here for water. Read et al. (2012) 
describe primal and dual LP inter-locational and inter-temporal market clearing models analogous to 
LMP models used in electricity sector. That model could actually be adapted to provide a short term 
market-clearing model for water flowing in pressurised pipes. Fortunately, this thesis relates to the 
dynamics of water flow over longer periods, and/or in open channels, which is much simpler. Thus, 
while the basic concept of the market-clearing formulation developed in Chapter 3 is derived from Read 
et al, it is much simpler.    
Read et al also propose several types of financial products to hedge against locational and temporal 
price differences. In particular, they highlight the need to find simultaneously feasible combinations of 
inter-locational/temporal equivalents to the FTRs employed in electricity markets in an integrated 
market, instead of clearing separate markets in inter-locational and inter-temporal instruments. In 
Chapter 4 we discuss the creation of water market hedging instruments to hedge against price 
differentials across both space and time differentials.  In our case, though, those instruments relate to 
separate system components (storage reservoirs and transportation channels), and can be traded 
separately.15 
2.6.2. Treatment of Hydro in Model-based Electricity Markets 
Hydroelectric production accounts for the largest share of power production in Norway (99%), Brazil 
(90%), New Zealand (65%), Canada (62%), and many other countries. The presence of hydroelectric 
generators means that inter-temporal optimisation must be handled somehow in the electricity market 
context, as reservoirs can store water for later production of energy. When electricity markets are 
cleared using deterministic real-time models they must ignore this aspect of the situation and assume 
that any internal constraints of generators have already been accounted for within bid offers.16 For 
																																								 																				
15  But we do propose a similar approach when a single arc can transport water from one node and time to another 
node and time (see Section 3.4.4). 
16 “Spot markets” that employ inter-temporal optimization over, say, the day ahead represents an intermediate 
case. Such markets routinely perform inter-temporal optimization of thermal unit commitment etc, and could, in 
principle, do the same for short term management of water in river chains. Participants would offer a river chain 
model, plus end-of-day marginal water value curves, with storage targets for small head ponds as a special case.  
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example in New Zealand, both hydro and thermal participants submit their offers irrespective of the 
fuel type (Alvey et al., 1998). Supply offers and demand bids are cleared a day ahead producing pre-
dispatch schedules and price forecasts. This implies that the hydro generator could be facing a 
restriction on the amount of stored water available for use over the horizon.  
But here we discuss the treatment of hydro power generators under two alternative approaches. The 
“centrally optimised” (cost-based) approach has been extensively employed in Latin America. And 
various forms of the “virtual reservoir” approach, have been implemented, or proposed, in some places.      
2.6.2.1. The Centrally Optimised Approach in Latin America 
In contrast to bid based markets, most Latin American markets are cleared using a centralised inter-
temporal optimisation, which Mastropietro et al (2014) and Mastropietro et al (2015) describe as “cost-
based”. This description is partly justified by the fact that many of these markets do actually regulate 
the costs that participants are allowed to offer. But actually the same centralised optimisation approach 
could be taken with participants freely offering thermal cost curves, end-of-horizon marginal water 
values, reservoir capacity, and river chain models, as was originally proposed for the day-ahead New 
Zealand market.17 The central issue driving the perceived need for inter-temporal optimisation is the 
difficulty in managing inter-connected large hydro systems. That difficulty is compounded by the fact 
that, in many of those countries, cascaded and multi-party owned hydro reservoirs are spread over 
several river systems, and are able to provide storage capacity for power production for several years. 
The SO seeks to optimize long term system operations considering the availability of hydro and thermal 
plants, reservoir levels, and forecasted future inflows. The value of water use in all reservoirs over time 
has to be accounted for when deciding the marginal value (non-bid based) for water in any one 
reservoir. The SDDP model is popularly applied to construct a large number of hypothetical future 
marginal water value curves for all reservoirs, and determines hypothetical future releases for a large 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																
The market-clearing LP would then endogenously determine marginal water values for each storage in the chain, 
in each market dispatch interval, and hence implicitly offer curves for each station and period. The effect would 
be somewhat similar to the Latin American market regime described below, only over a much shorter time scale 
within which deterministic optimization may be acceptable. This approach does not seem to have been adopted 
anywhere, but the concept was extensively tested by Drayton-Bright (1997), prior to development of the New 
Zealand electricity market described here.  
17 See footnote above.	
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number of inflow scenarios. And those releases are driven by upstream/downstream differences in those 
values, and thus often relate to reservoirs outside the owner’s control. In reality, those hypothetical 
future marginal water value curves and releases play no direct role in the market.    
Detailed study of Latin American Electricity markets are beyond the scope of this thesis, but interested 
readers are directed to the following literature: long-term markets of reliability products (Moreno et al. 
2009 & 2010), capacity expansion (Porrua et al, 2007; Batlle et al., 2010; Rudnick et al, 2012), 
regulation (Mastropietro et al, 2015). But the key point is that this centralized and cost-based 
optimization model can be thought of as a “water market” clearing model, except that here water only 
has one assumed use, and may be represented in equivalent energy terms. It is also similar to the water 
markets described below, in both situations the dispatch instructions are centrally made with the 
objective of maximizing the net benefit. But the focus of this thesis is mainly allocating storable surface 
water for both consumptive and non-consumptive uses in a catchment via a market based approach.  
2.6.2.2. The Virtual Models for Reservoir Management in Competitive Markets 
Barroso et al., (2012) describe general contracting mechanisms that help to develop “virtual reservoirs” 
to be managed by competing traders. Then authors analyze some existing regimes such as the Brazilian 
Energy Reallocation Mechanism, a virtual power plant agreement between Argentina and Uruguay 
(cited in Barroso et al (2012)), and the Churchill River catchment in Canada (Churchill River Water 
Management Agreement, 2009) and proposed regimes such as upstream/downstream coordination in 
New Zealand, competing traders in Tasmania, and in Brazil.18 Perhaps the clearest example of such a 
regime working in practice is the Columbia River catchment agreement described by (BPA, 1999).   
Such schemes could operate as an alternative system-wide market concept to any of the above, but they 
have mostly been designed to allow competitive coordination of particular river basins, in the context of 
a broader electricity market. An example is the Tasmanian proposal of Hunt et al., (2012).  
Chapter 3 extends the work of Barrosso et al, (2012) by describing an alternative “virtual reservoir” 
approach to creating a water market, in situations where common resources must be shared between 
																																								 																				
18 Hughes et al. (2013) discuss similar regimes already in operation in the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, but 
those are not in an electricity market context. 
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several parties who want to act independently of each other, rather than accept solutions produced by a 
central market-clearing optimisation model.  
2.7. Markets for Water 
2.7.1. Pre-market Water Exchange Mechanisms 
Many water professionals have utilized an integrated water resource management approach, which 
depends on the four principles expounded at the Dublin conference on Water and Environment in 1992, 
for managing the water resource (Tilmant et. al., 2008). The idea of commoditizing water resources is 
supported by the fourth principle: “Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognized as an economic good…” (United Nations, 1992) and this debate has been featured 
frequently in the water resources literature for the last several years. Economists have repeatedly 
pointed out the need for transferable private property rights for environmental resources such as water 
which is usually treated as common pool, publicly owned, resources (Coase, 1960; Tietenberg, 2003)19. 
Hence, the task of assessing water value has become an important aspect in almost every activity of 
water use. Economic valuation of a finite, but renewable resource (e.g. water) may not be that simple or 
straightforward. The marginal water value represents the utilization of the next unit of water from any 
type of use (such as consumptive or non-consumptive, public or private). Interested readers are referred 
to the works of Gibbons, (1986), Loomis, (1987), and Colby, (1989), who have studied the issue of 
water values in alternative use 
2.7.2.  Implemented Water Market Developments 
According to Saliba & Bush (1987) a market for water is defined as the “interactions of actual or 
potential buyers and sellers over one or more interrelated water commodities.” There are formal and 
informal water trading arrangements already in operation in various parts of the world (Easter et al., 
1998; Calatrava & Garrido, 2006). 
These include informal water markets in South Asia (Thobanl, 1997), a market for ground water 
abstraction in Pakistan (Jacoby et al., 2001), an indirect water market in France (Dinar & Subramanian, 
																																								 																				
19 Coase (1960) pioneered the theory of tradable permits. Coase argued that the tradable property rights approach 
better handles negative externalities over the Pigouvian solution method (Chao & Peck, 1996).  
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1997), a market for irrigation supplies in Israel (Tsur, 2009), markets for water in Chile (Hadjigeorgalis 
& Lillywhite, 2004; Bauer, 2015; Hearne & Donoso, 2014), and water markets in the U.S. (Michelsen 
et al., 2000). A formal market normally trades long-term water entitlements (Bjornlund, 2004) and they 
mainly focus on allocating water for agricultural use. Easter et al. (1998) provide evidence for both spot 
and option trading in the rural United States, while Hanak (2002) and Griffin & Characklis (2002) 
further describe water market arrangements in California and Texas. Bjornlund (2004) describes water 
market developments for agricultural use in Australia, while Anderson & Snyder (1997), Bjornlund & 
McKay (1998), Young & McColl, (2007) and Zaman et al. (2009) all report on the growth in water 
markets in Australia. For example, Waterfind, established in 2003, facilitates trading permanent and 
temporary water allocations across major irrigations regions in Australia via an online trading portal, 
Waterfind (2013). In Chile, the water sector reform process has been reportedly a significant success. It 
gave an opportunity for agriculturalists to acquire water for higher value agricultural products 
(Schleyer, 1992; Hearne & Easter, 1995). Regional water markets reported significant gains from 
trading water/water rights (Hearne & Easter, 1995). 	
2.7.3. Water Markets Research 
The previous section describes some real experiences with water markets around the world. However, 
much of the literature is still focused on defending water market proposals over existing water 
allocation regimes as the preferred method from the point of view of economic efficiency. Some papers 
evaluate economic effects of non-market re-allocations and resource transfer from one user to another. 
This is generally done through centrally planned social welfare LP/DP optimization models (see Vaux 
& Howitt (1984), Rosegrant & Binswanger (1994); and Calatrava & Garrido (2006)).  
The works of Easter et al., (1998), Lino et al., (2003) and Ambec & Doucet (2003), attempt to draw 
lessons for water market developments from the electricity market literature. Second, according to 
Ambec & Doucet (2003), the absence of markets for water could sometimes lead to sub-optimal 
management of water resources and exercise of market power. Similarly, Lino et al., (2003) studied the 
issue of market incompleteness and noted the importance of remunerating reservoirs for their economic 
contribution to the hydro system. On the other hand, there is a strong possibility of developing a 
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spectrum of product trading opportunities such as spot, forwards, futures, and options, as in electricity 
markets, to trade storable surface water due to a number of analogies between the two resources (Easter 
et al., 1998). 
Some articles propose various institutional arrangements to set up hypothetical water markets that trade 
either spot water or rights (Vaux & Howitt, 1984, Garrido, 2007). Rosegrant et al. (2000) report intra-
seasonal gains from trade Maipo basin in Chile. Recently, Qureshi et al. (2009) provide evidence of 
economic gains from water trading in Australia. Garrick et al (2009) discuss the enabling conditions for 
water market policy reform and implementation. Other authors including Brennan (2008), and Hughes 
& Goesch (2009), discuss the reform process of water storage rights in Australia.  
Smart market models for water seems to have pioneered by Dinar et al (1998) and Murphy et al (2000). 
Murphy et al. (2009) represented in-stream flow via an environmental agent who submits demand bids 
in the water market. Several detailed smart market design options for water, and associated 
“commodities” have been proposed by the Water Management Research Group (WMRG) at the 
University of Canterbury, in New Zealand. These include market-clearing models for nitrates 
transported via subterranean water (Prabodanie & Raffensperger, 2007), water pollution (Prabodinie et 
al., 2010) and sediment discharge (Pinto et al., 2012). These models all seek to allocate the natural 
resources via respective transportation networks, with trading at prices determined by shadow prices on 
the critical resource constraints. Most of them employ deterministic optimization models, but the last 
uses SLP as it considers uncertainty of rainfall events. 
With respect to water markets, as such, Raffensperger et al (2009) illustrate a low cost market based 
approach to allocate ground water rights among participants who draw irrigation water from a joint 
aquifer. That model employs deterministic optimisation. Starkey et al., (2011) and Starkey (2014) 
outline several types of simple to sophisticated water market design options that might employ 
stochastic optimisation to clear a market for surface water in a reservoir-based system with variable 
hydrology driven by variable weather changes, in surface water. In all cases dual prices on water 
availability constraints are used as market clearing prices. The authors discuss how each market 
interface and/or clearing option could handle uncertain future inflows and demands. Participant’s bids 
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reflect their future demand for water, and could be binding or merely indicative. They could be for 
fixed quantities, or depend on a hydrological index. They could trade physical contracts or financial 
instruments. And quantities could be determined directly by the optimisation, or the market manager 
could employ statistical methods to determine the final allocation. Or the whole market could be merely 
indicative, merely informing participants who would arrange their own trades, perhaps directly, or 
through an independently managed futures market.   
In a sense, the proposal that “financial instruments” be traded, rather than “future physical water” builds 
on some earlier work proposals in the literature. Hamilton et al. (1989) discuss long-term option 
contracts formed between agriculturalists and hydropower users to allocate water from agriculture to 
power generation during low flow periods. Michelsen & Young (1993) propose option contracts as a 
“less expensive institutional arrangement” to temporarily allocate irrigation water rights to non-
irrigation uses during drought periods. Early studies such as Miller (1996) and Howitt et al (1998) 
discuss how different spot and rights markets could help to stabilize water availability. Brown & 
Carriquiry, (2007) highlight potential welfare gains from diverting water from low valued use to high 
valued use during low inflow periods using an option-contract arrangement.  
For our purposes, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will assume that a water market exists and is cleared by 
solving a stochastic formulation such as that described in Starkey (2014). Starkey actually favours a 
centrally cleared market trading a mix of fixed and proportional “futures” products.  But we will 
assume a simpler arrangement, under which the market trades spot water and financial contracts for 
fixed volume long term water and index based inflows as further discussed in Section 4.2.1. The focus 
of those chapters is then on developing financial instruments to complement such markets, by hedging 
price differences over space and time, just as FTRs complement markets in financial contracts for 
future electricity. 	
2.8. Chapter Conclusions 
This Chapter has noted the importance of water allocation issues, and discussed traditional approaches 
to optimization of water resources allocation. But it has also focused on the way in which similar 
commodities such as electricity and natural gas are traded through “smart markets”, which are, typically 
42	
	
cleared using an LP based optimization model, subject to constraints representing a transportation 
network. Thus, we surveyed the literature on model-based electricity and natural gas market models, 
along with the emerging literature on applying similar approaches to trading storable surface water 
under uncertainty.   
From that survey, it would appear that no consideration has yet been given to developing, model-based 
markets for surface water in mixed-used catchments involving consumptive, non-consumptive, in-
stream, and environmental users. Nor has there been any detailed analysis of the structure of solutions 
that would emerge for such mixed participants, or the locational/temporal structure of the prices in such 
a system. So the major part of this study (Chapter 5 to Chapter 8) develops intra-period CDDP pre- 
computation models that clear mixed-use water markets in catchments with one or two reservoirs. This 
work builds on several CDDP developments previously implemented in New Zealand. It produces 
marginal water value functions that can be interpreted as demand curves for water released from the 
long term reservoir storage, and these could be employed within a long term stochastic market-clearing 
model such as that of Starkey (2015). The way in which consumptive and non-consumptive use value 
functions combine in forming these curves also provides insights into how economic incentives operate 
in a multi-user nodal river catchment.   
One other obvious gap in the literature is that no hedging instruments have been proposed to deal with 
the inter-temporal and inter-locational risks that would arise when trading in such a catchment. But we 
expect that such instruments will be required to support efficient water trading between locations, and 
between periods, just as FTRs are required to support efficient trading between locations, in electricity 
markets.  So the earlier part of this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) draw on electricity market analogies, and 
particularly the FTR literature, to develop an SLP formulation for the water market clearing problem, 
broadly following Starkey (2015), and a set of financial instruments to hedge against the inter-





3. LP-based water market price analysis and financial hedging instruments	
Primal and dual water market optimization models    
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate how to clear a market for hydrology dependent surface 
water supplies to optimise both consumptive and non-consumptive water use across space and time. It 
does so by developing a general LP formulation that could be used to clear markets in which water is 
traded between water users of various types, both consumptive users and non-consumptive users, or by 
a catchment manager to optimise integrated operations. The benefits these users receive can be 
modelled directly, or as market bids at points within a river catchment, which forms part of the market 
clearing model. A market bid reflects users’ willingness to pay as a measure of her benefit from water 
consumption, or flow. Water can be traded in the present, on the “spot market”, but that leads us to ask 
how much water to save in storage for future release? The market framework discussed here assumes 
that both release and storage decisions are taken by the market, which is periodically re-cleared to 
account for changes in participant bid/offers, and in hydrological conditions.  
This chapter is organised in the following way. Section 3.2 highlights relevant literature on LP based 
commodity market models, while Section 3.3 presents a deterministic multi-period nodal LP-based 
water market model. Section 3.4 describes how to allocate costs associated with arc flows yielding joint 
benefits. Section 3.5 presents a general form of stochastic multi-nodal multi-stage benefit maximising 
model, following the event tree formulation approach. Finally, Section 3.6 presents Chapter Summary.        
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3.2 LP-based Market Models   
The literature on LP based surface water network market modelling starts with MaCabe et al. (1991) 
and Dinar et al (1998). Murphy et al (2000) illustrated how to achieve an efficient water allocation 
using auction based mechanisms. Recently, the same authors have studied some important issues such 
as environmental use and in-stream flow values in water markets (Murphy et al., 2009; Murphy & 
Stranlund, 2003).  
On the other hand, Labadie (2004) surveys several non-market network reservoir optimization models 
(see for example, Bertsekas & Tseng (1994), Hsu & Cheng (2002), Labadie & Baldo (2001)). These 
models use nodes to represent storages or non-storage points (e.g., confluence, flow off-take) and arcs 
to represent reservoir releases, conveyer flows, and storage transfers over time. In the majority of water 
cases, piecewise linearization of the non-linear cost (benefit) functions is believed to give a good 
enough approximation to model the problem with an LP/SLP (Dupacová et al., 1991). More recent 
literature discusses a number of water market issues such as locational marginal prices, revenue 
adequacy (Raffensperger, 2009) and in-stream flow values. However, except for Starkey et al. (2011), 
these papers rarely focus on hedging instruments such as arc flow capacity rights and contracts. 
Unlike the water sector, the electricity market literature refers to many LP based auction models (e.g., 
Hogan, 1992; Alvey et al, 1996; Read et al. 1998). Schweppe et al. (1988) first modelled nodal energy 
prices for power electricity networks. The economic dispatch model allocates electricity generation 
optimally, accounting for the costs of losses, and network constraints. Hogan (1992, 1993) studied the 
full complexity of the AC power system, based on the AC optimal power flow formulation. His ex post 
pricing approach determines the locational marginal prices which can be used in a single period 
settlement model for wholesale electricity market transactions. Later, Hogan et al. (1996) presented a 
generalized dispatch based pricing framework which could explain active and reactive nodal prices 
basing upon Hogan (1992, 1993). The locational electricity prices reflect how the physics of current 
flow in a network, and the economics of trading a commodity in a network, influence the marginal cost 
of supplying energy. Even though the physical attributes of electricity and water are quite different, we 




Section 3.3 presents a basic LP model (multi-period, deterministic) to demonstrate some important 
price relationships in the market. This helps us to understand wider network flow issues later. 
3.3 Multi-period Deterministic Nodal LP for a Water Market in a Tree Structured 
Catchment 
Storable surface water supplies are uncertain and differentiated spatially and temporally. Typically, 
water is stored in reservoirs and within the transfer network. This stored water would have opportunity 
values for consumptive use and sometimes for non-consumptive use. For example, many power 
systems rely, in part, on hydro-electric power generation, which often occurs in catchments where other 
parties also value water for competing or complementary uses. Typically a hydro reservoir system 
includes water stored for later use in interconnected storages and a complex network of water ways 
with different users distributed geographically (e.g. Waitaki river catchment in New Zealand, Mahaweli 
Scheme in Sri Lanka).  
In this chapter, though, we formulate a multi period mathematical programming model for a simplified 
network model based on the following assumptions. It clears a nodal water market in a catchment with 
a single long term storage reservoir, over a planning horizon, assuming known bids and inflows. Our 
market clearing model described here relates to the operation of the network in the short to medium 
term. Typically, an annual time horizon is assumed for the following developments20. A typical market 
optimization model seeks to maximise the producer (seller) and consumer (buyer) surpluses to 
maximise the net welfare to the society. The purpose of our mathematical programming based market is 
to allocate water resource to maximise the net welfare21.  
We assume the catchment network has a single long-term storage reservoir (at the root) and a tree 
structure, which might extend downstream and/or upstream from the reservoir. Due to the tree-
structure, each non-root node has a parent node, being the neighbouring node on the unique path 
towards the reservoir. Even though this chapter assumes a set of interconnected nodes radiating in a tree 
																																								 																				
20 System performance in the long run equilibrium is outside the thesis scope. 
21 A market is formulated assuming price taking agents and a market clearing agent maximises surplus at the 
marginal prices. Market water flow is determined by the joint impact of bids and gravity. However, the impact of 
the latter is not accounted for in the model.	
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structure from the reservoir, we illustrate some limited applications of this procedure for non-tree 
structures within a nodal network in Chapter 5. A node’s parent may be either upstream or downstream, 
depending on how it is situated with respect to the reservoir. Moreover, assume there is no loss of water 
between periods (e.g., evaporation, leakages).  
In a perfectly competitive market, consumers and producers would express bids reflecting their, 
marginal benefit of consumption, and offers reflecting their marginal cost of supply. For this thesis we 
assume that all bids and offers do this. The costs and benefits of consumptive and non-consumptive use 
at different locations are assumed to be independent of one another. That is, water use in one location 
does not affect costs and benefits in other locations. This single reservoir mixed-use multi-nodal 
problem can be formulated as an LP model22, given the user bids and offers form monotone decreasing 
piecewise constant marginal benefit functions as in electricity market clearing models. Following 
Starkey (2014), we form a set of net demand bids by concatenating the nodal demand bid set 𝑛𝑏{ and 
the nodal supply bid set 𝑛𝑏 such that 𝑛𝑏 = 𝑛𝑏{ ∪ 𝑛𝑏
23. Then the final bid set, 𝑛𝑏, is stacked in 
monotone, non-increasing price order to construct the net nodal demand curve.  In Chapter 5, we will 
show how to construct a nodal net demand curve when several types of consumptive users (e.g., 
agricultural, distributary) exist at a node. 
Note that the following formulation does not consider “consumptive” supply, although that extension is 
simple. Non-consumptive pumping bids can be either represented by assigning appropriate signs or 
declaring new variables for the marginal water value (to reflect the cost) and the quantity (to reflect 
flow direction). We follow the former approach when we discuss risk management aspects of pumping 
applications in the next chapter.  
																																								 																				
22 The LP is formulated as a “gross pool”, “uniform price” market which is independent from the initial position 
of property rights. That is the market requires the participants to bid for quantities starting from zero, ignoring any 
initial holdings. There will be equivalent bid and offers created for each participant based on her contract position 
including in the case of a participant with existing rights choose not to trade them in a market clearing round. The 
issue of settlement surplus discussed in Chapter 4.2.3 arises as a result of these net differences in trading.    
23 Net inflows to the reservoir and tributary flows to the downstream nodes are treated as zero cost supply offers. 
We defer discussing the issue of ownership of inflows and other resource constants appearing in the RHS of the 
constraints in the below formulation to Chapter 4.   
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Linear constraints represent reservoir storage balance, and arc flow and storage capacity bounds. Future 
inflows are exogenous parameters which are really stochastic and unknown, but are assumed to be 
known in the following deterministic formulation. We assume a non-pressurised water transportation 
network (e.g., channel/canal system), in which it is assumed to take no time to send water from an 
upstream node to a downstream one. Chapter 8 discusses transportation delay issues in a networked 
water system, but this chapter does not model transfer delays. It is assumed that water is traded over a 
long enough period of time that intra-period transport can be treated as more-or-less instantaneous. 
Further, this thesis will not consider water quality issues, other than indirectly through constraints on 
water flow or storage levels.  
The first part of Section 3.3.1 declares the indices, parameters and decision variables used in the LP 
formulation. The dual variable(s) associated with each constraint are listed to the right of the (primal) 
constraints. Section 3.3.2 explains both primal and dual formulations, and how they determine prices in 
the water market.       
3.3.1 Primal Formulation and Primal/Dual Variables  
Nomenclature 
Indices 
𝑏	 = 	1,2, … . . 𝐵 : Usage (consumptive or non-consumptive) bid tranche (or step).  
𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1,2, … . . 𝑛: Nodes, where 𝑖, 𝑗  denotes an arc belonging to the set 𝐴, of arcs in the 
network. Node 0 is the only long term storage reservoir in the network. 
𝑘 = 0,1,2, …: Non-consumptive users. Ω denotes the non-consumptive user set for the network, 
where 𝑘 ∈ Ω 𝑖, 𝑗 ⊂ Ω indexes those non-consumptive users on arc (𝑖, 𝑗). The empty 
set Ω 𝑖, 𝑗 = ϕ denotes no non-consumptive users on arc (𝑖, 𝑗). The notation 
𝑖 𝑘 , 𝑗 𝑘  is used to indicate the arc for non-consumptive user 𝑘, so that 𝑘 ∈
Ω 𝑖 𝑘 , 𝑗 𝑘 24. 
																																								 																				
24 Two distinct 𝑘 indices on the same arc represent two non-consumptive uses in series. 
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𝑚 = 1,2, …𝑀: End of horizon storage “bid” tranche. Here each participant could submit a set of bid 
tranches.25 Otherwise we assume that the market manager uses the previous price 
information to estimate the marginal water value of storing water beyond the current 
planning horizon. 	
𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇: Time period. Period 𝑡	 = 	1 is the current period (e.g., week). 𝑇 denotes the last period 
of the planning horizon.	
Parameters 
𝑋: Lower arc flow bound of arc 𝑖	𝑗 .	
𝑋: Upper arc flow bound of arc 𝑖	𝑗 . 
𝑃,? : Consumptive bid price for water demand quantity 𝑞,,? at node 𝑖, tranche 𝑏, period 𝑡. 
𝑃,? : Non-consumptive bid price for water flow demand quantity 𝑥,?  on some arc, tranche 𝑏, period 
𝑡. 
𝑉o: End-of-period bid price for storage demand quantity 𝑠o , tranche 𝑚, period t.  
𝑓?: Uncontrollable tributary flows coming into node 𝑖, time period 𝑡. 
𝑆: Upper bounds on 𝑠L? , assumed constant for  𝑡	 = 1,2,3 …	 Let the lower bounds on 𝑠L?  is 𝑆 = 0. 
𝑌,? : Upper bounds for non-consumptive bid tranches. 
𝑄,? : Upper bounds for consumptive bid tranches. 
𝑆Lo : Upper bounds for the end-of-horizon bid tranches. 
Decision Variables 
𝑞,? : Flow off-takes for consumptive/distributary use valued at bid price 𝑃,? , tranche 𝑏, in time 
period 𝑡. 
𝑞?: Total nodal flow off-takes in time period 𝑡. 
𝑦,? : Non-consumptive arc flow use valued at bid price  𝑃,? . 
𝑥,? : Flow through arc 𝑖 → 𝑗 in time period 𝑡. 
𝑠L?: End-of-period storage volume at the reservoir node 0 for time period 𝑡.  
																																								 																				
25  Starkey discusses the possibility of indicative bids but, for simplicity we will assume all bids to be binding.	
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𝑠Lo : End-of-horizon reservoir storage volume valued at 𝑉o: 
𝑧?: Spill at node 𝑖 in time period 𝑡. 
Model 












Flow balance at nodes (net flow injection): 
𝑞? + 	 𝑥,?, ∈ − 𝑥,? + 𝑧? = 𝑓?, ∈ 	 , ∀	𝑖 ≠ 0, 𝑡 : 𝜆,? [3.2a] 
Storage flow balance: 
𝑥L,?L, ∈ − 𝑥,L? − 𝑠L?IG + 𝑠L? + 𝑧L? = 𝑓L?,L ∈ 	 , ∀	𝑡 : 𝜆L,? [3.2b] 
Storage bounds: 
0 ≤ 𝑠L? ≤ 𝑆,			∀	𝑡	  : 𝛾?I, 𝛾?F [3.3a] 
Initial storage conditions: 
𝑠LL = 	 𝑆LL				  : 𝛾L [3.3b]  
Nodal spill bounds: 
0 ≤ 𝑧?					∀	𝑖, 𝑡  :	𝜉,?I  [3.3c] 
End-of-horizon storage conditions: 
𝑠Lo = 	 𝑠Lo				 : 𝜍oFG [3.3d] 
Bounds on end-of-horizon storage bid tranches: 
0 ≤ 𝑠Lo ≤ 𝑆Lo  : 𝜗,oI , 𝜗,oF  [3.3e] 
Upper and lower arc flow bounds:  
𝑋, ≤ 𝑥,? ≤ 𝑋,					∀	𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗   :	𝜇 , ,?
I , 𝜇 , ,?
F  [3.4a] 
Arc flow non-consumptive use limit: 
𝑦,? = 	 𝑥  , 
? 						∀𝑡, 𝑘 ∈Ω		  : 𝜔,? [3.5a] 
Bounds on non-consumptive use bid tranches: 
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0 ≤ 𝑦,? ≤ 𝑌,? 								∀	𝑏, 𝑡, 𝑘 ∈Ω		   : 𝜌,,?I , 𝜌,,?F   [3.5b]
26 
Consumptive and distributary use: 
𝑞,? = 	 𝑞?		∀	𝑖, 𝑡  : 𝜐,?  [3.6a] 
Bounds on consumptive use bid tranches:  
0 ≤ 𝑞,? ≤ 𝑄,? 			∀	𝑖, 𝑏, 𝑡  :	𝜎,,?I , 𝜎,,?F  [3.6b]
27 
Explanation 
[3.1] The objective function seeks to clear the water market by maximising the release benefits, plus 
future storage benefits, assuming that the bids represent the true economic contribution of the 
water used by activities across the network. The objective function coefficients 𝑃,?  and 𝑃,?  
(participant bids) denote how much each incremental unit of water is worth for the consumptive 
and the non-consumptive users28.  
Discounting could be used to represent the present value of future water allocation. Hotelling’s 
rule, which is frequently used in the environmental economics literature, would then imply 
prices for water rising over time, at the assumed discount rate.29 However, in this formulation, 
this aspect is assumed to be an issue for the bidders. That is, it is assumed that participants 
would discount their own bids. 𝑉o𝑠o  is also assumed to be an appropriately discounted 
piecewise linear, increasing, convex, end of horizon benefit storage function. It represents the 
																																								 																				
26 For simplicity, the non-consumptive tranche bounds in the nodal CDDP discussed in Chapter 5 are:	
	0 ≤ 𝑦,? ≤ 1	
27 Similarly, the consumptive tranche bounds in the nodal CDDP are:  0 ≤ 𝑞,? ≤ 1 
28 Note that later chapters are motivated by the solution of the intra-period problem of the standard dynamic 
programming problem, which amounts to the first term of the convex programming problem above, for some 
particular period, 𝑡. This represents both consumptive (node) uses and non-consumptive (arc) uses, across the 
network. 
29 Manning & Gallagher (1982) discussed the importance of time preferences in reservoir operating policies. They 
argued that the marginal value of stored water should be rising at a rate of prevailing interest rate, based on the 
rule introduced by Hotelling (1931) and later applied for exhaustible resources by Solow (1974). This rule is 
normally applicable over multiple years but, strictly speaking it should really apply whenever storage is not at its 
bounds. Water values will rise faster than the interest rate when the upper storage bounds are binding, and fall 
when the lower storage bounds are binding.	
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value that would be achieved by the market if water is carried forward, beyond the current 
planning horizon.  
[3.2] This constraint describes the flow balance at any node. 𝑠L?  in constraint [3.2b] represents the 
storage volume in the reservoir at the end of time period 𝑡, and features only in the reservoir 
nodal flow balance constraint equation for node 0. 𝜆,? and 𝜆L,? indicate the shadow prices of 
the two constraints, that is the marginal water values at the node.    
[3.3] Constraint [3.3a] sets the storage bounds, which have dual variables 𝛾?I and 𝛾?F. The initial 
storage level is set by constraint [3.3b], which may be seen as a special case of [3.3a] in which 
both 𝑆 and the minimum bound are set to equal 𝑆LL. 
In reality, “spill” often flows down the same channels as “release”,30 and the model could 
handle this type of spill by relaxing the upper arc flow limits, while perhaps setting negative 
environmental values. Alternatively, the SO, or an environmental agency, could be assumed to 
impose a penalty scheme on flows outside the desired bounds. But [3.3c] also allows for an 
unconstrained spill which is treated by 3.2a&b as exiting (or not entering) the system, and this 
avoids the possibility of negative water values if a flood occurs.      
A final storage target could be represented similarly to the initial storage level but, once we 
consider inflow uncertainty, it will not generally be feasible, or desirable, to establish a fixed 
end-of-horizon storage target. So constraint [3.3d] instead assumes a set of (possibly notional) 
“bids” for the end-of-horizon storage. Hence, 𝜍o is the dual variable of [3.3d] and it represents 
the marginal value of carrying water forward. Constraint [3.3e] represents the bounds on end-
of-horizon storage bid tranches (e.g., 𝜗,oI , 𝜗,oF ).        
[3.4] The total flow through any arc (𝑖, 𝑗) in the network in time 𝑡 must be less than the physical 
capacity of that arc. 𝜇 , ,?
I  and 𝜇 , ,?
F  represent the dual variables on the constraint [3.4]. This 
is the marginal gain to the market from an extra unit of capacity on arc (𝑖, 𝑗) in time period 𝑡. 
																																								 																				
30 We will ignore the possibility that spill may flow down alternative channels to re-enter the system downstream. 
Spills are assumed to be non-utilisable flows and they have a zero marginal value. 
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[3.5] Constraints [3.5a] and [3.5b] relate to non-consumptive use31. Constraint [3.5a] aggregates 
accepted bid tranches to compute the quantities of flow allocated to each non-consumptive use. 
𝜔,? indicates the shadow price on [3.5a]. This implies that a bidder must express her bid curve 
for the total arc capacity range sometimes with zero bids. This constraint allows the model to 
accept both positive and negative bids. Negative bids (if they exist) can offset positive bids. 
Constraint [3.5b] represents the bounds on non-consumptive bid tranches, and has two dual 
variables, 𝜌,,?I  and 𝜌,,?F . Different non-consumptive users on the same arc are allowed and 
assumed to each gain value from the same flow of water. 
[3.6] This denotes the set of constraints for consumptive and distributary demands. [3.6a] aggregates 
the total consumptive/distributary demands at any node 𝑖, and the associated dual variable is 
denoted by 𝜐,?. [3.6.b] sets the upper and lower bounds of the consumptive/ distributary bid 
tranches. The quantity accepted in each bid tranche cannot be negative. 𝜎,,?I  and 𝜎,,?F  indicate 
the respective dual variables on these bounds.  
Note that, as stated, the lower bounds in equations [3.3c], [3.4], [3.5b], and [3.6b] would have negative 
dual variables. But we will implicitly assume that these lower bounds are re-stated in a canonical way, 
so as to produce non-negative shadow prices32.  So we have: −𝑧L? 	≤ 0 : −𝜉?I ≥ 0 , −𝑥,? ≤ 𝐿,: 
−𝜇 , ,?
I ≥ 0 , −𝑦,? ≤ 0: −𝜌,,?I ≥ 0 , −𝑞,? ≤ 0: −𝜎,,?I ≥ 0 , −𝑠L? ≤ 0: −𝛾?I ≥ 0   and 
	−𝑠o ≤ 0: −𝜗,oI ≥ 0 . Therefore, non-negative values for 𝜉,?I , 𝜇 , ,?
I , 𝜌,,?I , 𝜎,,?I , 𝛾?I and 𝜗,oI  will 
be assumed in the following section.      
Section 3.3.2 presents the full dual formulation of the above problem, and explains each dual variable 
and constraint, to give insight into the resource prices that match the optimal market clearing solution.33  
																																								 																				
31 This formulation accounts for arc non-consumptive use in a catchment network. But, we do not cover any non-
consumptive use of reservoirs or at other nodes. 
32 The shadow prices multiplied by the respective quantities provide a basis for resource valuation which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
33 We can form an LP dual here because we dealt with non-linearity by assuming piece-wise linear convex benefit 




3.3.2 Dual Formulation and Shadow Price Analysis 
The dual formulation of the above primal problem can be thought of as the commodity valuation 
problem. The primal variables associated with the dual constraints are listed on the right hand side. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
£,¤,¥,¦,§,¨,©,ª,«
𝑆LL𝛾L + 𝑠Lo𝜍oFG + 𝜗oF 𝑠Lo















−𝜐,? + 𝜆? = 0	, ∀𝑖, 𝑡  : 𝑞? [3.8] 
−𝑃,? + 	𝜎,,?F − 𝜎,,?I + 𝜐,? = 0  : 𝑞,?   [3.9] 
− 𝜔,?∈Ω , + 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I + 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? 	= 0	, ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 : 𝑥 ,
?  [3.10] 
−𝑃,? + 𝜌,,?F − 𝜌,,?I + 	𝜔,? = 0 : 𝑦,?   [3.11] 
𝜆L,? − 𝜆L,?FG + 𝛾?F − 𝛾?I = 0	  : 𝑠?  [3.12a] 
𝛾oF − 𝛾oI + 𝜆L,o − 𝜍o = 0	  : 𝑠o  [3.12b] 
−𝑉o + 𝜗,oF − 𝜗,oI + 𝜍o = 0 : 𝑠o  [3.12c] 
𝜆,? − 𝜉,?I = 0 : 𝑧? [3.13] 
The following section analyses the above dual constraints and price relationships. Later, Chapter 4 uses 
these dual variable relationships to examine some market issues such as network revenue, settlement 
surpluses, and hedging.   
3.3.3 Deterministic Price Analysis 
𝜎,,?I  and 𝜎,,?F  denote the shadow prices on the consumptive/distributary bid constraint [3.6b]. The bid 
price 𝑃,?  (𝑏¬­ bid of the consumptive use at node 𝑖) will set the price for that period and location if, and 
only if, that bid tranche is marginal i.e. the optimal allocation lies between its upper and lower bound 
(ignoring degeneracy).  In that case, the shadow prices on both bounds are zero.  Otherwise, the dual 
variable 𝜎,,?F  is the amount of extra social benefit gained if a consumptive or distributary user at node 𝑖 
had use for an additional unit of water at a marginal value equal to the specified bid price 𝑃,? . In other 
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words, the dual variable 𝜎,,?F  is the social benefit loss if the consumptive use valued at 𝑃,?  was 
restricted by one unit. Similarly, the shadow price 𝜎,,?I  of the consumptive bid lower bound constraint 
indicates how much society would lose if that bid was accepted. The dual constraint associated with the 
primal variable 𝑞,?  describes the relationship between the consumptive bids and the nodal market 
prices: −𝑃,? + 	𝜎,,?F − 𝜎,,?I + 𝜐,? = 0. Hence, the following price relationships can be derived from 
consideration of dual constraint [3.9]. For example, combining dual constraints [3.8] and [3.9], given 
complementary slackness, we can write the following relationship if the consumptive bid is fully 
accepted (i.e., 𝑞,? = 𝑄) then 	𝜎,,?I = 0, so −𝑃,? + 	𝜎,,?F + 𝜆? = 0. If a bid is not accepted at all (i.e. 
𝑞,? = 0) then 𝜎,,?F = 0, so −𝑃,? − 	𝜎,,?I + 𝜆? = 0. Finally, if the bid is partially accepted (i.e., 0 <
𝑞,? < 𝑄) then 𝜎,,?F , 𝜎,,?I = 0	, and	𝜆? = 𝑃,? .  
In summary, 𝜎,,?F > 0 (only) for a fully accepted consumptive/distributary user bid, and 𝜎,,?I > 0 
(only) for a fully rejected consumptive/distributary user bid. Here, the nodal price 𝜆? indicates the 
market price determined by the net nodal demands, and is thus applicable to the consumptive use at a 
particular node. Figure 3-1 illustrates the merit order allocation of the consumptive marginal water 
values (𝑃,? bids) and the accepted/non-accepted bids. The market (nodal) price corresponding to 𝑞? is 
shown by the checked horizontal line. According to Figure 3-1 consumer (buyer) surplus is: 
𝜎,,?F 𝑞,? .      
	










The flow off-take demands differ depending on the location in the network and the type (e.g., 
consumptive versus distributary) of the use. The dual variable 𝜆? for the constraint [3.2] represents the 
marginal value to the market (or system) from having an extra water unit available at node 𝑖, in period t, 
given  the optimal water allocation. This is similar to locational marginal prices in an electricity or gas 
market. The locational marginal price (LMP) in an electricity market refers to the lowest price at which 
an incremental unit of power (energy) can be optimally dispatched to a node, without violating the 
binding network transmission constraints. In this context, the nodal (spot) price reflects how much the 
objective function would increase if an extra unit of (free) tributary flow was available at that node, in 
that particular time period. That value could be set by consumptive/ distributary use, there and then. But 
it could equally well reflect the value added if the water flowed on to be allocated to a downstream 
user, or was used to replace an extra unit consumed by an upstream user, in that time period.  Or, it 
could reflect the marginal value of consumption in a later period, even at nodes where storage is not 
possible, because the extra unit could flow on down to the reservoir, or replace a unit that would 
otherwise have been released from the reservoir. 
For non-consumptive uses, 𝜌,,?F  and 𝜌,,?I  denote the dual variables for the non-consumptive bid 
upper/lower bound constraints [3.5b]. The shadow price 𝜌,,?F  of the non-consumptive bid upper bound 
constraint [3.5b] indicates how much the “social benefit”, as measured by the objective function, would 
increase if non-consumptive user for 𝑘 ∈Ω could utilise an additional unit of water flow at a marginal 
value of 𝑃,? .
34 As above, these dual prices can be explained with reference to the full dual formulation. 
The dual constraint [3.11] associated with the primal variable 𝑦,?  explains the relationship between the 
prices of non-consumptive use and bid steps in the non-consumptive arc flow demand function: 
−𝑃,? + 𝜌,,?F − 𝜌,,?I + 	𝜔,? = 0. Using duality and complementary slackness conditions we can 
write the following.  
If the non-consumptive bid is fully accepted, i.e., if 𝑦,? = 𝑌,?  then 𝜌,,?F > 0 and 𝜌,,?I = 0. Hence, 
−𝑃,? + 𝜌,,?F + 	𝜔,? = 0. Hence 𝜌,,?F  is the price difference between the bid price 𝑃,?  and the 
																																								 																				
34 Here, and elsewhere, the gain in “social benefit” from relaxing a bid trance constraint would actually accrue to 
the individual party making the bid.  
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‘water flow’ price for 𝑘,	𝜔,?. 𝜌,,?I > 0 implies the lower bounds on non-consumptive use bid tranche 
is binding. This indicates how much the society would lose if one unit were accepted from that bid. 
Therefore, if a bid is not accepted, i.e., if 𝑦,? = 0, then 𝜌,,?F = 0, 𝜌,,?I > 0 and −𝑃,? − 𝜌,,?I +
	𝜔,? = 0. Finally, the price relationship 𝜔,? = 𝑃,?  corresponds to a partially accepted bid, where 0 <
𝑦,? < 𝑌, and 𝜌,,?F , 𝜌,,?I = 0.  
The dual constraints [3.12a] and [3.12b] correspond to the storage variables. 𝛾?F > 0 corresponds to a 
binding upper storage limit (where 𝛾?I = 0). So 𝛾?F positively contributes to the next period’s marginal 
water values, indicating a rise in the marginal water value as we pass a period in which we expect the 
upper storage limit to constrain the solution. 𝛾?I > 0 represents a binding lower storage limit (𝑠L? ≤ 0) 
which then lowers the marginal water values in the next time period, as we pass a period in which we 
expect the lower storage limit to constrain the solution. Most of the time, we will have non-binding 
storage constraints, so  𝛾?F, 𝛾?I = 0, and the marginal water value does not change.  
In dual constraints [3.12 b & c], unless storage limits bind we have 𝜆L,o − 𝜍L,o = 0 and −𝑉o + 𝜗,oF −
𝜗,oI + 𝜍o = 0. If an end-of-horizon storage target had been set, equation [3.12b] would merely set the 
marginal cost, in the current year, of meeting that target. However, because this study values end-of-
horizon storage and storage volume that will be carried beyond the current planning horizon, that 
constraint says that the marginal water value in this year equals the marginal benefits of carrying water 
over beyond the current planning horizon, to the next year.        
Equation [3.13] relates to the cost of spill to the market. 𝜉?I measures how much value is added to the 
system by relaxing (decreasing) the spill bounds by an extra unit (e.g., -1)35. 𝜉?I > 0 implies the lower 
spill bound is binding. Thus 𝜆L,? is positive, unless water is being deliberately spilled to waste. When 
spill occurs we will have 𝜉?I = 0, and 𝜆L,? = 𝜉?I implies zero marginal water value.  
The dual variable 𝜇 , ,?
F  of the arc flow capacity constraint [3.4] for 𝑥 ,
?  measures how much the 
benefit maximising objective function would increase if the capacity of arc (𝑖, 𝑗) could be increased by 
a unit, in period 𝑡. The dual variable 𝜇 , ,?
F  is analogous to a “line shadow price” in an electricity 
																																								 																				
35 Note that 𝜆L,? could become negative if an upper bound on spill was to bind.  But there is no such bound, and 
hence no possibility of a positive  𝜉,?F shadow price being added on the LHS of 3.13 so as to force 𝜆L,?	 below zero.	
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market, which denotes the dispatch cost saving by increasing the transmission line flow capacity 
incrementally by a unit. The shadow price 𝜇 , ,?
I  of the constraint [3.4] indicates how much the 
objective function would increase if the lower bound could be relaxed (e.g., by not meeting minimum 
in-stream flows) by a unit, in period 𝑡. Thus 𝜇 , ,? explains the difference between water values at 
connected nodes, driven by the fact that users on, or downstream of, the arc would make an incremental 
profit of 𝜇 , ,?
F  if they were allowed to increase the arc flow capacity by a single unit of flow, without 
violating other binding constraints. Conversely, a penalty of 𝜇 , ,?
F  per unit increase in flow would be 
just enough to discourage those users violating the upper arc bounds. Hence, 𝜇 , ,? is a market price 
which gives an efficient allocation of arc capacity, maximising the trading benefits.  
𝜔,?∈³ , = 𝜆,?−𝜆,? implies that if there is more than one non-consumptive user on the same arc, 
there can be multiple values of 𝜌,,?F  and 𝜔,? that satisfy this and the relationships here when the bids 
are fully accepted. This issue is addressed in the following.  
The dual constraint − 𝜔,?∈Ω , + 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I + 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? 	= 0, [3.10], indicates the 
relationship between nodal prices, arc flow non-consumptive use prices, and arc flow capacity 
constraint price. Let us ignore the non-consumptive rental component in the above equation for the 
moment. Then, it will provide us a simple relationship between the nodal prices and the arc flow 
constraints for an arc 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I + 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? 	= 0. In this case, the shadow price on the arc flow 
limit is just the nodal price difference 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? . Alternatively, in an unconstrained network, the 
constraint becomes: − 𝜔,?∈Ω , + 𝜆,?−𝜆,? 	= 0. This implies that all non-consumptive users on 
the arc (𝑖	𝑗), collectively, pay the price difference between the two nodes for the flow. The shadow 
price sum 𝜔,?∈Ω ,  represents the combined marginal benefit for all non-consumptive participants. 
This reflects the fact that their use of the arc flow is complementary, with all bidders gaining from the 
same flow unit (recall the non-consumptive users are assumed to be in series on the arc). As above, the 
model is forced to accept negative bids with the equality constraint. This can occur if negative bids are 
sufficiently offset by positive bids to create an aggregate gain, after accounting for the 
upstream/downstream water value differential. This implies that 𝜔 has no sign restriction. As a result,	𝜔 
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may become negative if the water value differential is positive. That is, the market could accept some 
cost of water transport, in order to move water to a node where it has a higher value.  
While this shadow price sum needs to match the nodal price difference, when there are multiple non-
consumptive users on the same arc there can be multiple optimal dual solutions each corresponding to a 
different allocation of the nodal price difference between different non-consumptive users. 
The following section considers allocating costs in this situation, where arc flows yield joint benefits, 
creating a “free-riding problem” similar to one occurring in electricity markets.  
3.4 Allocating Costs Associated with Arc Flows Yielding Joint Benefits  
Non-consumptive users in series on an arc may gain more total benefit for water than reflected in the 
combined price they pay.  This leads to multiple feasible allocations of the cost amongst those users. 
Under the convexity assumption, equation [3.10] implies that each non-consumptive user should be 
paying in accordance with the marginal benefit the optimization allocates, irrespective of how much 
benefit they might have derived from infra-marginal release units. Thus in cases where 𝜔,?∈Ω , <
𝑃,?∈Ω ,  some non-consumptive bidders may pay nothing, because they become infra-marginal, in 
the sense that other users want, and are prepared to pay for, higher flow levels than such a user can 
economically utilise, or is prepared to bid for36. This is particularly likely if there are minimum stream 
flow releases for which the costs are implicitly incurred by, or on behalf of, the environmental users. 
The market implicitly charges the price only to the marginal user(s)37. This could provide gaming 
incentives for some parties to strategically evade their contribution to the dual prices associated with the 
																																								 																				
36 As a result of multiple dual solutions, there could be multiple ways of allocating the water values amongst non-
consumptive users in series on the same arc. Preferably, the market is required to find a fair way to allocate water 
values consistently. A non-consumptive user in series with others on an arc can become marginal depending on 
the optimal dual solution chosen.  
37 The marginal user sets the price. Then all consumptive users at the same node pay the same price. However, 




capacity constraints, thus effectively taking advantage of their physical positioning in the network, 
relative to users who are prepared to pay more to increase flows.38 	
A market with a single non-consumptive user and a (large) set of consumptive users at each node could 
be expected to behave as a perfectly competitive market. Their bids are expected to reflect the marginal 
benefit of consumption to each participant. This creates a collection of prices at the nodes and arcs of a 
simple network that permit trades to take place. However, the correspondence of a perfectly 
competitive market with multiple non-consumptive users per arc cannot be guaranteed. This situation is 
somewhat analogous to the situation with respect to ancillary services (e.g., contingency reserve to 
cover breakdowns and frequency keeping) in electricity markets, in that common costs need to be 
allocated among the users. Many markets recognise energy and reserve as non-independent 
commodities (Read, 2010). For example, the New Zealand market accepts joint supply offers for energy 
and ancillary services (e.g., reserve) from the same capacity. Then an energy and ancillary service co-
optimization model seeks to minimise total costs.  In a co-optimization model, all ancillary service 
suppliers are recognised, and all receive the marginal price, but the optimisation only recognises one, or 
a few, largest contingencies as marginal ancillary service “consumers”.  
Taken at face value the economic dispatch models alone would assign all ancillary service purchase 
costs to these few marginal contingencies, and would not provide any degree of cost sharing among the 
consumers in proportion to their benefits. However, in reality, participants (e.g., generators) are, in 
some sense, “consumers” of ancillary services, since all are liable to break down at some point. In 
reality, there is a common benefit situation, for which some kind of group-based cost sharing rule 
seems reasonable and the electricity market literature refers to several approaches to avoid the issue of 
“free riding”. Not surprisingly, these show affinities with group-based “incentive compatible” regimes 
discussed in the broader literature39.   
																																								 																				
38  Although note that this is already true, without a market, in that non-consumptive users have traditionally 
enjoyed free use of ‘environmental” flows.  
39 Sometimes mutual cost sharing agreements may satisfy the requirement of being “fair and equitable”. For 
example, Read (1997) recommends freely negotiated settlements when establishing a transmission pricing regime 
with less regulatory intervention. 
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For example, in many electricity markets (e.g., Australia, New Zealand or Singapore), the reserve 
operating costs are allocated among the generators by a “runway” cost allocation approach, similar to 
the way in which runway construction costs are allocated among users according to a “club principle” 
(Littlechild & Owen, 1973; Littlechild & Thompson, 1977) depending on the air strip length use by 
different size carriers during their landing and taking-off. This is similar to a game theoretic approach 
that apportions the total cost/benefits of the shared resource among participants who cooperate on 
shared resources. For example, the Shapley value method is one popular method referred to in that 
literature (see Junqueira et al, 2007). It implicitly solves the cost-cause identifying problem (Tsukamato 
& Iyoda, 1996), and is intended to give a “fair chance” of each participant facing both adverse and 
favourable situations40. That is, the right incentives will be offered to a group of participants, but not to 
an individual. In the runway charging formula, all plane types share the construction cost of the runway 
length required to handle the plane type with the shortest take-off/landing requirement. Then all but that 
type will face the incremental cost of construction for the incremental length required to handle the 
plane type with the next shortest take-off/landing requirement, and so on, until the plane type requiring 
the longest runway faces the incremental cost of runway construction, beyond the length required by 
any other plane type. Then, a fair and efficient landing fee schedule can be worked out based on the 
number of landings of each type.  
Similarly, in the electricity sector, the largest unit operating will face the incremental costs of 
contingency response cover, not required by any other unit, but will bear the common costs of covering 
lesser contingencies with smaller units. Thus, a fair and efficient fee schedule can be worked out for 
plant generating in a particular time period, based on the size and expected number of contingencies. 
Here we suggest a similar approach to apportion the non-consumptive infra-marginal benefits in the 
																																								 																				
40 For example, Faria et al., (2009) studied a firm energy right allocation problem among hydro-power plants 
using the Shapley value method. Murphy & Rosenthal (2006) have cited several other applications of the Shapley 
value to apportion resources in telecommunication networks (Anandalingam & Nam, 1997; Archer et al, 2004), in 
shareholder voting games (Zingales, 1995), in pollution reduction and emission control (Carbone & Sweigart, 
1976; Chattopadhyay, 1995) and in water resource allocations (Dinar et al, 1992; Kucukmehmetoglu & 
Guldmann, 2004; Becker & Easter, 2010). 	
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water market context, as described in the following example. For illustrative purposes, let us assume a 
set of non-consumptive users 𝑘 on the arc (𝑖	𝑗). 
 
Figure 3-2. Example of a non-consumptive arc flow bid stack belong to a set of arc flow users on the arc (i,j). 
Figure 3-2 shows the bids expressed by the non-consumptive users 1, 2, and 3 for the arc flow 
quantities 𝑥G, 𝑥l, 𝑥´ and 𝑥µ. For example, the non-consumptive users 1, 2 and 3 value the first 𝑥G units 
at 𝑎GG = 5, 𝑎lG = 2, and 𝑎´G = 5 respectively. According to this diagram, the non-consumptive user 3 
becomes the only marginal user at the arc flow clearing price 𝜔, (That is with an arc flow  clearing 
price of 𝑎´µ = 1). But all users enjoy consumer benefits on the first increment, in proportions, 
𝑎GG: 𝑎lG: 𝑎´G. Therefore the purchase cost allocation implied by the dual of the optimisation problem 
could easily be considered “unfair”, and likely to invite gaming. That is, users will restrict their bids so 
as not to be the user demanding the ‘last flow’41, and hence deemed responsible for all costs. According 
to the above example, user 3 is the marginal user, and hence responsible for relevant costs, as she has 
exclusively bid for the 𝑥µ tranche. And that will be true if the market clears anywhere in this tranche. 
Alternatively, user 1 and user 3 would have shared the costs had user 1 reduced her bid so that the 
market cleared, say, just below the top of the 𝑥´ bid tranche. And cost burden faced by both these 
participants will reduce by another there will be another increment, if they can get the market to clear 
just below the top of the 𝑥l tranche, and so on. Thus, users will set their demand curves so as to back 
away from being the marginal bidder. There is ambiguity as to how to apportion the clearing price (say 
“1”) among the three users. For example, if there was only one bidder for 𝑥G bid tranche, she would 
																																								 																				
41 Here the last flow (marginal flow) refers to the position of the user bids in the final bid stack. 
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simply pay clearing price “1”. However, in the above example, there are 3 bidders for 𝑥G bid tranche 
and hence the payment of “1” can be made in one of the following ways. User 3 who is marginal at 𝑥µ 
will be required to accept the full amount if there are no other non-consumptive users in parallel. The 
market clearing price is payable by the highest bidder at 𝑥G if there are no multiple highest bids. To 
avoid this effect, though, the flow purchase cost must be apportioned among the participants for the 

































𝑥´  denotes the flow purchase cost proportions for the first participant. 
These bid apportionments dis-incentivise the participants to play a game for the last unit because the 
costs/benefits are now redistributed among each participant based on an accepted rule42. Thus the cost 
allocation adjusts continuously, and there is no distinct advantage for any bidder to restrict her bids so 
as not to become marginal. The above Shapley value based method can be used to determine a “fair 
cost” of each participant’s contribution in joint work. However, the participants may choose not to 
cooperate if the market outcomes do not meet their final expectations.  
It may be argued that this weighted average consumer surplus approach is inconsistent with the uniform 
price market clearing assumption and that, in allocating costs based on infra-marginal rents, it possesses 
some features of the pay-as-bid auction method43. The choice between pay-as-bid and uniform price 
water auctions leads to theoretical and/or empirical questions that need deeper analysis, beyond the 
scope of this thesis44. And it will not explore the theoretical properties of the weighted average 
																																								 																				
42 Suppose User 1 reduces her bid for unit 𝑥G to 4 from 5. Now her portion is 4/11. Still the circumstances could 
make it less likely for unit 𝑥G to be marginal. She makes this gain at a lower risk. Similar game could be played by 
the other users to increase their gain but the level of risk of respective unit become marginal could be different. 
43 The financial contracts developed in the next chapter assuming uniform-price market clearing do not seem 
appropriate if multiple parties gain non-consumptive benefits from the same flow on the same arc as they bid to 
cover part of the cost.	
44 The literature refers to several studies about the choice between, and applicability and consequences of uniform 
price and pay-as-bid electricity market auctions. See, for example, Wolfram, 1999; Kahn et al, 2001; Klemperer, 
2001; Rassenti et al., 2002; Fabra et al, 2002.  
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consumer surplus approach any further, either45. However, note that this problem, effectively, exists if 
there are multiple serial non-consumptive users on a single arc. In order to eliminate this problem, this 
arc can be split into multiple arcs by adding dummy nodes between the non-consumptive users on the 
original arc to accommodate a single non-consumptive user per new arc46.  
The next section recasts the objective in Equation (3.1) to maximise net welfare temporally, spatially 
and under uncertainty. It considers net demand bids and it allows for state-dependent bidding, 
correlated to the system hydrology. 
3.5 Impact of Uncertainty  
The previous section formulated a single reservoir, mixed-use deterministic LP optimization model and 
provided some explanation of the shadow prices. A stochastic market formulation is more complicated, 
and we have to consider expected benefits from release and period-to-period storage.  
We use an event tree formulation approach to set up the multi-stage stochastic market optimization 
problem. All possible realizations of inflows form a scenario tree which has nodes organized in levels 
that correspond to stages (time periods) 1,2, … . 𝑇. We assume a general scenario tree and thus its 
structure can be labelled using parent-child relationships. For each event node there corresponds a 
particular hydrology state. For example, the root node is denoted by ℎ = 1 at level 𝑡 = 1. Thus, every 
event node in the scenario tree will have a unique label ℎ, 𝑡 , and all primal variables in the above 
deterministic formulation are indexed by event node,(ℎ, 𝑡). We refer to the set of event nodes 
immediately subsequent to event node (ℎ, 𝑡) for 𝑡	 = 	1,2, … . 𝑇 − 1 as the set of child nodes 𝕔(ℎ, 𝑡) at 
level 𝑡 + 1. Each node (ℎ, 𝑡) at level 𝑡	 = 	2, . . . , 𝑇 is linked to a single ancestor 𝕒(ℎ, 𝑡) node at level 
𝑡	 − 	1.  
The scenario tree divides into branches corresponding to different realizations of the random inflow 
events. It thus defines the historical path from root to node ℎ in stage 𝑡 in the event tree by 
ℎG, ℎl, … . . ℎ?IG , omitting the period indices. Let 𝕡 >,?  denote the probability of reaching event node 
																																								 																				
45 But we note that the problem at hand is not really an “auction”, in which each participant buys a distinct part of 
the total on offer at a price, uniform or otherwise.  It is more of a joint-product situation, and such situations 
always require some method to allocate purchase/production costs among beneficiaries.   
46 There could be overlapping basic/dual solutions leading to degeneracy issues.	
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ℎ, 𝑡 . The nodal probability is the product of corresponding conditional probabilities47 along the 
historical path.  
In reality, participants would not be willing to or be able to express contingent bids for every node in 
the scenario tree. We could think of notional bids estimated by the market manager, in situations where 
participants do not provide full information for all scenarios in all periods. These bids are hydrology 
dependent and conditioned on the previous events, as described by the scenario tree48. The details on 
developing these bid estimates are set aside as the scope of this chapter is to present a market clearing 
formulation suitable to discuss the issues such as risk management rather than to study various market 
design options and mechanisms for running a water market. The stochastic objective function in the 
















ℋ? denotes the set of all event nodes in time period 𝑡	, ∀𝑡 = 1,2,3, … . 𝑇. We also need to re-state the 
primal constraints using the corresponding (ℎ, 𝑡) index. In addition, we scale the dual variables 
associated with the primal constraints (e.g., from [3.2] to [3.6]) by multiplying each by the associated 
nodal probability. For example, the storage balance constraint can be re-written as follows:    
𝑥L,
>,?
L, ∈ − 𝑥,L
>,? − 𝑠L




,L ∈ 	 , ∀	(ℎ, 𝑡) : 𝕡 >,? 𝜆>,? 
At stage 𝑡 the storage decision 𝑠L
>,? can be thought of as a function of the history of storage/release 
decisions available at time 𝑡, and does not depend on future observations of the child nodes. As 
formulated, information regarding the intra-period inflow is assumed to be available for both future 
storage and present arc flow release decisions made in the current period. This corresponds to an 
informed inflow allocation policy (Starkey, 2014) and this implies that the release could be adjusted 
																																								 																				
47	𝕡 ℎ,𝑡 = 𝕡 ℎ1 . 𝕡 ℎ2|ℎ1 . 𝕡 ℎ3|ℎ2 …… . 𝕡 ℎ𝑡|ℎ𝑡−1 	describes the probability of a scenario ℎ at level 𝑡.		
48 Demand for water increases as conditions get drier, and vice versa. As a result, high valued bids are likely to be 




accordingly as the inflow for the coming period is known. The only change to the price relationships 
comes in the inter-period connections (specifically, dual constraints [3.12a & b]) which, when 
generalised, link marginal water values for this period with probability weighted conditional average 
marginal water values for the next period.  
Under informed policy, the stochastic version of the dual constraint [3.12a] corresponding to storage 
constraint	𝑠? is: 
𝕡 >,? 𝜆>,? + 𝛾>,?F − 𝛾>,?I − 𝕡 >
E,?FG 𝜆>E,?FG>E,?FG ∈𝕔(>,?) = 0, ∀	(ℎ, 𝑡)       :𝑠L
>,?  [3.14a] 
The probability ratio 
𝕡 Z,STUZ∈ℋSTU
𝕡 Z,S
 indicates the conditional probability of event ℎM occurring in time 
period 𝑡 + 1 given that event node ℎ, 𝑡  eventuated. Thus, the marginal water value of storage under 
scenario ℎ in period 𝑡 (i.e., event node ℎ, 𝑡 ) is equal to the probability weighted sum of all marginal 
water values of the event nodes in level 𝑡 + 1 that are linked to ℎ, 𝑡 . In general, under a stochastic 
setting, 𝜆>,? is the marginal water value in scenario ℎ, 𝑡  as a result of hydrology dependent inflows. 
This implies that the accounting occurs at the end of the period (that is at period, 𝑡) as there is no prior 
knowledge during period 𝑡 − 1 about the scenario that will be occurring in period 𝑡.	
Note that it is not necessary to have binding storage constraints to induce price differentials in a 
stochastic setting. The storage constraints still influence the (conditional) marginal water values for 
release irrespective of the type of formulation (stochastic versus deterministic), and the roles of the 
multipliers 𝛾?F and 𝛾?I remain essentially unchanged in a stochastic formulation
49. In particular, the 
marginal water value can only change when the storage trajectory for that path reaches a storage bound.   
Apart from this, though, most of the price relationships can be derived from the deterministic LP model. 
For example, we could think of the scenario tree as populated with identical information for all forward 
																																								 																				
49 This may be seen more clearly if we apply the scenario decomposition to the SLP, in which copies for all 
variables and constraints are made for each scenario. We then need to declare the non-anticipativity constraints for 
the storage variable. If a pair of scenarios 𝑢 and 𝑣 in the tree, are identical up to time 𝑡, the non-anticipativity 
storage constraint is: 𝑠»? = 𝑠¼?. We re-cast the associated dual variable as 𝜆?», and these dual variables link with 
those before/after in the scenario, via the storage bound multipliers, exactly in accordance with the deterministic 
dual equation, [3.12a] above. The path based modelling based revenue adequacy for financial storage rights is 
discussed in Read (2016). 
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paths nodes assuming 𝑉o𝑠o  perfectly models the future value function. Alternate paths radiating 
from a node can be collapsed to a single path. Thus, temporal 𝜆L variables can be assumed to be correct 
with respect to the original model. We also limit ourselves to deterministic LP models to explain the 
network rents as it does not explicitly involve temporal variations of 𝜆L, and discuss some commercial 
and organizational arrangements which could be used to deploy “settlement surpluses” to hedge against 
trading risks, improve liquidity and ultimately increase efficiency of short-run use as discussed in the 
next chapter.   
3.6 Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter, we focused on presenting a market-clearing formulation to manage hydrology 
dependent surface water supplies, where consumptive and/or non-consumptive use occurs in a network, 
with storage. Participant bids, presumably reflecting their marginal use values, are assumed to be 
cleared by a benefit-maximizing optimization, such as Linear Programming. The aggregated net 
demand curve reflects the maximum quantity that each participant is willing to supply or consume, at a 
particular marginal cost/benefit. Section 3.3 lays out a deterministic multi-period LP primal/dual 
centrally coordinated water market clearing model. This helps us to present a price analysis and discuss 
issues such as allocating costs associated with shared resources and impacts of uncertainty. In Section 
3.5, a centrally coordinated market clears water under uncertainty, based on marginal water values 
expressed by participants.  
The above creates both locational and temporal price differences, and causes the market to accumulate 
a “settlement surplus” of rents associated with resource constraints such as storage bounds, arc flow 





4. Financial Hedging Instruments for Water Markets	
Financial Hedging Instruments for Water Markets   
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter sets the background for the developments in this chapter by presenting a multi-
period deterministic/stochastic water market model of the operation of a network in a series of 
relatively short intervals (e.g., weekly) within an annual time horizon. In the primal and dual LP 
formulations of that chapter, the resource (i.e., storage volume and inflows) was assumed to be traded 
in both current and future periods. Here we will simply assume that a market exists in financial water 
rights, at each location, and is cleared by solving a deterministic/stochastic formulation such as that 
described in Chapter 3. In reality, many decisions with respect to releasing and storing water are made 
across time and space, under uncertainty. As a result, markets make decisions regarding some resource 
components in the current period (e.g., flow delivery), knowing that subsequent choices regarding other 
resource components (e.g., storage) will be required in future, when the situation becomes clearer.   
As noted in the previous chapter, a market for water can create a complicated situation given there is 
gaming and risk faced by participants due to the tight interaction between the upstream and the 
downstream parties. It is unlikely that participants accept the idea of trading water in a spot market 
unless there are contracts in place to deal with issues such as gaming, loss their current rights and risk 
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exposure. So this chapter explores some financial contracting ideas drawn from electricity market 
literature50. 
Starkey (2015) ignores the locational detail introduced here, and hence any consideration of non-
consumptive uses, but discusses many possible market options for trading some form of future water 
right. Ideally, contingent bids/offers for water seem conceptually appealing, and Starkey discusses 
affine bids comprised of fixed and proportional components. The proportional component (volume) can 
be scaled linearly with one or several indices depending on the inflows between the current and the 
future periods. Starkey also discusses the possibility of trading affine FWRs too. But, to avoid 
modelling difficulties, here we assume that, irrespective of the bid form, a market exists in “firm” (i.e. 
fixed volume) financial water rights, at multiple nodes, and is cleared by solving a deterministic multi-
node formulation such as that described in Chapter 3, or the stochastic variant described in Section 3.5. 
Critically, it is assumed that water flow is strictly determined by the market clearing solutions. Thus 
water flows will only occur if downstream consumptive users express positive bids for water 
consumption, and/or non-consumptive (e.g. hydropower users express positive bids for water flow. 
 As discussed in Section 4.2.3, clearing such a market will generate a revenue surplus, implicitly 
capturing the rents associated with different types of constraints. For example, some limitations of 
allocation of water will occur as a result of transportation capacity constraints within a period, and other 
limitations will occur as a result of storage capacity constraints between periods. According to the 
market formulations in the previous chapter, such limitations will cause marginal price differences over 
the arcs across the network, and across time. And, as we have seen in Section 3.3.2, price differentials 
exist even over unconstrained arcs, because of non-consumptive arc flow use.  
Thus the market accumulates rents associated with the resource constraints.51 As in in other resource 
allocating network markets, the SO may collect the rents generated by some particular types of binding 
																																								 																				
50 Contracts can secure the existing position of participants transitioning into a market environment, and underpin 




constraints, thus creating a “settlement surplus”. This would generally expose both the SO and 
participants to inter-temporal risks depending on the amount of water carried forward.  
Ideally participants prefer certainty about their future allocations and costs. But, in reality, with a 
constrained uncertain resource, these price differences will not be certain, as they depend on the 
hydrological conditions. Hence participants might wish to hedge against spatial and temporal price 
variations in the spot market by entering into some form of contract. Otherwise, uncertainty in the rents 
associated with network constraints may make some participants unwilling to engage in trading unless 
insurance is available. 
To the extent that participants own their own physical systems they would manage those risks by taking 
physical actions, such as storing water, or moving it. To the extent that they rely upon a common 
system, though, they need to be provided with other “instruments” to manage those risks. This leads us 
to ask how to manage “settlement surpluses” and then to explore the possibility of introducing some 
commercial arrangement that could be supported by the settlement surplus, in order to hedge against 
trading risk52. The market is faced with the following issues regarding these rents and surpluses:  
§ Who to allocate the rents to?  
§ How to interpret different types of rents associated with market/system constraints? and  
§ How to utilise settlement surpluses to fully/partially insulate themselves from trading risks by 
“hedging”?  
Briefly, the issue of who actually “collects” the rents largely depends on the market design, but the 
ultimate recipients should be the owners of system components. The interpretation of rents is 
determined by the physical and economic roles played by the corresponding system components. And, 
consequently, settlement surpluses can be decomposed into rental components that provide 
opportunities for the participants to hedge their trading risks in the market.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																
51 Technically, the RHS of each constraint represents the amount of some limited “resource”, such as channel or 
reservoir capacity, available to the system, and the rents represent the value of that resource, as determined by the 
dual solution discussed above. 
52  In the case of bilateral financial/physical contracts, the contract holders can swap their positions and effectively 
cancel each other out. The surplus is important in unbalanced situations where physical resources must be able to 
physically support the financial contracts. 
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The main objective of this chapter, then, is to establish a general structure of financial hedging 
instruments that could be used to deploy the settlement surplus arising as a result of water market 
clearing, to hedge against inter-temporal and inter-locational price risks in such a market. In particular, 
our scope is limited to exploring rent-based risk management concepts for water markets, in the form of 
(potentially tradable) financial property rights corresponding to physical system components. This 
chapter draws on the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) concepts developed for electricity markets, 
and discussed in Section 2.5.3, to describe and discuss similar water market hedging instruments.  It is 
worth noting that the scope of this thesis does not include issues relating to the allocation, valuation, or 
trading of such instruments, or their impact on “gaming behaviour”.   
This chapter is organised in the following way:  
Section 4.2 sets the stage. It describes the water market environment, how financial water rights 
operate, and the market settlement process. We explain how marginal price differences across time and 
space causes the market to accumulate a “settlement surplus53” of rents associated with resource 
constraints (see Section 4.2.3). Then, Section 4.2.4 presents a range of financial property rights 
applicable to different components of the reservoir system that could be used to re-distribute rents 
accumulated in the settlement surplus among relevant parties.  
Section 4.3 develops Obligation-inclusive Financial Storage Rights and Financial Storage Options for 
the storage system. Then we investigate the issue of inter-temporal revenue adequacy of these storage 
related hedging instruments.   
Then, Section 4.4 describes transportation network rents (referred to as network rents). It describes both 
Options and Obligation-inclusive Rights for Arc Capacity Flow that would enable the right holder to be 
compensated for the flow transportation rents collected by the market. Four different scenarios 
involving consumptive benefits, consumptive benefits and non-consumptive costs, consumptive 
benefits and non-consumptive benefits and flow losses and delays, and investigates the issue of revenue 
adequacy for each scenario.  
Section 4.5, considers an alternative “swing option” based virtual reservoir management approach in 
which a water swing option should cover initial storage, inflows, storage capacity and release.  
																																								 																				
53 A settlement surplus is created when there is a positive difference between receipts and payments. 
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Finally, Section 4.6 presents a chapter summary. 
4.2 The Water Market Environment and Financial Water Rights 
The previous chapter describes a formulation for the multi-period deterministic storable water market 
clearing problem. Starkey (2014) extends that kind of formulation to cover general multi-period 
stochastic optimization problem and then explains a spectrum of modelling options. In all cases the 
market manager has to run the model to clear the water market in each period. The simplest market 
would just use a deterministic optimization model to allocate water between participants in the current 
period, once the market manager had determined an allocation to be reserved for future periods.  In 
other cases water trading would also be conducted, or simulated, in advance. A deterministic multi-
period optimization model could support a market trading both present and future water, or it could just 
estimate the future stored water value. A multi-period deterministic optimization with forward 
simulation could provide future price/quantity estimates for a range of scenarios, and Chapter 4 of 
Starkey (2014) explains how those estimates could be used as a basis for trading future water, or just to 
inform trading in futures markets. The same is true if the market manager runs a forward stochastic 
optimization given the hydrology information, to form a general scenario tree. Starkey discusses 
various ways in which such a regime might be made workable, perhaps using bids and/or contracts that 
depend on hydrology indices.  
If a stochastic market clearing provides at least indicative price-quantity information for the possible 
future inflow realizations modelled in the scenario tree, then participants can estimate the price 
volatilities they expect to face. And they could make out-of-market arrangements (e.g., financial 
contracts) to hedge their risks using the market information, without the market manager’s intervention 
or knowledge. 
But Starkey also discusses using the stochastic optimisation more directly to clear a market in future 
water contracts. Key issues include the nature and form of the contracts that might be traded, and the 
ways in which the quantities to be traded could be determined from the stochastic “market-clearing” 
optimisation, if they are.  
If not otherwise constrained, a stochastic optimisation of the form discussed in Section 3.5 will actually 
determine a different market-clearing quantity to be traded for every event node.  But, while that kind 
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of “conditional” solution might indicate how the market could clear under various future scenarios, it 
would not really be implementable, in the form of a contract to be entered into now.  While we could 
define the quantity to depend on the scenario, the reality is that none of those exact scenarios will 
actually occur. Starkey suggests that the best approximation would be a contract in which the quantities 
are defined in proportion to some hydrology index. He also discusses ways in which the stochastic 
optimisation could be constrained to produce market-clearing trades in such contracts, in a formulation 
utilising the hydrology indices implied by the scenarios.  
A question remains, though, as to which hydrology indices might be used. Should it be a short term 
index representing current inflows, or a longer term exponentially weighted index representing 
cumulative inflows?  Or might both be used in the same market? For simplicity we discuss only two 
variants here: Fixed volume Financial Water Rights (FWRs) for long term water trading; and Financial 
Inflow Rights (FIRs) defined in proportion to a short term inflow index. 
4.2.1 Financial Water Rights 
While Starkey (2014) provides a more detailed discussion of options for trading water, as above,  most 
of our discussion in this chapter will simply assume the existence of a market in “fixed volume” 
Financial Water Rights (FWRs). If the market-clearing price for water in storage 0 at the end of period 
𝑡 is 𝜆L,? then an obligation-inclusive FWR defined for a quantity of water 𝑄? in that storage, at the end 
of that period, at an agreed price 𝑆𝑃? pays out:  
𝐹𝑊𝑅 𝑄?, 𝑆𝑃? = 𝜆L,? − 𝑆𝑃? 𝑄?.  
Thus this is a generic kind of (financial) “fixed” volume market trading instrument that can be used to 
protect against exposure to fluctuations in the price of water stored in the reservoir (as opposed to water 
released to the market) in any future time period 𝑡.54  
Under the informed policy assumption, the exact amount of FWRs in the end-of-period and spot market 
clearing volumes will be known by the SO. Final settlement for a participant in a “single node” market 
holding an 𝐹𝑊𝑅? 𝑄?, 𝑆𝑃?  can be written as follows: 
																																								 																				
54 See Section 4.4.3 below for discussion of how that price might differ from that of water delivered to a node, and 
how that difference in value is covered by a FDR. 	
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𝑞?𝜆? − 𝑄? 𝜆? − 𝑆𝑃? = 𝑄?. 𝑆𝑃? + 𝑞? − 𝑄? 𝜆? 
Here 𝜆 and 𝑞 denote market clearing price and cleared quantity.  
4.2.2 Financial Inflow Rights 
Inflow uncertainty makes future storage demands stochastic, but that is true of electricity flows, too. An 
inflow at the reservoir in time period 𝑡 is similar to a nodal power injection in the electricity economic 
dispatch model. Hence these inflow risks will be hedgeable using an instrument based on inflow rents.       
The term 𝑓?𝜆L,?55 of the dual objective function in Section 3.3.2 refers to the surpluses that will accrue 
on inflow supplies at a node in time 𝑡. We will define property rights for the inflow related settlement 
surpluses, which we refer to as Financial Inflow Rights, FIRs.    
Unlike other “capacity” volumes discussed in later sections, the inflow volume available is uncertain. In 
principle, fixed volume FIRs could be defined as analogues to CfDs in electricity markets, and used to 
hedge against spot price uncertainty at a particular time and place. Thus, a participant could have a 
financial contract to buy a pre-arranged quantity of inflow, at a pre-arranged strike price, and then buy 
matching FSR storage capacity rights (see below) to perfectly hedge a known withdrawal requirement 
in some future period. The pay-out from 𝐹𝐼𝑅L,?	 𝑞L,?, 𝑆𝑃L,? , giving the holder the right (and obligation) 
to “receive” quantity 𝑞L,? of the flows arriving at reservoir node in period 𝑡 will be defined as: 
 𝐹𝐼𝑅L,?	 𝑞L,?, 𝑆𝑃L,? = 𝜆L,? − 𝑆𝑃L,? 𝑞L,? 
But, the problem with fixed volume FIRs is that the SO will be exposed if the “‘expected” inflows do 
not occur. While these hedge against spot price uncertainty at a particular time and place, they leave the 
holder facing volume uncertainty. In that sense they are like the line “shareholdings” proposed by Read 
and Sell (1989). Instead, this section defines index based FIRs of the type discussed by Starkey (2014).  
Those shareholdings were like FGRs discussed in Section 2.5.3, in the sense that they were defined in 
terms of the Lagrangian multiplier associated with particular flow constraints, but they were defined as 
proportions of available capacity, rather than as a fixed MW capacity. But FIRs are much simpler, and 
more intuitive. In general, they could be similar to weather derivatives, and be based on a variety of 
																																								 																				
55	But, to avoid modelling difficulties, we will only consider the inflows at reservoir node. 	
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indices. But here we will assume that the “hydrological index” is just the reservoir inflow volume, so 
they simply apportion that volume amongst the FIR holders.  
Note that these FIRs are being priced at the same value as FWRs, per unit of volume. They really only 
differ in that the volume is proportional to the inflow index, 𝐻>,?. In other words the FIR is just a right 
to receive a volume of FWRs, with that volume being proportional to the inflow received. This is 
appropriate if all inflows can be totally directed to the storage without any non-consumptive benefit, 
and without turning any away as spill. Inflows arriving at another node could be priced differently, with 
FDRs being used to hedge the locational marginal price difference, as discussed in Section 4.4.3 
These index-based FIRs ensure the inflows, and inflow risk, belong to the participants. Hence, the SO 
would be insulated from the risks of inflow fluctuations. The participants, on the other hand, would be 
accepting all the risks themselves, and would have to manage their physical consumption strategy, 
and/or exercise of the system capacity rights discussed below to manage those risks. And this creates a 
situation very much like that created by the “virtual models” approach discussed by Barrosso et al 
(2012), and in Section 4.5. 
4.2.3 Settlement Surplus   
Before we proceed to in-depth investigations on inter-temporal marginal price and inter-locational 
marginal price hedging instruments, it is important to see how the settlement surpluses are created over 
the spatially and temporally distributed arcs and nodes As discussed in Section 2.5, the balance of funds 
remaining in the electricity market pool account as a result of net receipts across the network is known 
as the settlement surplus or congestion rent. It accrues when the network is constrained or congested 
and the participants need to pay the marginal cost of congestion. Typically, an FTR pays part of the 
congestion rents receivable by the ISO back to the holder. As a result, a surplus of funds is created for 
the ISO if there is an excess of congestion rent over payments to FTR holders, and this may be re-
distributed to market participants. In the case of a networked water market, the only “settlement 
surplus” arising from the purely intra-period market clearing would relate to the arrival of water into the 
system, and the movement of water within the system, in that period. But there would also implicitly be 
a profit, or potentially a loss, generated as the water carried forward was re-valued between periods. 
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That profit would not actually be collected by the market manager, though, until the water carried 
forward was actually bought by market participants, at those (hopefully) higher prices. So the market 
manager would face significant uncertainty with respect to the size of any profit, and possibly be in a 
position to lower that risk by issuing hedging instruments. 
If future water was bought and sold in an integrated inter-temporal market, and the reservoir operated in 
accordance with market outcomes, there would be a formal “settlement surplus” arising from inter-
temporal water trading. The market manager still faces significant risk, in an uncertain world, but at 
least the surplus can be formally analysed in terms of the shadow prices on storage bounds. This section 
will assume that kind of market arrangement, and discuss financial instruments that can be supported by 
the revenue collected by the market manager as settlement surplus, just as FTRs are supported in 
electricity markets. Suppose that 𝑞,?  and 𝑦,?  denote cleared consumptive/non-consumptive quantities. 
Then, the settlement surplus will be:  
𝜆,?𝑞,?? + 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? 𝑦,?∈Ω(,)(,)∈?   
Here the amounts 𝜆,?𝑞,??  (LMP revenues) and 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? 𝑦,?∈Ω(,)(,)∈?  (arc 
flow revenues) can be interpreted as the SO’s revenue (i.e., paid by the consumptive and non-
consumptive users respectively), after clearing the market. Any settlement surpluses due to price 
differentials induced by the binding constraints will contribute positively or negatively to the above 
revenue depending on different ownership regimes. For example, in the real world, a participant in the 
market can also be an asset owner (e.g., hydropower generator owns long term storage and/or canals). 
In this particular case, though, it is assumed that the supply system (i.e., storage, tributaries and 
inflows) and transportation system (i.e., channels), are “owned” by the market manager, rather than by 
any party trading in the market. If the system “owns” the inflows/tributaries cost them at zero, the 
market is accumulating all these revenues, with an adjustment for the value of starting and closing 
stocks.  
𝑆L𝛾L in Equation [3.7] denotes the initial valuation of the storage at the beginning of the planning 
horizon, while 𝑠Lo𝜍oFG in Equation [3.7] denotes the final valuation of the storage at the end of the 
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planning horizon. The term 𝑉o𝑠o  of the primal objective function expresses the piecewise linear 
end-of-horizon storage value function in the primal formulation together with the end-of-horizon 
storage block limits in constraint [3.3d]. 𝜗oF 𝑠o  is the end-of-horizon (piece-wise linear) constraint 
rent component for future/contingent bid tranches in the dual objective function. If there are real future 
bids for end-of-horizon water in storage, and the SO settles participant accounts at the end of each market horizon, 
there will be actual payments to/from participants contributing to the settlement surplus.56 These will cancel 
out, though, if the SO merely clears the end-of-horizon market between participants, and takes no net 
position itself. More generally, the SO could be exposed to spot market risk in each period when there 
is a storage imbalance in the absence of hedging instruments. In particular, she will definitely face a 
loss when prices fall as no adequate storage capacity to carry water forward.  
4.2.4 Overview of Hedging Instruments  
Section 4.2.2 above has already discussed the concept of FIRs, based on inflow rentals. Sections 4.3 
and Section 4.4 below, complete the picture by describing hedging instruments designed to complement 
the FWR market by creating and trading property rights associated with storage capacity and network 
flow capacity, and investigate revenue adequacy issues associated with those products. 
As shown in Figure 4-1, Financial Inflow Rights (FIRs), Financial Storage Rights (FSRs) and Financial 
Delivery Rights (FDRs) can be defined to hedge against risks associated with trading of inflows, water 
in storage, inter-temporal storage, and flow transportation across network, respectively.   
																																								 																				
56 With ‘indicative’ bidding (Starkey, 2014) for the end-of-horizon water, or SO-estimated penalty values, the SO 
would be facing a risk of collecting end-of-horizon settlement surpluses because pool account balances only will 
be accrued as expected future receipts. However, under steady state conditions, we could assume the closing stock 
to have approximately the same value and/or level as the opening stock. Hence, unless participants can bid for 
end-of-horizon stock, the initial and end-of-horizon stock valuations may only be used for internal purposes, and 




Figure 4-1. Structure of water market hedging instruments    
The following table presents spectrum of the hedging instruments discussed in various sections of this 
chapter, and their associations. 
Table 4-1. Spectrum of water market hedging instruments 
System Component Hedging Instruments Relevant Section 
Inflow Financial inflow rights Section 4.2.2 
Storage 
Financial storage capacity rights Section 4.3.1 
Financial storage capacity options Section 4.3.3 
Transportation network Financial Delivery Rights Section 4.4. 
4.3 Supply System Rents and Rights 
This section interprets the “supply system” rent components, associated with stored water (Section 
4.3.1), inflows (Section 4.3.2) and storage capacity (Section 4.3.3) in the dual objective function, and 
then goes on to discuss the issue of corresponding property rights. These rents can be explicitly handled 
by defining separate accounts for each constraint, as in the case of financial flow gate rights. Settlement 
of rents in successive spot market clearings can be implicitly done using periodic accounting.  
In principle, the users should be willing to pay the expected value of these supply system rents, plus 
some risk premium, for rights to receive water and/or use the system. And, in the absence of scale 
economies, the payments they are willing to make should be able to fund infrastructural upgrading in 
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the long-term under optimal expansion conditions. In the context of electricity networks, Read & Sell 
(1988) noted that rents actually collected on transmission capacity constraints, after expansion occurs, 
will only partially offset the costs of capacity expansion, under realistic scale economies. Read (1989, 
1997) discusses an ex ante contracting regime designed to overcome this deficiency, and a similar 
approach would apply in water markets, but that is beyond our present scope. Here, though, this section 
will ignore the longer term implications, and merely consider the role of rents as support for hedging 
instruments.  
4.3.1 Financial Storage Rights  
This section proposes financial storage rights to hedge against the inter-temporal storage price risks. 
The 𝑆𝛾F and 𝑆𝛾I terms in the dual objective function represent the rents associated with the storage 
constraints. The corresponding settlement surplus could be used to support an FTR-like instrument that 
we will refer to as a “Financial Storage Right” (FSR). These are similar to the gas market FTRs in Read 
et al., (2012)57 but FSRs are less complicated, because “storing” and “transporting” can be more 
“cleanly” distinguished from each other for water than for gas, where both occur in the same pipeline.   
These FSRs could be seen as representing a virtual pipe that enables flow transfers (within the storage) 
between two time periods 𝑡M and 𝑡MM. For example, if the inflows are ignored, participants might own a 
share of the initial stock, and use FSRs to cover the risks involved in storing that stock until it is 
consumed. But the initial stock will be exhausted after some time, and uncertain inflows to the storage 
in the future time periods will create risk unless someone buys a contract to receive those inflows, as 
well as FSRs to then store them to be released in different periods. We could create index-based FIR 
rights corresponding to those uncertain and variable inflows as described in a previous section. The 
storage capacity itself is deterministic, though, and thus similar to the transmission line capacities in an 
electricity market. And, by analogy, we would like to be able to determine feasible FSR allocation 
																																								 																				
57 As discussed in Section 4.4.5 of Read et al, gas market FTR implementation could be relatively complex due to 
significant transit flow delays, with non-linear flow compressibility equations implying that the transportation 
network works as a temporary storage. Thus the FSR/FTR concepts discussed here are less easily distinguished, in 
that context.  
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patterns over the planning horizon. Then users may trade both water and FSRs separately, or perhaps in 
a combined market. But revenue adequacy needs careful consideration. There is a clear incompatibility 
here, between indexed FIRs and non-indexed FSRs, but that incompatibility merely reflects the physical 
incompatibility between uncertain inflows and certain storage capacity. Thus we will develop a fixed 
volume FSR concept here, discuss the implications of that incompatibility in Section 4.3.3 on 
“alterative concepts”. 
Most FTRs are defined in the “obligation-inclusive” form (two-sided obligation), in which the “pay-
out” is implicitly defined by the inter-nodal price difference, and can be positive or negative58. That 
form could be used for FSRs too. An FSR can be labelled as 𝐹𝑆𝑅 𝑡M, 𝑡MM , paying out at 𝜆L,?EE − 𝜆L,?E  
per unit of water, to hedge the risk implied by the inter-temporal price difference on a specified storage 
volume between	𝑡M and 𝑡MM(> 𝑡M) (e.g., from winter to summer). That is, it effectively hedges the 
transaction of selling water into the reservoir, then buying water out of the reservoir later.  
As noted in Starkey (2014), water market clearing can range from simple clearing for a single period to 
a more complex clearing for the multiple stages in a scenario tree. Here, the latter is assumed, in which 
case rents are explicitly ‘generated’ by the market clearing solutions when the upper/lower bounds are 
binding at the end of any period, in any scenario,  in the multi-period water market clearing, thus 
creating an (expected)  marginal water value difference. To further simplify we will assume that the 
lower bound is constant, so that the problem can be transformed to make the lower storage bound zero, 
thus avoiding some secondary issues related to rent generated by changes in the non-zero lower bounds.  
Under these conditions we might expect that the SO can only sell a maximum FSR volume of 𝑆 59.    
Revenue adequacy is a tricky issue, though. In electricity markets, an FTR hedges a specific volume (in 
MW) transmitted between nodes, in a single period. There is no carryover of current flows from one 
period to another.  The FTR settlement is simple and straightforward, as there is no uncertainty yet to 
																																								 																				
58 Often just referred to as an “obligation FTR”. 
59  More generally, the rent associated with the upper storage bound is 𝑆 − 𝑆 𝛾?F? , and the SO could issue an 




be resolved, at the time settlement is made. This means that the electricity market ISO is not exposed to 
any residual revenue adequacy risk. Similarly, there would be no risk in a deterministic situation, and 
hence no risk associated with a deterministic “FSR settlement”.  But the situation is different under 
uncertainty.  
Our inter-temporal FSRs will hedge a specific volume stored between time periods, at a single node 
(i.e., at the reservoir). Settlement on the inter-temporal nodal FSRs will occur based on market prices 
reflecting expected water values determined at the time when the FSR commences, and when it 
concludes. But conditional expected marginal water values change in every period, reflecting changes 
in the probability that the storage trajectory will reach the storage bounds, and this will create market 
price differences between periods, even when storage is well away from the bounds. In the dual, 
though, storage bound rents will only be generated when storage bounds are actually active, and 
carryover of storage means that  the true marginal water values for each period will only be known in 
retrospect, when the full path is known as described in Section 4.3.2.1. 
So the water market SO does need to be concerned about the risk when settling an inter-temporal FSR 
under uncertainty, for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the fact that rents are being “generated” when 
storage bounds are active, does not mean that they are “collected” in those periods.  So a market 
manager who settles an FSR using rents “generated” in a market clearing solution  would be  doing so 
on the assumption that those rents will eventually be collected, in the course of future water market 
transactions. In the real world, that means that the market manager may face a significant and ill-
defined non-collection risk. But we can at least define and discuss that kind of risk if we assume 
(simplistically)  that the uncertainty faced by the market is completely described by the scenario set in 
the event tree formulation. This means that stochastic market-clearing optimisation actually only needs 
to be solved once, in order to determine the quantities and prices applying in all possible future states. 
So, while the market manager does not know which scenario path will occur, it does at least know, from 
the beginning, what revenue it will receive in each future situation it could face, and can pre-calculate 
conditional expected values for each node. It will still be in the situation, though, of paying out a water 
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value difference when neither the initial nor final water values are actually known, only their 
(conditional) expected values.  
This means that the notion of inter-temporal revenue adequacy for FSRs needs to address the issue of 
the residual risk faced by the SO when making FSR pay-outs. As we will see, revenue adequacy is only 
guaranteed in expectation. We will develop a set of propositions regarding revenue adequacy in a 
stochastic setting, but first discuss the issue for FSRs in a (hypothetical) deterministic environment:, 
where: 
§ If no storage limits are binding during the interval	(𝑡M, 𝑡MM), then there is no related settlement 
surplus contributing to the support of FSR(𝑡M, 𝑡MM). But then there would be no price difference 
either, and hence no pay-out required. In a stochastic environment we might imagine FSR sales 
for that period generating positive revenue for the SO. But, if the future really were known to 
all parties, no-one would see any point in paying positive prices for FSRs whose value was 
known to be zero.60 
§ If the upper limit is binding at some point during that interval, it will create a positive rent, 
adding positive value to the FSR, reflecting the fact that water will be worth more after the 
constraining period than before. Similarly, if the lower limit binds at some point during the 
interval 	(𝑡M, 𝑡MM), it will add a negative value to the FSR. In that case, though, (with a zero 
lower bound) there will be no negative rent, since no water is carried over in an empty 
reservoir. 
§ So we can derive a multi-period (deterministic) relationship between FSR pay-out (per unit) 
and accumulated rents (per unit) by repeatedly applying  constraint equation [3.12b] to the 
periods from 𝑡M to 𝑡MM, we get:  
																																								 																				
60 Actually the whole concept of hedging, and FSR trading, breaks down under deterministic assumptions, 
because all parties value all instruments at exactly what they would have to pay for them.  But this discussion is 
helpful in setting up our understanding of dual relationships in the real situation, where uncertainty is obviously 
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Using this, in the deterministic case, if the SO has sold a total of 𝑄 ≤ 𝑆 units of obligation-
inclusive 𝐹𝑆𝑅(𝑡M, 𝑡MM), the pay-out is 𝑄(𝜆L,?EE − 𝜆L,?E). Then, using the above we have:  




?|?E ≤ 𝑆 𝛾L,?
F?|?EEIG
?|?E   
So, for the deterministic case, the FSR pay-outs are covered by the rents generated, and thus the SO will 
not face any revenue adequacy issues.  
However, water is subject to uncertainty affecting both demand and supply. In principle, most 
participants prefer some form of certainty about their future water allocation, though. In particular, 
participants will, on average, want to increase storage draw-down to maintain adequate supply in dry 
conditions. However, future allocations cannot be made certain for all participants, in reality, and the 
centralised market clearing authority will look to decrease withdrawal in that situation. Revenue 
adequacy of FSRs under uncertainty could be a major issue, and in the next section, we show that it can 
only be guaranteed in expectation.  
4.3.2 Inter-temporal FSR Revenue Adequacy Problem   
Now, in a stochastic environment, suppose 𝜆L,>,? denotes the marginal water value at the storage node 
as a function of the period and scenario node index. That is, it is the conditional expected marginal 
water value at node (𝑡, ℎ) in our event node formulation. Hereinafter this section omits network node 
indexing (e.g., 𝜆>,? denotes 𝜆L,>,?) to reduce notational complexity.  
Consider an FSR contract from time period 𝑡M to 𝑡MM. The pay-out occurs once we have observed market 
prices in both periods 𝑡M and 𝑡MM. More specifically, a multi-stage FSR pays out the actual market price 
difference across the inter-period sub-scenario actually realised. However, the market price in each 
period is based on the expected value of the range of prices which could be seen over all possible 
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outcomes, from that period forward. And evolving expectations can make the market price differ 
between 𝑡M and 𝑡MM even if the storage bounds remain slack throughout the sub-scenario, and so no rent 
is generated. However, on average, the price difference can be supported by the rents generated on the 
storage constraints that actually bind in intervening periods, as shown in the results below.			
We could use unconditional expectations to describe the revenue adequacy problem, and show that the 
expected rent collected would cover the pay-outs required, on average, in the long run. That may be 
true, at a very high level, but hardly gives much assurance to an SO who could still be left carrying a 
huge risk exposure, perhaps over decades. So revenue adequacy results that only apply in expectation 
are of limited practical use. Ideally we would like to show that, provided the physical storage is 
available, revenue adequacy can be guaranteed, with certainty, with respect to each and every FSR, just 
as in the FTR case.Unfortunately, that proves to be impossible. What this section seeks is a revenue 
adequacy result that is at least as tight as possible, in the sense that the risk faced by the SO is 
minimised.    
The SO is increasingly becoming exposed to the risk of revenue adequacy on FSR pay-outs as we 
traverse backwards through the scenario tree along a specific scenario path towards the root node from 
the final leaf event node at which all uncertainty is resolved. FSR pay-outs must be based on a 
conditional expected value in looking forward from the event tree node at which the FSR terminates, 
leaving perhaps significant uncertainty yet to be resolved. Thus any revenue adequacy proof needs to 
work with the conditional expectations, given all the information available at the time when settlement 
must be made. 
The first proposition is about the revenue adequacy of a single period FSR under uncertainty. The 
second proposition then employs that result to prove an inter-temporal multi-stage FSR revenue 
adequacy result. Finally, we will consider multiple, multi-stage (overlapping) FSRs. It will be seen that 
these propositions will depend upon arguments derived using conditional expectations. Proposition [4-
A] can be expressed as follows.  
Proposition 4A. Suppose that the lower bound is zero and the upper bound remains unchanged during 
the planning horizon. The SO issues a single period obligation–inclusive FSR, for 
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quantity 	𝑄r ≤ 𝑆 − 𝑆 = 𝑆, between time periods 𝑡M and 𝑡M + 1. Then the rents 
generated on the binding storage constraints, over the contract period from 𝑡M to 𝑡M +
1, will be sufficient to meet the conditional expected value of the FSR payments, when 
that expectation is taken at the beginning of period 𝑡M. [4-A]  
Proof. The FSR holder has the right to collect (or obligation to pay) the actual market price 
difference, for the sub-scenario that actually occurs between the time periods 𝑡M and 
𝑡M + 1, for any realisation of the inflow for period 𝑡M + 1, given the entire scenario 
leading up to node ℎ, 𝑡M . And the FSR pay-out must be known at the time it is made 
(end of period 𝑡M + 1) based on events that have been realised at that time.  
Recall the conditional expected dual constraint equation, [3.14a] in the previous 
chapter. Here ℎ, 𝑡M  is the ancestor of event node ℎM, 𝑡M + 1 . We will re-arrange 
equation [3.14b] as follows:  
𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG| ℎ, 𝑡M −𝜆>,?E = 𝛾>,?E
F − 𝛾>,?E
I   
Taking expectations on both sides, conditional on node ℎ, 𝑡M  eventuating, and noting 
that there is, in fact, only one end-of-period period storage shadow price pair for each 
event node, the expected per unit pay-out requirement is just the price differential, 
which is as follows:   
𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG−𝜆>,?E| ℎ, 𝑡M = 𝔼 𝛾>,?E
F − 𝛾>,?E
I | ℎ, 𝑡M = 𝛾>,?E
F − 𝛾>,?E
I   
But, since non-zero shadow prices only occur when the reservoir is either full or empty, 
the following relationship yields the expected FSR pay-out requirement for an FSR 
quantity of  𝑄r: 
 𝔼 Payout>E,?E(𝑄r) = 𝑄r 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG| ℎ, 𝑡M −𝜆>,?E =
𝑄r𝛾>,?E
F 									𝑖𝑓	𝑠 = 		 𝑆
0											𝑖𝑓		𝑆 < 𝑠 < 𝑆	
−𝑄r𝛾>,?E




Now we must compare this requirement with rent generated, using an inequality 
implied by the FSR volume limit which, with the lower bound to zero, we can write as 
𝑄r ≤ 𝑆. The required result then follows using similar logic as for the deterministic 
dual constraint equation [3.12b]. Again, there is only one pair of end-of-period storage 
bounds, and hence storage prices, for each event node. The terms 𝑆𝛾>,?E	
F and 𝑆𝛾>,?E	
– in 
the equation below can be thought of as conditional expected rents associated with the 
upper and the lower storage bounds. The conditional expected rent is thus either: 
Rent>E,?E 𝑆 = 𝑆𝛾>,?E
F , if the reservoir is full, or Rent>E,?E 𝑆 = −𝑆𝛾>,?E
I = 0, if the 
reservoir is empty61. So, comparing the conditional expected requirement with the rent 
generated, we have:   
 𝔼 𝑄r(𝜆>E,?EFG−𝜆>,?E)| ℎ, 𝑡M =
𝑄r𝛾>,?E
F (≤ 𝑆𝛾>,?E
F )																										𝑖𝑓	𝑠 = 𝑆
0																																											𝑖𝑓		𝑆 < 𝑠 < 𝑆	
−𝑄r𝛾>,?E
F (≤ −𝑆𝛾>,?E
I = 0)								𝑖𝑓	𝑠 = 𝑆 = 062
  
Therefore, revenue sufficiency is guaranteed, because the conditional expectation, at 
the beginning-of-period 𝑡M, of the net surplus after settling the FSR, is positive, that is:  
 Netsurplus>E,?E(𝑆, 𝑄r) = Rent>E,?E 𝑆 − 𝔼 Payout>E,?E(𝑄r) ≥ 0.∎  
The following proposition generalises the above result for the above single period FSR. When the 
conditional expectation is taken at any time period before commencement of the FSR 
Proposition 4B.Suppose that the assumptions above hold, and the SO issues a single period FSR which 
commences at time period 𝑡M. The conditional expected value, taken at any time period, 
𝑡L < 𝑡M of 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠>E,?E(𝑆, 𝑄r) will be positive.  [4-B] 
																																								 																				
61 In section 4.3.1, we manipulated the canonical form of the lower bound to make the shadow price positive: 
𝛾>,?I ≥ 0. That would still give us a negative rent when the lower storage constraint was binding, because that 
same manipulation makes the RHS = (−𝑆).  But we have already set 𝑆 = 0. This means the rent is actually zero. 
By way of contrast, electricity transmission lines have a positive flow capacity in each direction, so electricity 
networks always generate positive rent when transmission capacity constraints are binding, regardless of the 
current flow direction. 
62	Based on personal communication with E.G. Read, (Read, 2016). 
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Proof. Proposition 4A guarantees revenue adequacy for a single period FSR issued and 
commencing in the same time period. But in this proposition we are focusing on the 
conditional expectation of the FSR pay-out taken in a time period (𝑡L), prior to the FSR 
commencing time period 𝑡M. The proof is straightforward, by splitting the computation 
of the expectation for 𝑡M + 1 taken in 𝑡L into two stages (i.e., 𝑡L, 𝑡M  and 𝑡M, 𝑡M + 1 ). 
Applying the laws of iterated expectations, we state the following: 
𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG| ℎ, 𝑡L = (ℙ[(ℎM, 𝑡M)>M ℎ, 𝑡L . 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG| ℎM, 𝑡M )  
Similarly, we have the following expression for the conditional expected value of 
Netsurplus>E,?E(𝑆, 𝑄r), taken at node ℎ, 𝑡L : 
𝔼 Netsurplus>E,?E(𝑆, 𝑄r)| ℎ, 𝑡L =
(ℙ[(ℎM, 𝑡M)>M ℎ, 𝑡L . Netsurplus>E,?E(𝑆, 𝑄r)  
Therefore, we can safely state that the conditional expectation of the net surplus for 
period 𝑡M, taken at any time period 𝑡L ≤ 𝑡M will always be positive, because it is a 
weighted sum of terms, one for each event node (𝑡M, ℎM) that might occur at time 𝑡M, 
each of which is itself positive, by Proposition 4A.∎ 
The next proposition is about the inter-temporal revenue adequacy issue for a multi-stage FSR. The 
problem is separable in time, thus it decomposes into a collection of single period sub-problems.  
Proposition 4C.Suppose that the assumptions above hold, but the SO is now issuing a multi-stage 
obligation–inclusive FSR, for quantity	𝑄r ≤ 𝑆, between time periods 𝑡M and 𝑡MM, where 
𝑡MM > 𝑡M. The conditional expected value of the aggregate rents generated on the 
binding storage constraints, over the contract period from 𝑡M to 𝑡MM, will be sufficient to 
meet the conditional expected FSR payments, where those expectations are taken at 
any time 𝑡L ≤ 𝑡M. [4-C] 
Proof. We can decompose 𝐹𝑆𝑅 𝑡M, 𝑡MM  into a set of single period FSRs, from 𝑡M to 𝑡M + 1, 𝑡M +
1 to 𝑡M + 2 etc, assuming that the SO issues them all at some time period t ≤ 𝑡M.The 
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pay-out required, from 𝑡M to 𝑡MM, is just the sum of the pay-outs for these single period 
FSRs, because the end-of-period/beginning-of-period price terms cancel, as follows:  
 𝜆>E,?EFG−𝜆>,?E + 𝜆>E,?EFl−𝜆>,?EFG + ⋯+ 𝜆>E,?EE−𝜆>,?EEIG =
𝜆>E,?EE−𝜆>,?E.  
 So the expected pay-out requirement, conditioned on node ℎ, 𝑡L  is as follows: 
 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFG−𝜆>,?E| ℎ, 𝑡L + 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EFl−𝜆>,?EFG| ℎ, 𝑡L + 
⋯+ 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EE−𝜆>,?EEIG| ℎ, 𝑡L = 𝔼 𝜆>E,?EE−𝜆>,?E| ℎ, 𝑡L  
 Here, each term represents the expected pay-out of a single period FSR conditioned on 
ℎ, 𝑡L , as in the previous proposition. By that proposition, then, each of these 
conditional expected pay-out requirements is covered by the conditional expected value 
of the rents generated in the period to which it applies, where those expectations are 
taken at any time 𝑡L ≤ 𝑡M. So it follows immediately that the conditional expected sum 
of those pay-out requirements is covered by the conditional expected sum of rents, as 
stated in this proposition.∎ 
In reality, the SO will expect to issue multiple FSRs with different time periods. Proposition [4-D] is 
about revenue adequacy to support multiple FSRs covering different periods, in the same market 
horizon.   
Proposition 4D:Suppose that the assumptions above hold, and the SO issues multiple multi-period 
FSRs indexed by	= 	1, 2, 3, … . 𝐾, commencing at various time periods, and sometimes 
overlapping each other. Define, the pay-out of the 𝑘th FSR as 𝑄Î(𝜆>EE,?ÎEE − 𝜆>E,?ÎE ) 
where 𝑄Î is the contract quantity, 𝑡
MM > 𝑡M and event nodes (ℎMM, 𝑡MM) and (ℎM, 𝑡M) 
eventuate. If the net sum of overlapping FSR allocations, for each period, is less than 
the storage capacity, then the conditional expected value of the aggregate net 
surpluses, taken at any time period, 𝑡L ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑡M}, will be positive, for each period 
𝑡 ≥ 𝑡L, and in total over all such periods.  [4-D]  
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Proof: In general, we could have all FSRs issued at any time period on or after 𝑡L and 
commencing in any period (𝑡M ≥ 𝑡L) as sketched in Figure 4-2, where the dashed/solid 
lines represent the periods from when an FSR is issued, and then when it is  active, 
within the market horizon.  
 
Figure 4-2. Example of multi-stage multiple FSRs issued and starting at different periods.  
First, each multi-period FSR can be decomposed into a set of single period FSRs, each 
for quantity 𝑄Î, as in proposition 4C. Second, for each time period, 𝑡, we can define 
the aggregate FSR quantity to be: 𝑄? = 𝑄Î : 𝑡
MM > 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡M . Then the original FSR 
set is equivalent to a set of single period FSRs, one for each 𝑡, with quantity 𝑄?. 
Clearly, taking expectations at time 𝑡L ≤ 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑡M }, proposition 4B applies with respect 
to each of these aggregate single period FSRs.  
So the conditional expected net surplus 𝔼 Net	surplus>E,?E 𝑆, 𝑄rÎ | ℎ, 𝑡L
63 will be 
positive for all FSR issuances, provided, 𝑄? ≤ 𝑆 , for each 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡L. Clearly, the same is 
true for the sum of the above conditional expected net surpluses, over the market 
horizon.∎  
So we will get a positive conditional expected net surplus for the aggregate of any set of FSRs 
commencing in different periods, provided we take the expectations in any time period before any of 
them commences. In reality, though, the SO will be issuing new FSRs continuously during the market 
horizon, and will be interested in (re-)assessing revenue adequacy in any period, while earlier issuances 
are still functioning (as shown in Figure 4-2). The overall revenue adequacy situation at any period 
																																								 																				
63	Rent>E,?E 𝑆 − 𝔼 Payout>E,?ÎE 𝑄rÎ | ℎ, 𝑡L 	
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during the market horizon will depend on the losses/gains already accumulated on the FSR portfolio 
already issued, and there is no way we can guarantee that a conditional expectation taken during the 
term of (some) FSRs will be positive. But we can still expect a positive conditional expected net surplus 
values, at any time in the horizon, provided the total issuance is less than storage capacity, 𝑆, 64 and the 
value of unrealised losses/gains on existing FSR issuances can be written-off (e.g., by “mark-to-
market” valuation of tradable FSRs) and the assessment focused only on the conditional expected value 
of aggregate future risk exposure, across the whole portfolio.  . 
Proposition4E: Suppose that the assumptions above hold, and the SO has issued multiple, multi-stage 
obligation–inclusive FSRs, with aggregate volume 𝑄? ≤ 𝑆, for each t, as in Proposition 
4D. At any event node (ℎ, 𝑡), let the residual FSR pay-out for the 𝑘?> FSR be defined 
by: 𝑄Î(𝜆>EE,?ÎEE − 𝜆>,?), if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡
M , and otherwise 𝑄Î(𝜆>EE,?ÎEE − 𝜆>,?ÎE ). Then the 
conditional expected value of the aggregate rents generated on the binding storage 
constraints, over the future market horizon, will at least cover the conditional expected 
residual FSR pay-out requirement , where both conditional expectations are taken at 
event node (ℎ, 𝑡).   
  [4-E] 
 Proof: Any FSR operating at time t, in the range 𝑡M 	< 𝑡 < 𝑡MM , can be decomposed into a 
series of single period FSRs, as in proposition 4C, and hence re-composed into two 
FSRs: 𝐹𝑆𝑅 𝑡M, 𝑡  and 𝐹𝑆𝑅 𝑡, 𝑡MM  The value of former is already known at time 𝑡, and 
that will imply unrealised losses/gains, which may be written-off as “sunk”, and 
irrelevant to this proposition. However, proposition 4D applies to the residual FSR 
values, with the conditional expectation being taken at time period 𝑡, which is less than 
or equal to the commencement date for each of these (residual) FSRs, as required by 
that proposition.  Hence we have the result that above proposition holds.	∎     
																																								 																				
64 That is, provided the new issuance is only up to the remaining unassigned storage capacity 𝑆 − 𝑄? 	
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In theory, then, proposition 4E implies that a rational forward-looking market manager who is willing 
to write-losses (or write-up gains) to date on existing FSRs (e.g., by “mark-to-market” valuation of 
tradable FSRs), could issue “fresh” FSRs, at any time, up to the remaining unassigned reservoir 
capacity, for any future period in the remaining market horizon. The market manager then has the same 
assurance of expected future revenue adequacy for its portfolio of new and residual FSRs, as if she was 
starting with a clean slate.65  
4.3.3 Alternative Concepts 
While this thesis only sets out to provide a preliminary exploration of hedging concepts, it should be 
recognised that the FSR concept developed above is not entirely satisfactory, for two main reasons: 
§ Revenue adequacy only seems possible on an expected basis and 
§ It does not fully meet the participants’ likely requirement to manage an uncertain volume of 
inflow entitlements. 
Thus, while the development of alternatives lies beyond the scope of this preliminary investigation, we 
conclude by discussing some of the issues, and suggesting some alternative concepts that might be 
considered.  
4.3.3.1 Revenue adequacy and Retrospective FSRs 
It may seem disappointing that we were only able to prove revenue adequacy “in expectation” for the 
FSRs described above. But Read 201666 suggests that “on reflection, it does not seem reasonable to 
expect any more than this.  At best, we might expect a financial instrument like this to put the holder in 
the same position as if they owned, controlled and benefited from a corresponding slice of the physical 
system. And he observes that even a reservoir owner with full control over the system would not be 
able to know the actual (rather than expected) initial or final value of water at any time 𝑡 < 𝑇	  
Typically, the reservoir owner will go through phases of conserving water because it has a high 
																																								 																				
65 In reality, decision-makers are seldom free to act in such a purely rational fashion, and we might expect 
issuance policy to be significantly impacted by the gains or losses accumulated to date. But we will not explore 
that here.  
66  Personal communication with E. G. Read.	
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expected value due to the likelihood of future shortage, only to find that the water so conserved is 
eventually spilled.  Conversely, they will go through phases of releasing water freely because it has a 
low expected value due to the likelihood of future spill, only to find that the water so released might 
eventually have staved off a shortage.  In other words, the true marginal value of water is only known to 
the reservoir owner, let alone the market, retrospectively.  Neither the true initial nor true final water 
values can be known at the time an FSR of the type described above is settled.  
In light of this, Read notes that, while the previous chapter models the whole range of future uncertainty 
using the event tree formulation method, the analogy between FSRs and FTRs, may be better 
understood in the context of the alternative “scenario path” formula, as described by Rockafellar & 
Wets (1991).  In that formulation it becomes clear that67 the “true” shadow prices (including marginal 
water values) for each scenario path behave in exactly the same way as for a deterministic formulation. 
But they are only slowly revealed to the decision-maker, who must base each real-time (event node) 
decision only on conditional expectations taken at that node. That requirement is expressed, in that 
formulation, by a “non-anticipativity restriction” which, mathematically, implies that the decision 
variables for all paths passing through an event node be identical, in all periods prior to that event node.  
For the reservoir management problem, Read (1979) shows that this implies that the “multiplier 
(shadow price) on the non-anticipativity restriction” for each path, at each event node is just the 
difference between the conditional expected marginal water value at the node, and the true marginal 
water value for that path, which will typically be known only at the end of the planning horizon, when 
the path has been completed.  
Thus Read suggests that, at least within the simplified context of a finite and discrete scenario tree, the 
SO could avoid all risk if it were allowed to defer FSR valuation and settlement until the end of the 
horizon, when all uncertainty has been resolved. At that time the exact scenario path will have been 
revealed, and the actual water value at any node along that path will also be known, depending on 
whether storage actually did reach its upper /lower bounds, spill/shortage actually did occur, etc.  And a  
“retrospective FSR” (RSR) could then be settled using the “true” retrospective marginal water values of 
the initial and final period, for the path that did occur.  In reality, situations are constantly evolving, and 
																																								 																				
67  See discussion in Chapter 8 of Read (1979) and other working papers.  
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uncertainty is not fully described by a scenario tree. But there could be an interim payment made at 
some date, with subsequent adjustments occurring, perhaps until some definitive event, such as a 
reservoir actually spilling, reveals what the true marginal water value actually was.  
Naturally, the higher level of security provided to the SO by an RSR kind of hedging instrument is 
reflected in a lower level of certainty given to participants, who would find the instrument less 
attractive as a result. But Read argues that the level of certainty provided is in fact realistic, and that 
participants could not do any better by building their own reservoirs. Thus he suggests that participants 
might eventually accept that this kind of instrument is better than having none at all, because the SO 
cannot face the risks of issuing firm FSRs of the type discussed above. So this alternative should not be 
dismissed out of hand.  It is not unusual, after all, to buy a product the true value of which only 
becomes evident after some period of time.  
4.3.3.2 Volume Uncertainty and Financial Storage Options 
It should be recognised that hydrological uncertainty does not just create price uncertainty for 
participants in water markets, but volume uncertainty. But the FSRs discussed above, like FTRs in 
electricity markets, only hedge price uncertainty, not volume uncertainty. In the presence of non-
seasonal inflow patterns, ideally, participants would want to hold fixed volume FSRs from one period 
to another together with indexed FIRs. But, the problem with this FSR-FIR regime is that the SO will 
be exposed if the “expected” inflows do not occur. The SO would have to buy back the FSRs from the 
market to support the current period consumption. 
It should be recognised that all of the above propositions and discussion relate to obligation–inclusive 
FSRs, but it is not clear that those are actually the best hedging instruments to use in this context, even 
if they are traded dynamically to match inflows, as above. At least they are not the natural analogues of 
physical reservoir capacity.  
As noted above, if the lower limit may be binding at some point during that interval, the marginal water 
values will typically be declining between the two periods, on average. However, since we assume 
‘zero’ storage lower bounds, there is no associated (negative) rent component appearing in the dual 
objective function. This reflects the fact that the stochastic optimisation ensures that we would never 
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carry water forward in situations when its ‘market observed’ (conditional expected) value was expected 
to fall.68  
The conditional expected dual prices (“rents”) associated with the storage bounds belonging to different 
scenarios (taken at the FSR starting period) will take sometimes positive and sometimes negative 
values, when those particular scenarios hit the upper/lower storage bounds over the market horizon as 
described in the above discussion. If the balance of the storage limit shadow price effects is positive 
over the interval, when assessed in the terminal period of the FSR, the obligation-inclusive FSR holder 
has the right to exercise the property right, and receive the value difference. If the balance of these 
effects is negative, the SO can be expected to “exercise the property right”, and the holder of an 
obligation-inclusive FSR has the obligation to pay the negative value difference. And we have shown 
that the net pay-out requirement can be supported by settlement surpluses, on average. 
So an obligation inclusive FSR contract holder could be sometimes exposed to risks if future storage 
conditions turn out to be adverse, and will definitely face a loss, on average, if FSRs are held during 
that part of the annual cycle when prices always fall. Meanwhile, there will be a positive contribution to 
the settlement surplus, on average, from the periods in which prices can rise, because storage may be 
full, and the SO would collecting these rents for every year. But, while the SO may face some negative 
rents, on average, from periods in which prices can fall, reservoirs will be much emptier than. In 
equilibrium, the average price rise over part of the annual cycle will be exactly offset by the average 
price fall over the rest of the cycle. But the differences in volume carried forward mean that the rental 
fund contribution will always be positive, over an annual cycle. But, if participants hold a constant 
volume of obligation inclusive FSRs over one or more annual cycles, the seasonal price fluctuations can 
be expected to cancel each other out over successive annual cycles, leaving a net pay-out requirement 
that may be positive, but may be negative, but does not grow, on average, over the years. 
																																								 																				
68 In reality, we will often observe, that, looking at past events, we have carried storage forward when its market 
value was, in fact, dropping. But that is because an adverse scenario actually occurred. We would not have 
(willingly) carried storage forward if we had thought that its value would drop, on average across all possible 
intra-period scenarios.  
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Thus obligation-inclusive FSRs would only seem appropriate as essentially seasonal instruments, 
allowing a participant to hedge a specific volume of storage from one season to another, within an 
annual cycle. Presumably participants would buy, and perhaps actively trade, such FSRs to hedge risks 
between times when they plan/expect to purchase water for storage (see below), and when they expect 
to withdraw it. In a seasonal system, participants could be expected to buy FSRs corresponding to 
moving water from wet(ish) seasons to dry(ish) seasons. 
If a longer term instrument is desired, to avoid participants being exposed to the risks of falling water 
values, we could suggest that participants buy a strip of annual “wet to dry” obligation inclusive FSRs, 
thus effectively giving them the right (and requirement) to store a specified volume of water over the 
relevant months, for each future year covered.  But they might also consider an FSR-option (FSO) 
contract. This would be similar to an FTR option69 which allows its holder the exercise rights when the 
power price difference is positive (Hogan, 2001; Ritcher et al, 2001; Deng & Oren, 2006), but implies 
no obligation in the opposite case. This means that the FSO holder in a water market is holding a right 
to store water, but has no obligation to do so. Thus the FSO is really the natural representation, in 
financial terms, of the physical capability a reservoir provides, to store water if, but only if, the water 
values are expected to increase during the contract period, just as electricity market option contracts 
give the holder the financial equivalent of a right to operate a thermal plant, at an SRMC equivalent to 
the strike price.  We note that such options are seem the natural form of contract to be sold by thermal 
generators, at least, in electricity markets, and so might be expected to form the main basis for trading 
in such markets.  But we also note that participants in such markets actually seem to prefer trading 
“sculpted” portfolios of obligation inclusive instruments.  Thus we would not be surprised if the same 
turned out to be true in water markets.  
4.4 Distribution System Rents and Rights 
The previous section described several financial instruments to hedge inter-temporal risks, based on 
supply system related settlement surpluses. But participants in a water market are also exposed to 
																																								 																				
69 An FTR option holder collects the congestion rents when the rents were positive, but there is no obligation to 
pay negative congestion rents.  
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locational price differences in each particular time period, and the uncertainty in these price differences 
could make some participants unwilling to engage in market activities unless insurance is available. In 
electricity markets, FTRs allow any user to hedge against locational price differences, and thus help to 
insulate her from flow transportation risks. In this section, we discuss how similar financial instruments 
are applicable to hedge against locational price risks in the water transportation network. It examines 
the transportation constraint rents in the dual objective function and then describes how these can be 
used to hedge against “transportation price risks”. 
The term 𝑋 , 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝑋𝜇,?I, ∈  of the dual objective function in Section 3.3.2 represents the 
rents implicitly collected from the consumptive/non-consumptive users, via the settlement surplus, 
when one or more arc capacity limits bind in period 𝑡. The value created by these rents should logically 
be credited to the transport system owners. However, this section initially avoids the problem of 
allocation to asset owners by assuming that all channels are owned by the market, or by an independent 
third party (e.g., government). 
4.4.1 Rents and the Settlement Surplus  
Let us drop the time superscript, t, and let 𝑖 and 𝑗 denote two adjacent network nodes. The SO is paid 
the nodal price for consumption at each node and the users implicitly retain the consumer surpluses, 
determined by 𝑄,𝜎,F , as above. The multiple copies of the primal constraint equations [3.2a] and 
[3.2b] across the network imply that the net release 𝑞  is equal to the net inflows across the network, 
plus the change in storage volume. For this scenario, one could assume that spill 𝑧 is a part of 𝑞. Using 
[3.2a], the term 𝜆 𝑞where 𝑖 ≠ 0 indicates the revenue collected from consumptive users who 
consume water anywhere in the network, while the cost of withdrawing this quantity from the reservoir 
will be 𝜆L 𝑞 − 𝑓 .  
If the flow on arc (𝑖, 𝑗) is limited by the arc flow limits this implies an arc transport price (per unit), 
given by re-arranging equation [3.10]: 𝜆,? = 𝜔,?∈³ , − 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I + 𝜆,?. With no non-
consumptive use, 𝜔,?∈³ , = 0, and the above  equation becomes: 𝜆,? − 𝜆,? = 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I . 
The RHS prices can be interpreted as the capacity constraint rent generated for a unit volume when 
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upper/lower arc limits are binding, while the locational marginal price difference (LHS) on arc (𝑖𝑗) 
shows how this rent is implicitly collected in the “settlement surplus” from market clearing for that 
particular arc, in period 𝑡.  
So the RHS identifies the rents which could, in principle, be returned to particular asset owners, out of 
the settlement surplus the SO is collecting from the consumptive users on the LHS. The net rent 
𝑋 , 𝜇 , ,?
F
, ∈ − 𝑋𝜇,?I, ∈  indicated in the dual objective function, is determined by 
taking the sum of the positive rent components for arcs on which flow is constrained in the normal 
stream flow direction and the negative rent components for arcs traversed in the reverse stream flow 
direction, over the network70. These revenue and rent components will be relevant in the following 
revenue adequacy proofs.  
4.4.2 Hedging Against Flow Transportation Price Risks 
Physical delivery contracts could give the holder an opportunity to physically take a defined water 
volume through a specified arc, for an agreed price.  But we propose financial delivery rights (FDRs) 
which take/pay the difference between a locational marginal price difference and an agreed “strike” 
price, for a defined volume of water. In real time, the optimal water allocation/market clearing problem 
is solved as if the FDRs do not exist. If the holder does not utilise the arc, its limits may not prove to be 
binding, and there may be no rents collected, or need to make hedging payments. If others use the arc to 
transport water, though, the upper flow limits may bind, and the FDR settlement ensures that the rents 
they implicitly pay into the settlement surplus are re-cycled to finance pay-outs to the rights owners. 
Thus there is strictly no need for a secondary rights market that allows participants to trade the initial 
issuance. But such a market may still be desirable, to improve liquidity, and to allow participants to 
adjust their positions over time. Authorities could let the water market FDRs all be traded in a 
combined market with simultaneous clearing to ensure feasibility of user trades in arc flow capacities. 
These FDRs will be somewhat like electricity market FTRs (Hogan, 2002), or like the capacity rights 
for gas markets suggested in Read et al (2012) if we disregard any transportation flow delays. For the 
																																								 																				
70 Positive/negative rents will be generated when upper/lower limits are binding. No rents will be collected when 
the upper/lower arcs limits are not constrained.   
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purpose of completeness, the locational marginal price differential 𝜆 − 𝜆  between any two non-
adjacent points in the network could be used to create an FTR type obligation-inclusive node-to-node: 
𝐹𝐷𝑅	 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄.  
Here 𝑄 denotes the contract quantity and 𝑆𝑃 denotes the strike price. This effectively gives the 
holder a right, and obligation, to swap the actual price differential corresponding to pre-specified flows 
between any two locations within the network in a particular time period, for the agreed differential, 
𝑆𝑃.
71  
Instead of using node-to-node FDRs similar to FTRs, this thesis will focus on arc rights that are more 
like a Flow Gate (FGR) transmission right (Chao & Peck, 1998)72 returning the rents generated when 
specific transmission links become congested. Such rights appear both conceptually and practically 
appealing in a network where participants can reasonably identify the flow of “their water” across 
specific arcs at specific times. Note, though, that this study is dealing with a tree-structured network, so 
there is always a unique path between any pair of nodes. And, since there are no “loop-flow problems”, 
our “arc rights” are equivalent to “node-to-node” rights between adjacent nodes.73 Thus it seems 
reasonable that participants could construct any “node-to-node” right as a series of “arc rights”.  It will 
be seen that this is not true for options, as discussed in Section 4.4.4, but it is true for obligation 
inclusive rights. We refer to these arc node-to-node rights as Arc Capacity Rights (ACRs) and node-to-
node options as Arc Capacity Options.  
4.4.2.1 Obligation-inclusive Arc Capacity Rights 
An ACR compensates the right holder when the prices rise across the arc (i.e., positive price differential 
in the normal stream flow direction), and that will happen if those flows are constrained by the upper 
																																								 																				
71	 	By way of contrast, 𝑆𝑃 is normally assumed to be zero, in the FTR literature, corresponding naturally to a 
situation where there are no non-consumptive costs or befits, and losses are small enough to be ignored.  
72 The volume of an FGR available depends only on the state/capability of the “gate” element itself, and not on 
network topology. It is the market value of the rights that varies over time, as flows vary, partly reflecting 
topology changes.  
73 This statement is not generally valid for electricity market FGRs and FTRs because in most cases there are non-
tree node configurations with loop current flows.  				
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arc capacity limit on the specified channel/flow gate in the specified direction. On the other hand, flows 
are sometimes constrained by the lower arc capacity limit on the specified channel/flow-gate in the 
normal stream flow direction, or perhaps by the upper arc capacity limit on the specified channel/flow-
gate in the reverse stream flow direction. Then the right holder is obliged to pay into the settlement 
surplus, because prices fall across the arc (i.e., there is a negative price differential in the normal stream 
flow direction).  
That is: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 	= 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄.  
Here 𝑄 denotes the contract quantity and 𝑆𝑃 denotes the strike price. Following the structure of the 
FSR/FSO discussion in Section 4.3, we could define arc capacity flow gate options (ACO) as discussed 
in the next section. 
4.4.2.2 Arc Capacity Options  
An ACO represents a non-obligatory type of contract, effectively entitling its holder to use the arc 
capacity 𝑖𝑗  in the direction from 𝑖 to 𝑗, at an agreed price, if that turns out to be profitable Given the 
contract quantity, 𝑄 and the strike price 𝑆𝑃, we can define an ACO as follows:  
𝐴𝐶𝑂	 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄, 0 .  
For simplicity, we will assume that 𝑆𝑃 = 0 in this case, with no non-consumptive, pumping or 
leakage cost/benefits in the network. Applying [3.10], yields the following relationship: 
𝐴𝐶𝑂	 𝑄, 0 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 0 𝑄, 0 = 𝜇F𝑄.  
Here 𝜇F , the per unit rent generated for arc (𝑖𝑗) is only non-zero when congestion occurs in the normal 
stream flow direction. The ACO gives the holder a right to receive the price differential when it is 
positive, that is when congestion occurs in the normal stream flow direction. And the above equation 
shows that the required pay-out is just a share of the settlement surplus, 𝑋𝜇F   corresponding to a pre-
specified flow of 𝑄 on that arc, in a particular time period
74. That would hedge the risk associated with 
																																								 																				
74 Because we deal with single period cases, we can drop the time index in this discussion. 
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transportation of that quantity of water in that time period, in the normal stream flow direction. Clearly, 
we have revenue adequacy provided 𝑄 ≤ 𝑋. 
So, an ACO gives the holder the right to use, or receive rents on, an amount of capacity in the normal 
stream flow direction, and that the rent is either positive or zero. An ACO issued for a non-congested 
direction will have no value, and the holder is not liable for any payment (Chao et al., 2000). ACO 
holders have no obligations when the price differential becomes negative because flows are so low that 
minimum flow requirements are only just met in the normal stream flow direction, or even reversed to 
use all arc flow capacity in the reverse stream flow direction. Because an ACO excludes the downside 
risk of the obligation, it does not fully hedge inter-locational risk, though.  
As a result, these rights cannot be concatenated into node-to-node rights. Suppose the SO issues the 
following ACOs for the flow gates lying along the path 𝑘, 𝑘M : 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆FG − 𝜆, 0 , 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆Fl −
𝜆FG, 0 ,…..	𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆E − 𝜆EIG, 0 . Their aggregate pay-out will only be the same as for a composite 
option for the path, 𝐹𝐷𝑂,E, if the price differences for individual flow gates are non-negative, and so 
the corresponding ACOs are exercised. Then the pay-out 𝜆E − 𝜆  for the path option will be 
matched, because the intermediate price terms do cancel off each other. But, otherwise the sum of ACO 
pay-outs will be higher than that for the path option.         
The desired result does prove to be true for obligation-inclusive rights, though. Suppose that a path 
between the two non-adjacent nodes 𝑘, 𝑘M  is comprised of a series of arcs: 𝑘, 𝑘 + 1 , 𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 +
2 , … , … 𝑖, 𝑗 , …… 𝑘M − 1, 𝑘M . Deploying the dual constraint equation [3.10] in the previous chapter, 
we can unbundle the shadow prices and the locational marginal prices (per unit quantity), for the entire 
path (i.e., for all flow gates 𝑘M − 𝑘  in the selected path between the two nodes) as follows: 
𝜆E − 𝜆 = 𝜆FG − 𝜆 + 𝜆Fl − 𝜆FG + ⋯ 𝜆E − 𝜆EIG   
= 𝜇 ,FG
F − 𝜇 ,FG
I + 𝜇 FG,Fl
F − 𝜇 FG,Fl
I + ⋯ 𝜇 EIG,E
F − 𝜇 EIG,E
I   
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Since the intermediate price terms cancel out each other, the above relationship between the 
concatenated arc price differentials and the composite price differential 𝑘M − 𝑘  will easily allow us to 
form a node-to-node path right by combining the obligation-inclusive arc capacity rights75. 
4.4.2.3 Arc Flow Losses and Delays  
Up to this point, this chapter has ignored losses (i.e., leakage, evaporation) in the transportation 
network, and supply system, and we ignore such for the later developments of this chapter. But this 
section briefly considers how ACRs might operate when flow losses create price differences between 
nodes, as in electricity networks76.  
In electricity markets, the generators are paid for total generation, which implicitly includes losses. But 
the market collects the marginal cost of losses from the loads. Since losses are quadratic (DC load flow 
approximation), the marginal cost is twice the average. So this leads to a positive settlement surplus 
under normal conditions, even when line limits do not bind.  
In a water market model, “losses” arise due to evaporation and/or leakage in the storage and/or 
transportation network, and can be represented by introducing a loss function in the flow balance 
constraints. We will assume a convex increasing transportation loss function, which would be 
analogous to the transmission loss function in the economic dispatch model of an electricity market. If 
the loss function is linearised in a piece-wise fashion, there will be loss rents corresponding to each 
flow segment in the linearized flow loss curve, as for electricity market transmission losses77.  
FTR systems in many electricity markets hedge only against the congestion component of the locational 
marginal price differentials. However, Hogan & Harvey (2002) and Rudhevich et al (2005) have 
																																								 																				
75 This will hold true with non-zero strike prices, too, provided 𝑆𝑃E, the composite strike price of the FDR 
issued for path 𝑘, 𝑘M , equals the sum of all 𝑆𝑃s assigned for all ACRs lying along the path.  
76 In addition there are supply system (reservoir) losses due to seepage and evaporation. 
77 In reality, the loss function may have a fixed loss if a minimum stream flow is essential to keep the  channel 
wet, in which case we should really use an integer variable to model wet or dry channel, plus a piece-wise linear 
incremental loss function for positive flows, as above. Non-convex losses may also arise if leakage occurs at 
particular levels, for example. In such cases we could approximate the function by inserting linear segments e.g. 
from the origin to some critical flow above which the loss/cost functions is convex (and monotonically 
increasing). Or we could use/successive linearization (van der Vlerk, 2005; Pepper et al., 2012). But these 
complications will be ignored.	
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illustrated two different proposals to redistribute the surplus arising from loss related revenues. More 
recently Read & Miller (2011) discussed the issue of revenue adequacy with loss contracts and or 
reserve contracts, for the HVDC link in New Zealand. 
If FTRs do not include loss hedging, participants will implicitly be expected to pay for the losses in the 
spot market, and may wish to hedge the implied risk. Even though we do not wish to pursue the issue of 
hedging the loss price risk further in this thesis, we could imagine issuing a combination of balanced 
ACRs and loss hedges, or general unbalanced ACRs (Harvey & Hogan, 2002; Philpott &Pritchard, 
2004; Rudhevich et al., 2005; Hogan et al., 2010; Read & Miller, 2011). Unlike a conventional 
obligation-inclusive ACR, the latter effectively gives the holder a right to receive less water at the 
receiving end of the arc than is injected at the sending end of the arc.  
A general unbalanced ACR can be defined as: 𝑄𝜆 − 𝑄𝜆 .  
This could be decomposed into the following form: 𝑄𝜆 − 𝑄𝜆 + 𝑄 − 𝑄 𝜆.  
Hence, the term 𝑄𝜆 − 𝑄𝜆  defines the balanced obligation component, a balanced obligation- 
inclusive ACR provides a perfect hedge for transportation congestion, but not for flow losses (Hogan, 
2002). Technically, the  𝑄 − 𝑄 𝜆 term can itself be thought of as a type of unbalanced ACR, but it 
is effectively a loss hedge. That is, it is an agreement to buy a specified quantity of water, 
corresponding to the loss volume that needs to be made up at the receiving node, at the water price for 
that node. 
If the marginal loss rate was constant then revenue adequacy would be provided if balanced ACR 
issuance is within arc capacity limits, and the constant marginal loss rate in the unbalanced ACR 
matches the real loss rate. While participants would prefer balanced ACRs, they are likely to accept 
some fair proportion of unbalanced ACRs if the contracts are priced attractively.  
The situation is more complicated, though, if the marginal loss rate varies. Convex piece-wise linear 
loss curves would generate infra-marginal rents, to be collected in the settlement surplus. One cannot 
accurately determine the losses because the loss rate is not known when the ACR is issued. As a result, 
the level of revenue adequacy is uncertain, because it depends on both the loss rate, as determined by 
the actual flows on the day, and the cost of making up those losses, as determined by the actual bids. 
102	
	
This is similar to the pumping case discussed below. The situation is slightly different, though, because 
piece-wise linear losses are not quite equivalent to piece-wise linear costs. Unlike marginal pumping 
costs, which depend on factors such as fuel prices, the costs implied by losses depend on the marginal 
water values. That may make them more variable, but it also means that they can be hedged by loss 
contracts, within the water market, as above78.  
Finally, inter-temporal effects will also arise within the water transport network, due to delays in arcs. 
One could create ACRs to cover both space and time price differentials when a single arc can transport 
water from one node and time to another and node and time. In this case, we could consider defining 
inter-temporal ACRs like those proposed for the gas market described by Read et al., (2012)79. 
However, hedging linked temporal and locational marginal price differences in this thesis. 
4.4.3 Implications of ACR Arrangements 
With the above generic definition of an ACR, we now turn to describe the way in which those 
instruments might be employed, in increasingly complex system situations.  The goal here is not to 
develop a concise or comprehensive mathematical theory of ACR behaviour, but to develop insight and 
understanding about the real world implications and potential applications of such instruments. So the 
sections below discuss the way in which transmission system rents may be implicitly collected from 
users in the settlement surplus, and used to provide locational hedging via ACRs. But they also discuss, 
at a common-sense level, the implications that creating and holding such rights would have on the 
balance of power and benefit between participants. Clearly, there is much more that could be done, in 
terms of formally analysing participant interactions, but the aim of this preliminary discussion is just to 
																																								 																				
78 However, note that estimating the loss coefficient is not straightforward, as it varies with the flow level and 
many other parameters. 
79 The inter- temporal-FSRs discussed in Section 4.4.2 enable hedging between the locational marginal prices at 
two different times, for the same location in the network (e.g., 𝜆?
E − 𝜆?	where 𝑡M ≠ 𝑡). But an extra unit of flow, 
with a delay from (𝑖, 𝑡) to (𝑗, 𝑡’) will often be feasible when flows from (𝑖, 𝑡) to (𝑗, 𝑡), and from (𝑖, 𝑡) to (𝑖, 𝑡’) or 
(𝑗, 𝑡) to (𝑗, 𝑡’) are not. This might seem to imply the need to define combined inter-locational-temporal FDRs, 
instead of using separate inter-locational and inter--temporal instruments, as discussed for the gas market by Read 
et al (2012). They argue, though, that this is not actually necessary, because the feasibility, and sustainability of 
the individual instruments does not matter, provided the inter-locational and inter-temporal markets are always 
cleared jointly by an auction process that ensures “simultaneous feasibility”.	
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establish the plausibility of creating and operating a market in this way. These are the kind of issues that 
potential participants would need to be satisfied about before they would contemplate accepting such 
revolutionary concepts as hydro generators having to bid in a market to induce water flow through their 
facilities. And we see little point in pursuing more esoteric conceptualisations until at least the 
possibility of such acceptance has been established. We discuss the issues in the context of three 
scenarios, in the following order:  
§ Scenario A: Consumptive benefits only in Section 4.4.1,  
§ Scenario B: Consumptive benefits and non-consumptive costs in Section 4.4.2, and  
§ Scenario C: Consumptive benefits and non-consumptive benefits in Section 4.4.3.  
4.4.3.1 ACR Issues under Scenario A: Consumptive Benefits Only 
This section first discusses the collection of rents in a simple generic network architecture with no non-
consumptive arc flow users, assuming that the initial rights are allocated to consumptive users. Then we 
discuss the issue of the revenue adequacy and then focus on some practical implications, in this 
Scenario context. We restate the ACR definition for the current scenario for the sake of completeness. 
An obligation-inclusive ACR is: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 	= 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄. 
Here 𝑄 denotes the contract quantity, and 𝑆𝑃 denotes the strike price. The locational marginal price 
differential is 𝜆 − 𝜆 .  
4.4.3.1.1 Revenue Adequacy 
In this section, we investigate revenue adequacy for an ACR under Scenario A. Suppose the SO has 
issued an obligation-inclusive ACR on arc (𝑖𝑗) for a quantity of 𝑄 with 𝑆𝑃 = 0. In order to set up a 
hedge against arc price differences, the users should be buying rights ahead of time. Using equation 
[3.10], we can write the pay-out required as:  
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 0 = 	 𝜆 − 𝜆 𝑄 = 𝜇 ,
F 𝑄 − 𝜇 ,
I 𝑄.  
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The rents collected for the actual arc flow quantity, 𝑞 are 𝜇 ,
F 𝑞 and 𝜇 ,
I 𝑞. The arc flow capacity 
congestion (net) rent associated with the binding upper and lower arc flow constraints is: 𝜇F𝑋 −
𝜇I𝑋 . 
The terms 𝜇F𝑋 and 𝜇I𝑋 are the rents associated with the upper and lower arc capacity bounds. The 
rent is thus either: 𝜇F𝑋, if the upper bound is constrained, or −𝜇I𝑋, if the lower bound is 
constrained (in the normal stream flow direction). Comparing this rent with the ACR pay-out 
requirement, we get:  
 (𝜆−𝜆)𝑄 =
𝜇F𝑄 ≤ 𝜇F𝑋 																										𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋
													0																																										𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
		−	𝜇I𝑄 ≤ −𝜇I𝑋 																								𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	80			
 [4.2]  
The term 𝜇F𝑋 is the positive rent generated if those flows are constrained by the upper arc capacity 
limit on the specified channel/flow gate in the specified direction (i.e. (𝑖𝑗)). So the first line in the 
above equation implies that the ACR pay-out indicated by (𝜆−𝜆)𝑄 on the LHS, is sufficiently 
funded by the arc capacity rent generated on the RHS], provided all ACR issuances 𝑄 ≤ 𝑋.  
4.4.3.1.2 Implications of Sign Conventions 
The previous dual price analysis manipulates the canonical form of the lower bound to make the arc 
capacity shadow price positive: 𝜇I ≥ 0. However, that same manipulation will create a negative LHS 
(−𝑋) , for a constraint expressing a positive lower bound on flows in the normal flow direction. So 
we still get a negative rent (−𝜇I𝑋)	when the lower arc capacity constraint is binding (see Diagram B 
of Figure 4-3). Thus we typically have both positive and negative rent components (𝜇F𝑋 and 
−𝜇I𝑋), unlike in electricity networks where flows are normally reversible, thus generating positive 
																																								 																				
80 This last expression is true, provided  𝑋 ≥ 0 . See next section for a discussion of the alternative case.  
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rent when transmission capacity constraints are binding, regardless of the current flow direction (see 
Diagram A of Figure 4-3). 81  
 
Figure 4-3. Rents associated with electricity line capacity bounds and arc flow capacity bounds. Arrow indicates 
the water flow direction.  
With regard to revenue adequacy, then, it was noted in the above that the ACR pay-out requirement is 
itself negative when the flows are constrained by the lower arc capacity limit on the specified 
channel/flow-gate in the normal stream flow direction, creating a negative price differential across the 
specified arc. And the final inequality above, −𝜇I𝑄 ≤ −𝜇I𝑋 (or 𝜇I𝑄 ≥ 𝜇I𝑋), implies that 
what the (obligation-inclusive) ACR holder is obliged to pay into the market settlement fund will at 
least cover the negative rents collected by the SO, provided  𝑄 ≥ 𝑋 . 
Thus, while ACRs are generally issued in the normal stream flow direction, they will have 
positive/negative value depending on whether flows are against an upper arc flow limit or against a 
lower arc flow limit. On the other hand, a participant who wishes to transport water against the normal 
flow direction along some arcs could be offered ACRs in that direction, with the value of those being 
equal, but opposite, to the value of ACRs in the normal stream flow direction. But, unless reverse flow 
is physically possible, such reverse rights could only be issued as an offset to rights issued in the 
forward direction. In fact, rational market-clearing implies that issuing a forward right to party 1, and a 
																																								 																				
81 If arc flow is specified with a net flow variable, it could have positive (𝑋) and negative (𝑋) bounds. A 
negative lower net arc flow limit indicates that one could send a flow up to (−𝑋) units in the reverse stream flow 
direction. This could be achieved using a pump, but a syphon or common pond can also accommodate bi-
directional flows. In such cases we will have a negative bound quantity, and a negative price, generating positive 
rents, as in the electricity transmission system.  
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reverse right to party 2, is equivalent to having  to party 2 sell the forward right to party 1, at the market 
clearing price.    
This means that the SO could issue obligation-inclusive ACR rights exceeding the actual physical 
capacity in one direction, provided she issues an offsetting amount in the reverse direction. The extra 
pay-outs required in one direction would be covered by payments made by those holding ACRs in the 
opposite direction. Note, though, that the net issuance of ACRs on any arc is still constrained to lie 
between the minimum and maximum arc capacity, in that direction.  And that means that the settlement 
surplus can only support node-to-node ACRs up to the minimum of the arc capacities along the path 
between the nodes, in the relevant direction. In particular a “blocked arc”, with no flow possible in the 
desired direction (e.g., because it is uphill) means that the path actually has zero capacity. So the net 
issuance, in that direction, must not exceed zero, if revenue adequacy is to be maintained. 	
The possibility of negative rents is a different issue though. They are not associated with the existence 
of reverse flow capacity (which would actually create positive rents), but with minimum flow 
requirements in the forward direction. That may seem surprising, and we should consider what it 
means, and what would happen if participants did not hold ACRs corresponding to at least the 
minimum flow requirement.  
Recall that we are assuming that the SO is strictly following the market clearing solutions with regard 
to dispatching of water flows, and consider what would happen if the SO were made responsible to 
keep flows within bounds, and no arc flow capacity rights had been issued. The minimum in-stream 
flow requirements will not be met if the downstream participants do not bid to consume sufficient 
water. In trying to meet these in-stream minimum flow requirements, the market clearing solution must 
lower the downstream delivery prices to encourage downstream consumptive demands. So water will 
have to flow from a higher to a lower priced node, implying a loss in the settlement surplus collected by 
the SO. If the SO were to face a penalty for not meeting the in-stream minimum flow demands, and 
lowering the downstream marginal water value to the point where the upstream-downstream marginal 
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water value difference is less than the penalty value produced insufficient response, the SO will prefer 
to pay the penalty, rather than lower downstream prices any further.82     			
4.4.3.1.3 Implications of ACR Allocations 
From the above, we see that, if the SO starts out without any (financial) rights protecting its position, it 
can incur a loss in the settlement surplus, whenever she has to meet the minimum in-stream flow 
requirements. The SO could be protected against that risk, though, if downstream users take up ACRs 
for (at least) the minimum flow quantity, thus committing them to pay into the settlement surplus, to 
cover the deficit, when it occurs. That negative value may be more than offset by the payments made to 
holders when the maximum flow constraint binds, thus giving the ACR a positive value overall. 
However the SO might have to compensate participants, up-front, in order to get them to accept ACRs 
for the minimum flow quantity, if they turn out to have a negative value, overall. Alternatively, in a 
regime where ACO call options are issued, we could think of creating a financial “put” option, under 
which the SO would receive: 
ACP 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝜆 − 𝜆 −𝑆𝑃 𝑄, 0  where 𝑄 = 𝑋 			
Here participants have the obligation to accept water flow (or to pay as if they were making water flow) 
if the SO exercises the option, which it will when 𝜆 − 𝜆 ≥ 𝑆𝑃.
83 In this case, with no non- 
consumptive costs or benefits, the SO faces no risk, if 𝑆𝑃 = 0. However, such put options obviously 
																																								 																				
82 If we assume free disposal of downstream water, it will always be possible to get sufficient response, when the 
downstream marginal water value falls to zero. In principle, though, negative prices must be allowed for when 
downstream flows cannot be disposed of costlessly, e.g., if downstream agriculturalists have the right to refuse the 
water during floods. 
83 Alternatively, participants could have the obligation to take water at the downstream node (or to pay as if they 
were taking water) when the price there, 𝜆 ≤ 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃	. But note that the upstream price in that expression is 
unknown. In order to guarantee incentives to maintain flow, such a put option would have to be accompanied by a 
contract to buy the water at the upstream node. Otherwise, incentives to maintain minimum flows would prove 
insufficient whenever the upstream price exceeded whatever upstream price was assumed in setting the strike 
price for the downstream put option. So a put option on the water price differential is really more effective.		
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have negative value for participants and, if they were not pre-allocated, the SO would definitely need to 
pay participants to accept them.84  
In reality, an SO is unlikely to accept a position where they had the responsibility of maintaining 
minimum flows, without also having the right to over-ride market solutions in order to do so, or having 
commercial protection when they did. “Put option” obligations corresponding to minimum in-stream 
flows, perhaps packaged into obligation-inclusive ACR rights, would probably have to be established 
prior to market start.  
Allocation of initial property rights prior to market start is important for both water and water 
distribution capacity. In general, participants may be contested for such rights. The form of such rights 
may be implicit and sometimes unclear85. Clearly the issue of allocating these initial “rights” to 
participants needs further attention. Similar situations will also arise in contexts involving non-
consumptive uses, and Section 4.4.2 discusses the case where non-consumptive pumping costs are 
present in the network. The purpose of the above discussion is just to point out the need for re-casting 
such traditional rights into financial instruments, in order to remain effective in a market context. 
4.4.3.2 ACR Issues under Scenario B: Consumptive Use and Non-consumptive (Pumping) 
Costs  
So far this chapter has briefly discussed flow losses on arcs, but ignored any arc flow costs such as 
pumping costs (or usage fees). Scenario (B) involves pumping of flows from one point to the other in 
the network. Assuming no other non-consumptive uses on the arc, the 𝑃,? 𝑦,?∈³(,)  component 
of the primal objective function (see Equation 3.1 in Section 3.3.1) would be just the pumping cost 
function. The pumping cost function is assumed to be a convex and piecewise linear, implying a 
stepped non-decreasing marginal pumping cost function. Note that the primal formulation in Section 
4.4.1 involves non-consumptive participants each offering a “demand curve” defining benefits 
produced by “forward” flows on arcs, which we can generally assume will be in a downstream 
																																								 																				
84  The issue of “gaming incentives” is beyond the scope of this thesis, but its importance cannot be ignored 
because it significantly impacts on participant bidding strategies.  




direction. Let us now introduce a new class of non-consumptive pump participants, each offering a 
‘supply’ curve for (pumped) “forward” flows on arcs, which we would assume to be in an upstream 
direction. Instead, we let the arc flow be specified by a net downstream flow variable, and allow a 
negative bound on 𝑥, to indicate that pumping upstream, from 𝑗(𝑘) to 𝑖(𝑘) at the maximum rate of 𝑋 
would send a negative net flow of 𝑌 = 	−	𝑋,	units in the forward stream flow direction, i.e., 
downstream in this case. This gives us a modified version of primal constraint equation [3.5a] for 
pumped arcs: 
𝑋 + 𝑦,? ≤ 	 𝑥  , 
?  where  𝑌 = 	−𝑋,.  
The constant appearing in the above primal constraint implies an additional “negative benefit term” 
(− 𝑃,? Y,? ) in the primal objective function. Because it is constant, this is irrelevant in LP terms, 
but it represents the cost of maximum pumping, at the maximum upstream flow rate. Above that level, 
though, we now have a “demand curve” with increasing benefit as 𝑥  , 
?  increases with each 
successive positive 𝑦,?  variable, representing a reduction in pumping, with a positive benefit 
coefficient 𝑃,? .
86 The above complies with the notion of net demand curves of the CDDP models 
discussed in other chapters.  
In the interests of simplicity, this section assumes a constant marginal pumping cost function, so that 
there is only one step in the arc pumping cost offer curve, with offered marginal cost 𝑃? . Assuming the- 
upper and lower bid limits are not binding87, the shadow price on the arc flow constraint must be: 𝜔 =
																																								 																				
86 Starting the demand curve from a firm lower bound makes sense in this case, because it is physically impossible 
for upstream flows to exceed the pumping limit. For normal arcs, though, we defined our demand curve to start 
from 0, rather than 𝑌. On those arcs it often will be physically possible for downstream flow to be less than a 
non-zero lower bound of 𝑌, even if non-csv users only bid for incremental release, above that level, as discussed 
in Scenario C. This raises the question as to who might be responsible for setting flows at least that high. If the SO 
is made responsible it may need a put-option to protect its position, as discussed in Section 4.4.6.3. 
87 That is, the block bounds are wide enough to ensure that, if any limit binds it will be an arc flow capacity 
bound. So we only need to consider the shadow prices on one set of bounds, not a combination of shadow prices 
on one set of bounds and/or the other.	
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𝑃 = −𝑃88. So, using [3.10], the relationship between the nodal price difference (per unit) and the 
marginal cost of pumping (per unit), is:  
𝜆 − 𝜆 = 𝑃 + 𝜇 ,
F − 𝜇 ,
I .  
In the case of pumping, the downstream-upstream price differential 𝜆 − 𝜆  will be negative, unless 
flow is at a lower bound. Considering the 𝑗 → 𝑖 direction, the above per unit rent expression can be 
transformed into the following form:  
𝜆 − 𝜆 = 𝑃 + 𝜇 ,
F − 𝜇 ,
I 89  
Suppose that the SO issues an obligation-inclusive ACR for arc (𝑖𝑗) to move 𝑄 from 𝑗 to 𝑖, with a 
strike price, 𝑆𝑃.  We have: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄  
Because the pay-out is directionless, the following will be true:  
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 .  
Hence, we can formulate the pay-out of an ACR issued in the reverse stream flow direction similarly to 
an ACR issued in the normal stream flow direction with appropriate sign transformations, and then we 
can proceed to explain the revenue adequacy problem.  
4.4.3.2.1 Revenue Adequacy with Arc Costs 
One could think of unpacking an ACR into two separate CfD contracts in which the first contract (i.e., 
locational marginal price differential) hedges against the capacity constraint rent risk and the other 
																																								 																				
88 The coefficients for the 𝑥 variables would actually be 𝑃 = 𝑃 ,  because positive 𝑥 represents decreasing 
pumping in the reverse stream flow direction, which increases benefit by saving money. In this simplified context, 
we have  𝑃 = −𝑃 , though, because we are applying the coefficient directly to the arc flow variable, which is 
negative, in the downstream flow direction. 
89 Let 𝑃 = −𝑃, 𝑆𝑃 = −𝑆𝑃, 𝑄 = −𝑄. Using this transformation, we can write the per unit rents as follows: 
𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑃 +1 = 𝜇 ,
F − 𝜇 ,
I +1 → 𝜆 − 𝜆 − −𝑃 −1 = −𝜇 
F − −𝜇 
I −1 =
𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑃 = 𝜇 
F − 𝜇 
I .	
The following relationship can be formed for the pay-outs of the ACRs issued in 𝑖 → 𝑗 and 𝑗 → 𝑖 directions: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − −𝑆𝑃 −𝑄 = −𝜆 + 𝜆−𝑆𝑃 𝑄 =
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 .		
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contract hedges against variation in the marginal non-consumptive cost (benefit)90. In that form, a CfD 
with a non-zero strike price subtracts a constant 𝑄𝑆𝑃 from the pay-out received by the participant, on 
a contract of volume 𝑄. Under this contract, the participant is unconditionally obliged to pay an 
agreed amount, 𝑄𝑆𝑃 in the specified time period. So this strike price really has no impact on the risk 
reducing effect of a CfD91, and is just subtracted from the total rent received by the participant. So the 
difference between adjusting the strike price in the CfD and adjusting the purchase price of the CfD, 
really only relates to the timing of payments, and even that will depend on the detail of market 
arrangements. Thus, when we say that we have revenue adequacy for a CfD, provided the strike price is 
above level 𝑃, we could equally well say that selling that same CfD, but with a zero strike price, will 
make a net positive contribution to the settlement surplus, provided the buyer buys the CfD for at least 
𝑃, discounted to the time when the CfD is paid for.  
Still, we will persist with the CfD form used above, because it allows us to easily state revenue 
adequacy results. Clearly, the value of this CfD can be re-expressed, using a composite of the shadow 
price on the arc flow capacity limits and the contract quantity 𝑄 = −𝑄  as follows: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 + 𝜇F − 𝜇I 𝑄  
Considering the re-expressed upper and lower arc capacity bounds (i.e., 𝑋 = −𝑋 and 𝑋 = −𝑋), 
and noting that the 𝑃 component in the price differential must be paid to the pumper, on the volume 
pumped, the following shows the net rent components associated with the arc: 
Rent 𝑞, 𝑄 = Rent 𝑞, 𝑄 =
𝜇F𝑞						𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
				0								𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇I𝑞					𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
  
Taking the difference between the rent and the ACR pay-out, the net surplus equation can be expressed 
in a general form as follows:  
																																								 																				
90 A similar approach can be found in Harvey et al (1996). 
91 The situation for put or call options is very different, because there the strike price determines whether a 
payment will be made, or not.		
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Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 = Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 =
𝜇F𝑞 − 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 − 𝜇F𝑄												if		𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
			− 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄																																						if					𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇I𝑞 − 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 + 𝜇I𝑄											if				𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
  [4.3a] 
Thus revenue sufficiency is guaranteed, if the net surplus, after settling the ACR, is positive.  With the 
strike price (𝑆𝑃) set to equal 𝑃, the middle term 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 drops out, and we can form the 
following inequalities as in the previous scenario: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 =
𝜇F𝑄 ≤ 𝜇F𝑞 								𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
			0																															𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇I𝑄 ≤ −𝜇I𝑞 			𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋 = −𝑋	
 [4.3b] 
The net-surplus for this case is as follows: 
Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 =
𝜇F 𝑋 − 𝑄 						𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
			0																𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
𝜇I 𝑋 − 𝑄 			𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
  
So the top and bottom expressions in [4.3b] yield a tight revenue adequacy result, based solely on arc 
capacity rents, as above, provided the net ACR volume (issuances) lies between 𝑋 and 𝑋. But the 
strike price on all ACRs issued can only be set equal to 𝑃 if we know the marginal pumping cost, at 
the time the ACRs are issued. In general there will be a net surplus or deficit corresponding to the 
𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄	term in [4.3a]. Note that this term only depends on the contract quantity 𝑄, and not 
physical flow, 𝑞. This payment is made to or from the participant, irrespective of the actual flow level, 
if any. This is because an obligation inclusive financial right has the same financial effect as a physical 
agreement to actually move the agreed amount of water. Thus, by accepting such a right, the participant 
is agreeing to make, or receive, payments as if that amount if water was moved, possibly at a profit 




4.4.3.2.2 Profit/Loss Trade-offs on ACRs with Arc Costs 
First, Figure 4-4 describes the revenue adequacy situation for the top relationship in [4-3a].92 If 𝑃 <
𝑆𝑃 (i.e.,	𝑃 > 𝑆𝑃) the ACR issuer will have to pay a positive base payment (shaded area 𝐶 in the 
LHS diagram in Figure 4-4) of (𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄.
93 An additional payment, shown as area ‘𝐴’, represents 
the term (𝜇F𝑄), which will only be required if the arc capacity limit binds, as assumed in Figure 4-4. 
In that figure, area ‘𝐴 + 𝐶’ represents the ACR pay-out if 𝑃 > 𝑆𝑃. Area ‘𝐴 + 𝐵’ indicates the surplus 
collected by the SO, on the actual flow, 𝑞, which in this case is at the lower bound in the upstream 
direction. The common area ‘𝐴’ cancels out (i.e., 𝐴 + 𝐵 − 𝐴 + 𝐶 ), and revenue adequacy will be 
met if 𝐵 > 𝐶. In other words, we could have revenue adequacy, provided the SO has not issued too 
many ACRs. But it is not easy to guarantee revenue adequacy because the extent to which issuances 
need to be scaled back depends on the degree to which	𝑃	exceeds		𝑆𝑃. As a result the risk being taken 
on by the issuer depends on how accurately one can estimate the future pumping offer price. Obviously 
that risk may be significantly reduced if forward contracts can be obtained for pumping.94  
In the case of 𝑆𝑃 > 𝑃, the rent difference 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 𝑄, indicated by area 𝐶 in the RHS diagram in 
Figure 4-4, will be added to the settlement surplus, representing a profit95. Area ‘𝐴 − 𝐶’ thus indicates 
the net payment to be made to the ACR holder, if the upper arc capacity constraint in the upstream 
direction binds. In this case it is positive, but it could easily be negative, and always will be if neither 
flow limit binds. In any case, the net payment required is always smaller than the rental component 
collected in 𝐴, even before accounting for the additional rental component in 𝐵. So revenue adequacy is 
																																								 																				
92 This figure has been drawn with all flows in the upstream (𝑗𝑖) direction, which is more intuitive for a pump.  
93 Deduction of area 𝐶 from the settlement surplus arises because the ACR holder agreed to pay the SO a pumping 
cost of 𝑆𝑃, but the SO needs to pay the pump 𝑃 (the offered marginal cost), per unit, in the spot market.	
94 This situation is very like that discussed by Miller and Read (2011) with respect to covering ancillary service 
support costs for inter-regional transmission in New Zealand.  
95 Addition of area 𝐶 to the settlement surplus arises because the ACR holder agreed to pay the SO a pumping cost 
of 𝑆𝑃, but the SO only needs to pay the pump 𝑃, per unit, in the spot market.	
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guaranteed because there is always a positive net surplus, as indicated by area 𝐵 + 𝐶 > 0, in the RHS 
diagram in Figure 4-496.      
 
Figure 4-4. Pumping costs, strike prices and revenue adequacy 
Suppose, instead, that arc flow level lies within the arc flow capacity bounds. The net surplus is then 
equal to 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 𝑄 in the middle relationship of [4.3a], as represented by the shaded area 𝐶 in 
Figure 4-4. Participants holding ACRs are effectively agreeing to pay (only) the projected pumping 
cost, 𝑆𝑃, when they settle up in the spot market, if no capacity constraints are binding. In that case, 
revenue adequacy will only be met if the pumping cost, 𝑃, turns out to be less than the strike price 
𝑆𝑃. 
The first relationship in [4.3a], arises because an ACR of this form also obligates the holder to use those 
facilities (or at least to pay or be paid as if it used them), even if the price differential is less than the 
strike price (𝜆 − 𝜆 < 𝑆𝑃), and possibly negative. At that point, net downstream flow must equal its 
upper bound, 𝑋 = −𝑋. Often a pumped channel is an artificial path, which is not likely to have any 
“environmental” flow requirement.97 So we can assume that 𝑋 = 0 and thus the rent generated when 
																																								 																				
96 In fact there may be a significant surplus, which suggests the possibility of issuing ACRs beyond the arc flow 
limit. As above, though the number of issuances would depend on the degree to which 𝑃	turned out to be less 
than 	𝑆𝑃, and there is generally no guarantee that it will be less than 	𝑆𝑃		at	all.		Thus the overall effect of 
uncertainty with respect to  𝑃	is always to reduce ACR issuances, as above. 
97 A channel whose flow can be reversed by pumping might have minimum flow requirements in the downstream 
direction, although these would have to apply in different periods from those in which pumping occurred. For the 
sake of completeness, though, there is a theoretical possibility of negative rent associated with a positive 
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the “upper” downstream flow limit (corresponding to the lower upstream limit in Figure 4-4) is binding 
will be zero, too. We will have revenue adequacy, provided: 
Netsurplus 𝑋, 𝑄 = 𝜇F𝑋 − 𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 − 𝜇F𝑄 = 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 𝑄 + 𝜇F𝑄 ≥ 0  
i.e., provided: 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 + 𝜇F > 0 
Since 𝜇F  is never negative, revenue adequacy will always be met if 𝑆𝑃 ≥ 𝑃, as for the previous case, 
where flow is not against either limit. In this case revenue adequacy may be boosted by rent from the 
lower upstream limit, if that limit does bind, and that may sometimes provide revenue adequacy even 
when 𝑆𝑃 < 𝑃. But there is no certainty of occurring 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 + 𝜇F > 0 with 𝑆𝑃 − 𝑃 < 0. So, 
as in the above, ACR volume cannot really be increased on that basis, without risk to the issuer.  
4.4.3.2.3 Arc Capacity Options with Arc Costs 
Our discussion has focussed on obligation-inclusive ACRs, because these can be concatenated into 
general point-to-point FDRs. However, it seems unlikely that participants will want to bind themselves 
to pay a penalty in situations where they do not actually want pumping to occur. They will most likely 
prefer ACOs, which do not imply such obligations:  
𝐴𝐶𝑂 𝑄, 𝜋 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 , 0 𝑄 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 , 0 𝑄 =
𝐴𝐶𝑂 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃   
Suppose that the strike price can be set to 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑃 in advance. Then ACO holder will exercise the 
option when locational marginal price differential is greater than the marginal cost of pumping (𝜆 −
𝜆 < 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑃). And those are precisely the situations in which pumping will be optimal for the 
system, and scheduled by the market. Clearly, the pay-out required by such an ACO will either be zero, 
as in the middle relationship of [4.3b], or positive, as in the last relationship. Thus the (zero) upper limit 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																
minimum flow requirement in the reverse direction that is upstream, in this case. Obviously, the negative rents 
plus the pumping costs will lead the SO to incur a loss in the settlement surplus if she directs pumping to meet 
these minimum in-stream flow requirements, in that direction, when the participants do not bid to consume 
sufficient water. We could again think of assigning a “put option” obligation to participants corresponding to 
minimum flows with a strike price of 𝑆𝑃 ≥ 𝑃, under which participants accept to pay the arc capacity contract 
price as in the previous scenario on aggregate quantity of 𝑋, when the SO exercises the option, i.e., when (𝜆 −
𝜆) < 𝑆𝑃. Similarly to the previous case, these could be implicit in obligation-inclusive ACR rights. 
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on nett downstream flow, and its shadow price, becomes irrelevant. However, if pump owners were 
committed to honouring such contracts, it is likely that they would submit their offers close to the strike 
price, because the contract gives strong incentives to operate the pumps if 𝜆 − 𝜆 < 𝑆𝑃.  
The situation would be more complex if flows were against their lower bound, downstream, i.e., 
pumping is at a maximum, there would be a positive shadow price on that bound, creating a price 
difference implying an excess rental component corresponding to the difference between the pump 
capacity and the ACR volume issued98.  
But note that setting the strike price SP equal to 𝑃, would require us to know the “offered” marginal 
price in advance. If the SO owns the pump, we can at least assume that the “offer cost” is the true 
marginal pumping cost, but 𝑃 may vary with pumping rate, in a piece-wise linear fashion. That creates 
uncertainty, and jeopardises revenue adequacy. But revenue adequacy will be improved because the 
infra-marginal pumping rents implied by a piece-wise linear curve create an additional 
participant/producer surplus (similar to the transmission line loss rents) that will be collected in the 
settlement surplus99. Just as for transmission losses, the actual cost of pumping would not be hedgeable, 
but the infra-marginal pumping rent would form part of the settlement surplus, from which the SO 
could fund the issuance of ACRs etc.  
4.4.3.2.4 Implications of ACR/O Allocation with Arc Costs 
If an asset is separately owned, e.g., by participants or external service providers, the SO may have 
limited control, and will not normally collect the additional rent.  We have assumed that pump owners 
																																								 																				
98 Numerical example: To give an example, suppose the upstream price 𝜆 = 18, the downstream price 𝜆 = 14, 
marginal cost of pumping 𝑃 = 6, and the strike price 𝑆𝑃 = 5. Now the locational price differential in 𝑗 → 𝑖 
direction is: 𝜆 − 𝜆 = 18 − 14 = 4. So pumping is undesirable, at a cost of 6, and the lower pumping bound will 
be active in the LP. Here 𝜆 − 𝜆 < 𝑆𝑃 implies that, if aggregate ACR holdings are positive, ACR holders will be 
paying into the settlement surplus (i.e., receiving 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 = 18 − 14 − 5 = −1 < 0 per unit), reflecting 
an implied commitment to support pumping at a positive rate, even when it is not economic. A similar issue will 
be described in Section 4.4.3 (Scenario C) with the non-consumptive arc flow benefit use. 
99 With the existence of block limits, the following relationship for the marginal pumping cost is formed by 
combining [3.10] and [3.11]: 𝑃,? = 𝜇 , ,?
F − 𝜇 , ,?
I − 𝜌,,?F − 𝜌,,?I + 𝜆,? − 𝜆,?. This creates participant 
surpluses (e.g., 𝜌,,?F 𝑋,) which could be explained similarly to the consumer surpluses created when the 
consumptive bid constraints are binding, as shown in Figure 4-4.  
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bid into the market, possibly over and above the marginal cost of pumping. So they would be paid their 
share of the clearing price difference, which is equal to the arc price differential minus the arc capacity 
rents, if we assume that they do not also own the arc capacity. Or they may own both assets, and collect 
the entire inter-nodal marginal price difference. Either way, the SO would not collect that part of the 
settlement surplus, and ACRs or ACOs funded by that portion would have to be issued by the arc 
capacity/pump owner. That owner may well also collect additional rent corresponding to the 
discrepancy between its offered pumping prices and the true marginal cost of pumping, but presumably 
it will want to set strike prices to at least cover the marginal cost of pumping, and reserve prices to try 
and cover the cost of providing and maintaining the pump facility. So participants might have to buy 
separate rights for arc flows and pump usage, as discussed above and, in theory, these ACRs and ACOs 
issued by different parties could all trade in the same market.  
Or the SO could issue composite rights, provided it contracts with the asset owners in a way that gives 
it the rents required to support the rights it issues. One way to do that would be to use either physical or 
financial contracts of the same general form as discussed above. This may be preferred from the market 
design perspective, because participants, who may be competitors, prefer to deal with pump owners 
through the SO. Also, once such contracts are in place, or hedges issued, market efficiency will increase 
because the incentives of asset owners to increase profits by “gaming” offer prices will be greatly 
reduced. But these topics lie beyond this thesis. We now turn to discuss ACRs for situations where non-
consumptive use has positive benefits in the forward stream flow direction.  
4.4.3.3 ACR Issues under Scenario C: Consumptive and Non-consumptive Benefits 
Suppose that the network now has both consumptive and non-consumptive use (e.g. hydropower), with 
a known positive marginal benefit, 𝑃. In the interests of simplicity, we will not consider pumps in this 
scenario.100 We assume no parallel arcs and a single non-consumptive use on arc 𝑖𝑗 . Assuming upper 
																																								 																				
100	In reality, some systems (e.g., a pumped storage power generator) provide both non-consumptive benefits (in 
the forward stream flow direction) and pumping (in the reverse stream flow direction). But we can refer to the 




and lower limits on the (single) non-consumptive bid block are not binding, as in the previous scenario, 
[3.11] reduces to: 𝜔 = 𝑃. 
Using [3.10], the relationship between the nodal price difference (per unit) and the shadow prices (per 
unit), including the arc flow benefits is: 
𝜆 − 𝜆 = − 𝑃 + 𝜇 ,
F − 𝜇 ,
I .  
Note that, unless the upper arc flow limit binds, the downstream marginal water value is less than the 
upstream marginal water value. So we are moving water from a higher valued node to a lower valued 
node. That will be optimal provided the value drop is less than or equal to the marginal benefit from 
non-consumptive use. But the market will release water as determined by the bid curve specified by the 
non-consumptive user, who desires water to flow between nodes, and the participants who wish to 
consume it downstream.  
Ignoring other participants, the generator will always bid so that the release decision is driven by the 
electricity market prices. In fact, it will want flow to occur whenever the electricity market price, times 
the conversion efficiency for the relevant block, is greater than the price differential across the 
respective arc. But downstream consumptive users can also induce the market to release more water if 
they submit attractive bids for downstream water. This will raise 𝜆 and so lower the net cost of flow 
movement across arc (𝑖	𝑗). That could make it worthwhile to move water in higher non-consumptive 
use blocks, with lower marginal benefits (e.g., because of lower efficiency) and perhaps even when no 
more non-consumptive use is possible, so that the market must spill water past the generation facility. 
As above, the value of an obligation-inclusive ACR (now in the downstream direction) is defined by 
price differences as follows:  
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄. 
Combining the above two equations, the value of 𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃  can be re-expressed, using the 
shadow price differential on the arc flow capacity limits and the contract quantity 𝑄, as follows: 
𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = (−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄 + 𝜇 ,
F 𝑄 − 𝜇 ,
I 𝑄  
The following section discusses the issue of revenue adequacy using the above.  
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4.4.3.3.1 Revenue Adequacy and Participant Interactions with Arc Benefits 
Considering the arc capacity bounds, we can write the rents generated as follows:   
Rent 𝑞, 𝑄 =
𝜇F𝑞													𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
				0											𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇I𝑞										𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
  
In the following, the above CfD pay-outs are subtracted from the rental receipts to form a general 
expression for the net surpluses:  
 Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 =
𝜇F𝑞 − (−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄 + 𝜇F𝑄 								𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋
	−(−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑞																																					𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇F𝑞 − −𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 − 𝑄𝜇I 						𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋				
 [4.4a]  
Revenue sufficiency is guaranteed, if the net surplus, after settling the ACR, shortfall is positive, If the 
strike price (𝑆𝑃) can be set to equal −𝑃 , the −(−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑞  term becomes zero and the 
following inequalities can be formed as in Scenario A: 
 𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 =
𝜇F𝑄	 ≤ 𝜇F𝑞 															𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
0																													𝑖𝑓		𝑋 < 𝑞 < 𝑋
−𝜇I𝑄 ≤ −𝜇I𝑞 										𝑖𝑓	𝑞 = 𝑋	
 [4.4b]  
We could think of a trading scenario in which an agriculturalist at the downstream node 𝑗, who already 
has purchased (relatively expensive) upstream water, enters into a hedging contract for an arc flow 
quantity of 𝑄 in a particular time period, with an upstream hydropower generator who has the right to 
determine what flows on that arc. But it is more natural to think of a scenario evolving from a situation 
where a generator has traditionally bought water at its marginal downstream value, which was 𝜆 = 14 
in our example in the previous section, and it has been agreed that a generator buys upstream water, 
provided the downstream users’ rights are protected. We will again let 𝑃 = 6, but this time it denotes 
the marginal benefit implied by the generator’s bid, rather than the marginal cost implied by the pump’s 
offer. The presence of the generator now raises the value of upstream water, so that 𝜆 = 20, unless a 
capacity limit binds. Then the position of the downstream consumer can be protected by a CfD of the 
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form, discussed above, with a negative strike price, 𝑆𝑃 = −6,	reflecting the benefits derived from 
water movement. 
In the case of the middle equality in [4.4a], the non-consumptive rents (in the forward stream flow 
direction) are paid into the settlement surplus101. The CfD pay-out is:  
𝐴𝐶𝑃 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = (−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄 		
Again, if  𝑆𝑃 can be set equal to (−𝑃) and if no arc capacity constraints are binding, the net surplus 
is given by the following:  
Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 = 𝜇F − 𝜇I 𝑞 − 𝑄 = 0.		
This means that the holder would neither pay nor receive anything from the CfD contract. This leaves 
them in the same situation as a participant holding a zero-strike price CfD on an arc with no non-
consumptive use, as in Scenario A. So the contract holder hedges against the locational marginal price 
difference. She is depending on the flows driven by the non-consumptive arc flow demand curve. 
Again, the non-consumptive marginal benefit, 𝑃 will be added to the spot settlement surplus by the 
generator, but most likely returned to the generator under another contract between the two parties. 
In our numerical example, with 𝑆𝑃 = 0, the per unit net surplus is:  
Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 = −𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = −6 − 0 . 1 = −6.		
The contract holder would “receive” the marginal water value difference: 𝜆 − 𝜆 = −6. This implies 
that the holder would be required to pay a value of 6, per unit, into the settlement surplus account. This 
reflects the fact that, moving a unit of water, of itself, actually reduces overall system value by 6. This 
loss will be accepted by the agriculturalist, who requires the water to move from the upstream to the 
downstream, with no allowance being made, under this CfD arrangement, for any non-consumptive 
benefits to another party. In addition, the settlement surplus would also receive the non-consumptive 
marginal benefit of 𝑃 = 6 per unit from the generator.  
Suppose that we set the strike price to 𝑆𝑃 = −8, with no change in the non-consumptive value. Per 
unit net surplus is:	
																																								 																				
101 There is no infra-marginal rent in any of these cases because  𝑃 is constant. 
121	
	
Netsurplus 𝑞, 𝑄 = −𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 = −6 − −8 . 1 = 2.		
Here the CfD holder agrees to pay the SO a value of 8 per unit. But the non-consumptive user only has 
to pay a value of 6 per unit for the movement of water in the spot market. So this positive differential 
contributes to the settlement surplus.  
In the case of the first equality in [4.18a], the settlement surplus collects positive rents 𝑋𝜇F  , from the 
upper arc flow capacity binding in the forward stream flow direction. So ACR pay-outs are adequately 
supported provided 𝑄 ≤ 𝑋 and 𝑆𝑃 ≥ −𝑃. If we can set 𝑆𝑃 = −𝑃, only the constraint rent 
𝑋𝜇F  contributes to the settlement surpluses. As in the previous scenario, this situation leaves the 
downstream participant to hedge against the upper arc flow congestion rents. We will have revenue 
adequacy, provided: 
Netsurplus 𝑋, 𝑄 = 𝜇F 𝑋 − 𝑄 − −𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 ≥ 0  
The second term in the above expression disappears if 𝑆𝑃 = −𝑃. There will (then?) be a positive net 
surplus if 𝑄 < 𝑋.  
Recall the following expression:  
𝐴𝐶𝑃 𝑄, 𝑆𝑃 = (−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄 + 𝑄𝜇F .		
We could imagine a scenario where the flows will be released to the downstream node because 𝜆 is too 
low to make it attractive for the generator to hold upstream water. Let the upstream marginal water 
value be set to 𝜆 = 18. So the CfD pay-out is: 
𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 = 14 − 18 − −6 = 2.  
In our example, referring to the above equation, the upper limit (𝑋) will bind if 𝜆 lowers below 20, 
which it can if the generator would really like to “leak” the maximum through the arc. Changing the 
prices at the injection end implies a positive rent of 𝑋𝜇 ,
F = 2 per unit contributing to the settlement 
surplus. This rent belongs to the arc capacity owner, who could be either the hydro generator, or the 
SO. But that rent may be assigned to a downstream participant via a CfD with a strike price of 𝑆𝑃 =




If, on the other hand, flow rights were initially held by downstream agriculturalists, the generator would 
prefer to secure the right to control the water flow through the arc via some form of a contract with the 
incumbent rights holder. In that case, the downstream agriculturalists would be accepting the flows 
released by the generator. 
In summary, at the natural negative strike price (i.e., 𝑆𝑃 = −𝑃), the non-consumptive marginal 
benefit will be contributed to the spot settlement surplus. As in all other cases, the contract holder is 
accepting the non-consumptive offers in the spot market to move water on the arc. With the term 
(−𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃)𝑄 disappearing, the above equation gives us a strict revenue adequacy result. Even 
ignoring risk reduction, these contracts will have a positive expected value to the holder. Setting the 
strike price higher improves revenue adequacy, but it reduces the net value to the holder, thus reducing 
what participants are prepared to pay. CfD value will easily become negative if the strike price is too 
high. If the strike price is set equal to zero, the CfD holder is paying 𝜆 − 𝜆 = 14 − 20 = −6 < 0 
into the settlement surplus. The marginal price differential will be equal to −𝑃 + 𝜇F , and the CfD 
holder will receive this differential as per the spot prices102. A higher strike price may provide revenue 
adequacy, even when excess rights are issued, but the exact volume of excess rights that can be 
supported is unclear, in advance, because it depends on prices, and hence on offers, and not just on arc 
capacity.103 	
In the case of the last equality in [4.4a], the settlement surplus collects (−𝜇I𝑋), the negative rent 
generated by flows being constrained by the lower arc capacity limit on the specified channel/flow gate 
in the specified direction. For revenue adequacy: 
Netsurplus 𝑋, 𝑄 = −𝜇I𝑋 − −𝑃 − 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 − 𝑄𝜇I   
= 𝜇I 𝑄 − 𝑋 + 𝑃 + 𝑆𝑃 𝑄 ≥ 0  
i.e., provided: 𝑄 ≥ 𝑋 and  𝑆𝑃 ≥ −𝑃 
																																								 																				
102 In the long run, any spill at the upstream leads to 𝜆 − 𝜆 > 0. As a result, the shadow price differential will 
be greater than the marginal non-consumptive benefits if the arc capacity constraints are not binding.  
103 This situation is similar to that for a lossy electricity transmission line, as discussed in a section 4.4.2.3 above. 	
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The lower arc capacity limit will bind if the upstream marginal water value, 𝜆 > 20, because the 
upstream generator assigns a higher value on the water that they would prefer to hold upstream water, 
even intending to release less than the minimum through the arc. In our numerical example, 𝜆 = 22 
implies a negative rent, (−𝜇I𝑋 = −2) per unit in the settlement surplus. Unless the minimum 
capacity is zero, this will be incurred by the asset owner (or SO), who presumably has an obligation to 
meet the minimum flow requirement as already discussed in the previous sections. But responsibility 
for covering that negative rent would be assigned to a participant via a CfD with a strike price 𝑆𝑃 =
−6, the payout for which will be: 𝜆 − 𝜆 − 𝑆𝑃 = 14 − 22 − −6 = −2, per unit. This means that 
the CfD gives the holder the obligation to use the arc capacity to transport water, but without any of the 
non-consumptive arc flow benefits. 
So CfD pay-outs are adequately supported provided 𝑄 ≥ 𝑋 and 𝑆𝑃 ≥ −𝑃. If the strike price 
(𝑆𝑃) is set to equal the non-consumptive marginal benefit (−𝑃), we get a strict revenue adequacy 
result, under which the non-consumptive arc user pays the rights holder, via the settlement surplus, for 
the movement of water, as above. Again, this means that one can improve revenue adequacy by setting 
the strike price to a higher value but, as in the previous discussion, we cannot guarantee revenue 
adequacy for CfD volumes outside the physical flow range without knowing the offer prices.  
4.4.3.3.2 Implications of ACR/ACO Allocation with Arc Benefits 
As we have already noted in Scenario A, it seems unlikely that parties will willingly enter into financial 
contracts to make up the negative rents implied by lower flow bounds, unless paid to do so. As in the 
previous scenario, the SO may have to make generators accept those option contracts, at market start. 
The generator may decide to sell contracts directly or sometime via the SO, only if it increase her 
overall welfare, in expectation. An agriculturalist will be motivated to buy these contracts at that price 
only if it increases her overall welfare, in expectation. The agriculturalist will get guaranteed access to 
reasonably priced water supply. The generator could lower her risks, at least for volumes up to their 
minimum flow level. However, the risk reducing effect of the contracts lowers, as volumes increase. 
Under such contracts, the generators are obliged maintain sometimes flow levels unattractive given 
electricity prices at the time. So they might prefer an option contract implying no such obligations. 
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Sometimes, the generators may prefer a put option contract implying no such binding commitment and 
giving control over the exercise104. Ideally, the generators may prefer non-standard exotic type options, 
linked to both electricity and water prices.    
Note that in the absence of any prior property rights, a non-consumptive arc flow user might be 
expected to pay for the point-to-point movement of the flows. But the real-world commercial outcome 
depends crucially on who “owns” the flow channel, or has the right to control it. For example, if the 
“arc owner” is a hydropower generator, that generator will generally have had the right, prior to market 
establishment, to make water flow through their facility, and to decide how much should flow, perhaps 
subject to restrictions contained in water rights etc. Thus they should not be expected to pay (again) for 
that right. Instead, we would expect arrangements to be made whereby the rents arising from their bid 
curve, and/or because the capacity constraint is binding, would be returned to them, and/ not retained in 
the settlement surplus105. Then, as above, it is that participant, and not the SO who would be in a 
position to issue ACRs with respect to the movement of water through that particular arc.The issues 
such as how to allocate initial property rights not just for water but for water distribution capacity, prior 
to market start and how to maintain minimum in-stream flows in the system require further attention. 
The generator (agriculturalist) will be incentivised to sell (buy) any contract at a price that increases 
their overall welfare, in expectation. A hydropower generator (arc owner) would be given the right, 
prior to market establishment, to make water flow through their facility, and to decide how much 
should flow, etc. The agriculturalist can reduce risks by acquiring guaranteed access to a reasonably 
priced water supply. The generator might prefer an option contract implying no commitment to flow 
levels that may be unattractive given electricity prices at the time. Ideally the generator prefers put 
options or non-standard exotic type options, linked to both electricity and water prices that gives greater 
control over the exercise of instruments. A “put option” obligation corresponding to minimum in-
stream flows, could be packaged into obligation-inclusive ACR rights, would probably have to be 
established prior to market start. 
																																								 																				
104 Selling a call option might make the generator worse of as it allows the buyer to determine when to exercise. 
105 This could be achieved by issuing them with a long term ACR for the full arc capacity.	
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4.5 Virtual Models to Define System Rights  
Bringing together the discussions in the previous sections, we conclude this chapter by considering an 
alternative regime under which participants make their own supply system and network trade-offs, 
rather than relying on a centralised market clearing process. Rather than having participants trade FSRs 
and FIRs, we could assign them long-term “slice of system” rights that give proportional shares of 
inflow, storage, and release capacity. Such arrangements may be thought of as creating, and selling 
shares in, a “virtual model” of the system. Discussion of the organisational arrangements and other 
issues relating to this concept can be found in Starkey (2014), Hughes et al., (2013) and Barroso et al., 
(2012). The latter discusses several actual or proposed “virtual models” for reservoir management in the 
US, South America, Canada, Tasmania, and New Zealand.  
A “slice of system mechanism” has been functioning for some time in the Columbia River Catchment 
(Barroso et al., 2012).  In this style of regime, a participant’s stake includes a proportion of each and 
every system resource (i.e., constraint RHS in canonical form) such as net inflows, transportation 
network capacity and storage. Unlike traditional centrally coordinated schemes, the users determine 
their own physical production strategies, for their share of the system, based on their own requirements, 
judgments with regard to the value of water, and projections of inflow uncertainty.  And, in a market 
environment, they receive their share of the rents/surpluses arising from spot market electricity sales. 
But the Hydro System Operator (HSO) aggregates all the physical production schedules, handles the 
physical management and coordination of the system, and seeks efficiencies where it can. Thus, this 
regime still manages to preserve some positive attributes of the centralised planning systems such as 
handling externalities and environmental minimum flow.  
This approach will not provide perfect hedging, because nothing can insulate the holder from inflow 
risks. But Barrosso et al suggest that the hedging concept can be taken further, and largely divorced 
from the physical management of the system. A “virtual model” of the system can be created, entirely 
from financial contracts, so that the holder of the financial contract is facing a share of the risks and 
incentives that the HSO faces, while the HSO is free to manage the system for maximum gain, given 
the aggregate contract position implied by all the holders exercising their rights.  
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For a thermal power station (with an unlimited fuel supply) the natural “virtual model” financial 
contract is just a (European) energy call option, which specifies quantity, delivery time, location and a 
strike price, based on the station’s capacity, location, and marginal production cost. These call options 
are normally traded as strips (see Oren, 2005), thus giving the holder a virtual share of the station 
capacity, for the duration of the strip.  
For a hydro system, though, we could employ the “swing option” based virtual reservoir management 
approach described by Read et al., (2012). Swing options were developed initially for coal contracts 
(Joskow, 1985; 1987), and later applied in other energy markets (Kaminski & Gibner, 1995; Kaminski, 
1997; Garman & Barbieri, 1997; Jaillet et al., 2004). The main feature of a swing option is that it may 
be exercised in multiple time intervals during the period in which exercise is allowed, but the quantity 
(e.g., MW) exercised must lie within a prescribed range in each time interval, while the total quantity 
taken during the lifespan of the swing option must also be less than the maximum limit. The holder may 
exercise their rights at any time based on the opportunity cost of the contract to them. Thus they are 
effectively managing a “reservoir” of opportunities106. Unlike electricity swing options, though, a water 
swing option has to cover initial storage, inflows, storage capacity and release. And, given the 
uncertainty in inflows, we need to slice both firm and non-firm system resources, such as inflows. The 
next section formulates the swing option pay-offs for a virtual share of a supply system as follows: 
4.5.1 Mathematical Description of Swing Option Parameters for Trading Water       
§ Time at which the swing option is written: 𝑡 = 0 
§ Possible exercise time intervals:  𝑡 ∈ 0, 𝑇 		  
§ Let θÚ be the share of the system contracted by user, with θÚ = 1. The system components 
can be expressed as follows107:  
Virtual storage capacity: 𝑆Ú¼ = θÚ	𝑆 
																																								 																				
106 Unlike normal option contracts, which are automatically exercised whenever the strike price is exceeded. 
Parties may determine a “strike price’ for their own internal purposes, but this will have to be adjusted, over time, 
so that the cumulative exercise, over any period of time, matches the volume actually available under the contract, 
over that period.    
107 Each system resource could be apportioned asymmetrically among different parties instead of equally shared, 
as proposed in this formulation. 
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Virtual initial storage:  𝑆ÚL¼ = θÚ	𝑆
L 108 
Virtual inflows109 : 𝑓Ú,?¼ = 	 θÚ	𝑓? 
Virtual release capacity:  𝑍Ú¼ = 	 θÚ	𝑋 
§ Options called during period 𝑡 by the participant 𝑎 at the reservoir: 𝑧Ú,? 
§ System slice continuity equation: 𝑠Ú,? = 𝑠Ú,?IG + 𝑓Ú,? − 𝑧Ú,?				∀	𝑎, 𝑡 
§ System (slice) constraints: 110  
Storage slice limits: 0 ≤ 𝑠Ú,? ≤ 𝑆Ú¼ 
 Release slice limits: 0 ≤ 𝑧Ú,? ≤ 𝑍Ú¼ 
• Strike price = 0, so given the spot price 𝜆?, the pay-off is: 𝜆,?𝑧Ú,?.       
Any surpluses (e.g., spill) or deficits of firm components could be sliced accordingly. A user slice 
entitlement account tracks the accumulated difference between the exercised resource and the slice 
entitlement over time, as per the continuity equation above. Under a dynamic storage leasing 
arrangement, as opposed to the fixed storage capacity regime described so far, the users could be given 
the opportunity to trade their storage slices over the planning horizon. But the system might also have a 
fall-back spill-over rule directing any “virtual spills” to be transferred to a common stock, or to other 
storage slice owners. 
As in a centralised system, the HSO carries out all physical coordination and operation of the system 
(including forecasting inflows, and providing information to right holders). In the regime discussed by 
Read et al, the hydro system was assumed to be operating in an electricity market context, and the HSO 
was to be free to determine the rate of physical delivery of electricity, and where it was to be produced, 
based on physical and market conditions, irrespective of whether users  exercised their rights or not. It 
is argued, though, that the HSO would have strong incentives not to deviate too far from participants’ 
																																								 																				
108  Closing storage value can be ignored if the contracts are perpetual. 
109 This approach can easily be generalised, but here we ignore the nodal network, and related factors like nodal 
tributary flows, to maintain the simplicity of formulation.  
110 The holder of the option has to comply with all slice limits during every exercise time period. But, in practice, 




aggregate “call”, so as to minimise their own risk, and avoid moving market prices to their own 
detriment.  As explained by Read et al, the participants also have incentives to manage their “virtual 
reservoirs” of callable contract capacity in much the same manner as they would manage physical 
reservoirs. 
We conclude this discussion by noting the following. Under this regime, participants own a virtual 
share of each component of the reservoir system. The swing option developed here allows participants 
to act on their own judgement by calling the swing option in multiple time intervals during the period in 
which exercise is allowed, without any intervention of other participants. The central coordination of 
the resource is unchanged. The issues such as how to ensure sufficient incentives for participants and, 
how to resolve possible gaming situations (e.g., monopolizing the HSO) are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
4.6 Chapter Conclusions 
Financial property rights are often useful to develop commercial and organizational arrangements to 
improve liquidity and ultimately increase efficient resource use in a water market. We assume the 
existence of a market in “Financial Water Rights” FWRs, at multiple nodes, cleared by solving a 
deterministic/stochastic formulation, as discussed by Starkey (2014). In this chapter, we did not discuss 
or analyse the workings of an FWR market, but explored a range of financial property rights that could 
be developed, and may be necessary, to complement such a market, drawing on the Financial 
Transmission Right (FTR) concepts developed for electricity markets. These financial hedging 
instruments could be used to deploy the settlement surplus arising from market clearing to hedge 
against trading risks, across both space and time.   
First, we discuss “Financial Inflow Rights” (FIRs). An FIR would be priced as a special form of FWR 
giving rights to water expected to flow into a storage reservoir. With fixed volume FIRs, the SO would 
be exposed if the expected inflows do not realise. Instead, an index-based FIR provides the holder the 
right to receive a volume of FWRs, with that volume being proportional to the inflow received, so the 
holder faces the volume risks herself, and the SO does not. The participants would be required to hold 




Section 4.3 then develops “Financial Storage Rights” (FSRs). Fixed-volume, obligation inclusive FSRs 
will hedge a specific volume stored between time periods, at the reservoir. Rents arising in the supply 
system could be used to support obligation inclusive FSRs, which would protect participants against 
exposure to supply system rent uncertainty. Deterministic FSRs could be funded by storage capacity 
congestion rents, but we were only able to show revenue adequacy in expectation, in a stochastic 
environment. We also note that fixed volume FSRs are fundamentally incompatible with indexed FIRs. 
So a combination of the two will not fully insulate holders from the impact of inflow uncertainties.  
While this may seems disappointing, Section 4.3.3 quotes Read (2016), who suggests that this is only 
what we should expect, because the owner of physical ’storage capacity could not expect any greater 
certainty than that provided by these hedging instruments.  He argues that the “true” marginal water 
value is not actually known at the time these FSRs are settled, and suggests the possibility of 
“retrospective” storage rights (RSRs) to cover the implications of this incompatibility. With the RSRs, 
the SO would not be exposed to risks if the RSR valuation and settlement can be deferred until the end 
of the horizon, when all uncertainty has been resolved. This implies that the actual water value at any 
node along that path will also be known, depending on whether storage actually did reach its bounds. 
That section also explores the concept of FSR-option contracts, representing a right to store water, with 
no obligation to do so. Again, this is more akin to the rights implied by ownership of physical storage 
capacity. But, detailed investigation of such concepts lies outside the scope of this thesis.  
As well as supply system rents, the SO also collects transmission/distribution system rents associated 
with arc capacity limits, in the settlement surplus. Thus Section 4.4 moves on to discuss on distribution 
system rents and rights. Instead of using node-to-node FDRs similar to FTRs, this section focuses on 
Arc Capacity Rights (ACRs) that are more like a Flow Gate Right (FGR). ACRs could be applied to 
hedge against the flow congestion price risks, for an arc in the network. In the absence of loop flow 
problems, ACRs could be equivalent to node-to-node rights between adjacent nodes. As a result, a 
series of ACRs could construct a “node-to-node” right. We discussed the implications of ACRs in the 
context of three scenarios. For the case with consumptive benefits only, the settlement surplus can only 
fund node-to-node ACRs up to the minimum of the arc capacities, in the relevant direction. The 
negative rents are associated with minimum flow requirements in the forward direction. For the case 
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with non-consumptive costs and both consumptive and non-consumptive benefits, the ACR hedges 
against both the capacity constraint rent risk and the variation in the marginal non-consumptive cost. In 
general, the revenue adequacy is met because it is unlikely to have any “environmental” flow 
requirement in the pumped channel. For the case with consumptive benefits, the revenue adequacy is 
met provided that the SO has not issued too many ACRs. In both cases, the revenue adequacy may be 
improved by setting the strike price to a higher value but, it cannot be guaranteed for contract volumes 
outside the physical flow range without knowing the offer prices. In Section 4.4.3, we recommend the 
possibility of using put/non-standard exotic option ACRs to handle situations such as minimum in-
stream flows, linked to both electricity and water prices, perhaps packaged into obligation-inclusive 
ACR rights.  
Although none of the instruments developed in this chapter to hedge against storage capacity rents and 
arc flow congestion system rents have actually been implemented, they show considerable promise in 
terms of increasing market liquidity and improving competition. But our discussion suggests that their 
most important role may actually be to reduce risks of agriculturalists by acquiring guaranteed access to 
a reasonably priced water supply and to provide option contracts to generators implying no 
commitment to flow levels that may be unattractive.  
Finally, section 4.5 explains the concept of creating, and allocating shares in, a swing-option-based 
virtual model of the system, giving proportional shares of inflow, storage, and release capacity to 
participants. This method expands the range of choices available for consideration by participants and 
others. Also, it allows some of the benefits of competition to remain, even when the system cannot be 
feasibly disaggregated. This concept deserves investigation, as discussed by Barroso et al (2012).  
Many issues relating to the allocation, support or trading of hedging instruments, and their value as risk 
management instruments, have significant potential for further research, as does their potential impact 
on gaming behaviour. We will not pursue any of these developments further in this thesis, though. 
Instead, the remaining chapters focus on developing an intra-period pre-computation routine, using the 






5. A multi-nodal intra-period model for a single reservoir mixed-use catchment 
A Multi-nodal Intra-period Model for a Single Reservoir Mixed-
use Catchment   
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is motivated by the intra-period reservoir optimization sub problem in a single reservoir 
mixed-use nodal catchment. Our work contributes to the CDDP literature by adding a new CDDP intra-
period model which pre-computes intra-period demand functions, for a multi-use reservoir system. This 
intra-period model provides a CDDP model with spatial rather than temporal stages. The intra-period 
nodal CDDP developed in this chapter could be applied to clear a single period spot market for water 
with any means of determining the storage decision. Chapters 6 through 8 then undertake a series of 
intra-period CDDP developments to investigate issues such as environmental service flow 
requirements, flow transportation delays, and two-reservoir modelling. More specifically, this chapter 
addresses the question of how to clear a water market to meet intra-period consumptive and non-
consumptive water demands in a river catchment with a single reservoir. Here we develop the 
deterministic multi-nodal version of the CDDP to form a series of demand curves for release. This 
problem is known as the intra-period problem to be used in the first stage of the two-stage stochastic 
CDDP. 	
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.3 provides an overview of CDDP models. Section 5.4 
describes the implicit intra-period optimisation model and the CDDP algorithm used to construct it. 
Proof that the algorithm constructs the desired demand curve for release is given in Section 5.5. 
Application of the algorithm is illustrated in Section 5.5, while Section 5.6 describes the use of the 
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demand curve for release constructed here to optimise the full inter-temporal model. The next section is 
about return flow benefits. Section 5.8 provides conclusions and suggests future directions.	
5.2 Intra-period versus Inter-period Optimization Problems 
This section is about the intra-period reservoir optimization sub-problem and the inter-period reservoir 
optimization problem. 
Here, a simple deterministic version of the inter-period model that uses the benefit function from a 
nodal optimization is illustrated. For the interest of simplicity, let us assume an operating policy where 
the market aims to maximise the benefit of allocating water in each period over the planning horizon 
based on the available inflows to the reservoir. Here, 𝑇 is the number of periods, 𝑠? is the reservoir 
storage for period 𝑡, 𝑠 the storage capacity, 𝑟? is the net release (accounting for inflow) which implicitly 
represents the met demand in a particular time period, and 𝑠L represents the initial and target storage 
level. 𝑧? is the spill (unusable overflow) during the period. The bounds on 𝑟? could be implicit in the 
definition of 𝑁𝐵? or they can be explicitly defined as follows. 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝐵? 𝑟?o?|G  [5-1] 
Subject to 
 𝑠?FG = 𝑠? − 𝑟? − 𝑧?,				∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 [5-2] 
 𝑅 ≤ 𝑟? ≤ 𝑅, ∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 [5-3] 
 𝑠G = 𝑠L, 𝑠oFG = 𝑠L [5-4] 
 0 ≤ 𝑠? ≤ 𝑠,			∀𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 [5-5] 
The objective set by the equation [5-1] seeks to maximize the net benefit for a nodal network catchment 
deterministically for the current and future periods similar to traditional reservoir optimization models. 
The concave intra-period benefit function, 𝑁𝐵(𝑟) gives the welfare (e.g. revenue) earned from release 
variable. Here we could think that 𝑁𝐵(𝑟) is representing the first term of the primal objective function 
[3-1] in Chapter 3: 𝑃,? 𝑞,?? + 𝑃,? 𝑥,?∈³(,)(,)∈?  where 𝑟 = 𝑥L,G? . For the 
interest of simplicity we assume that there is only a single arc connecting the downstream nodes to the 
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reservoir node111. A general inter-period benefit maximising objective can be written by considering 
both intra-period benefit function, 𝑁𝐵(𝑟) and the future benefit function, 𝑉oFG 𝑠oFG  in line with 
Chapter 3 formulations as follows:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
Y,r
𝑁𝐵? 𝑟?o?|G + 𝑉oFG 𝑠oFG   
Constraint [5-2] ensures continuity of storage balance across time112. In this model 𝑟 can take negative 
values (net flow injections) as the net release includes both inflows and releases at the reservoir node. 
The constraint [5-3] shows feasibility bounds for the net release. Chapter 3 explains spills in detail, but 
here for the interest of simplicity we include a spill variable 𝑧?, with relevant bounds. Instead a separate 
spill node could be included in the intra-period model to take care any spill from the reservoir. 𝑧? is 
non-zero only when the end-of-period storage is at reservoir capacity or the target storage in the last 
period. Constraint [5-4] maintains initial and end of the final horizon (target) storage value. The 
restriction, 𝑠oFG = 𝑠L means that we seek a steady state condition. Instead, the end-of-horizon storage 
could be left free by including an end-of-horizon benefit function, for case of a single year operation. 
Constraint [5-5] provides the lower and upper storage bounds.  
In the previous SLP, the intra-period optimization sub-problem is embedded within the inter-period 
optimization problem and hence it is solved using the same optimization technique as the inter-period 
optimization problem. On the other hand, SDP can accommodate a benefit function generated using any 
type of intra-period pre-commutation method. This chapter attempts to solve the intra-period single 
reservoir mixed-use network optimization problem of the standard dynamic programming problem, 
which amounts to the term 𝑁𝐵? 𝑟  of the convex programming problem, 𝑚𝑎𝑥Y,r 𝑁𝐵? 𝑟?
o
?|G +
𝑉oFG 𝑠oFG , for some particular period, 𝑡. Here 𝑁𝐵? 𝑟  denotes this intra-period benefit function 
which includes both demanders and suppliers in a nodal catchment. 
																																								 																				
111 However, 𝑟 becomes net flow out in general, if there are multiple arcs connected to the reservoir with some 
flowing into the reservoir and some flowing out.	
112 When the net increase in storage, 𝑠?FG − 𝑠? , is less than the net inflow, −𝑟?, the system operator has been 
forced to spill some inflow coming in the time period 𝑡 as the intra-period model is unable to make use of it all. 
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This chapter seeks to develop an intra-period pre-computation routine using mix of LP and DP 
approaches. Here we employ a CDDP intra-period model which pre-computes intra-period net nodal 
demand functions, for a multi-use reservoir catchment. The intra-period nodal CDDP computational 
routine proposed in this chapter focuses on a recursive technique to compute the convex intra-period 
nodal benefit function. This approach exploits the tree structure of the river system, and builds up 
𝑁𝐵(𝑟) by building up its derivative (i.e., net marginal benefit for release or the net demand curve for 
release) in terms of component curves (e.g., marginal consumptive benefit function and marginal non-
consumptive benefit function) that are added inversely and normal point-wise. 
This procedure constructs a ‘demand curve for release’ at the reservoir; this demand curve gives the 
optimal marginal value of any reservoir release. This method is quite general, and can be used for any 
river catchment that can be represented as a tree radiating upstream and downstream from one 
reservoir. It has been designed to clear markets in which water is traded between water users of various 
types such as consumptive users and non-consumptive users, but can also be employed to optimise 
integrated operations by a catchment manager. The benefits these users receive can be modelled 
directly or as market bids where the river catchment forms part of a market clearing model. A market 
bid reflects user willingness to pay as a measure of her benefit from water trading.  
With a relatively little effort, the CDDP could provide price information at node/arc levels, which is 
useful to explain pricing differences to water users and to understand the economic drivers behind nodal 
pricing. In addition, CDDP in particular, efficiently solve a single reservoir optimization problem over 
an SP with a similarly detailed scenario tree. 
Unlike the previous CDDP intra-period models (e.g., Cournot gaming intra-period model proposed by 
Scott & Read (1996)), the multi-nodal CDDP procedure described here applies across space not time 
(providing locational marginal prices across the network). The spatial CDDP may be embedded in a 
more traditional temporal CDDP. A participant can backtrack to explore the spatial trajectory of both 
successful and rejected bids from the point of market clearing to her original position. Hence a user can 
be better equipped to decide her bidding strategies in subsequent market rounds.   
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5.3 Constructive Dual Dynamic Programming (CDDP) 
As already noted in Chapter 2, CDDP can help the reservoir manager to select competing water 
demands for release and storage. As a part of the reverse recursive CDDP procedure, the marginal value 
curve for releasing water, 𝑚𝑣𝑟? 𝑟?  is given or constructed by the intra-period problem (similar to the 
sub-problem 𝑁𝐵? in the standard DP formulation). This is referred to as intra-period pre-computations 
in the CDDP. Scott & Read (1996) noted that the “pre-computations” could be thought of as defining a 
“demand curve for release” (𝑑𝑐𝑟) within each period.  
Similar to a standard DP formulation, the intra-period CDDP pre-computation model can be performed 
independently from the main procedure, employing any solution technique that produces a monotone 
non-increasing demand curve (or surface) for release. For example, Read (1989) used merit order filling 
of load duration curves, but Read & George (1990) used parametric LP, while Scott & Read (1996) and 
Batstone & Scott (1998) used Cournot gaming models. Even a heuristic approach can be used to 
construct monotone non-increasing 𝑑𝑐𝑟.  
This chapter proposes a similar pre-computation method to construct the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for a single reservoir 
network represented by a set of nodes in a tree that enables off-take and in-flow water for different 
water uses. The nodal network and network structure-based graph representations are widely used to 
model the interconnected system in commoditised utility optimization models such as water, electricity 
and natural gas. For example Wang et al., (2007), Barros et al., (2008) and Cheng et al., (2009), 
explicitly represent water buyer-seller delivery relationship through a physical network of water 
distribution system in the optimization model.   
Given those pre-computations, the CDDP algorithm can be described as equivalent to ‘horizontal 
addition’ or ‘augmenting’ of demand curves (Read & Hindsberger, 2010). Horizontal (demand curve) 
addition accumulates the demand at each price point, effectively adding the demand curve inverses 
(Scott & Read, 1996). The concept is common in the construction of industry supply curves in 
microeconomics. See, for example, Mankiw & Taylor (2006).  To date CDDP implementations have all 
involved adding curves backwards, through time, to solve an inter-period CDDP problem by 
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recursively forming a new “demand curve for storage” (𝑑𝑐𝑠) for the beginning of each period by adding 
𝑑𝑐𝑟 to the 𝑑𝑐𝑠 for the beginning of the next period.  
The next section presents a generic intra-period optimization model that could be used to optimise the 
nodal network. Then, we illustrate how the intra-period CDDP model could efficiently construct the 
demand curve for release for the reservoir.   
5.4 Constructing the Intra-period Demand Curve for Release to Clear a Water Market 
The term demand curve is used to denote the relationship between price and the demand quantity. It 
could, in general, refer to a price-quantity relationship without limiting to a strict functional form. Thus, 
‘demand curve’ refers to both forms (price as a function of quantity or quantity as a function of price). 
Unless otherwise noted, in this thesis the term demand curve is used to mean price as a function of the 
release volume (quantity). Where the demand curve is piecewise constant, it may be expressed as a 
merit ordered set of prices which water users (e.g., hydropower producers) are willing to pay for water 
released to meet their current requirements (Read & Hindsberger, 2010). The inverse net demand 
function is defined in terms of the net quantity of water demanded at the node as a function of the nodal 
price113. 
As we noted earlier, the inter-period CDDP optimisation does not depend on any particular solution 
technique being used for intra-period optimization. So here we propose to use CDDP at this intra-period 
level, too, developing an efficient algorithm to clear a multi-node market operating across the 
catchment, within each period. Although the method is also valid for centralised water management 
with no market, it is best described as constructing the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for the reservoir by recursively combining 
all (net) nodal demand curves for water at the nodes radiating from the reservoir as a tree.  
Unlike previous CDDP implementations, though, the recursion in this algorithm operates “inwards” 
towards the main reservoir, rather than “backwards” over time. Each 𝑑𝑐𝑟 is constructed solely as a 
function of long-term reservoir release for a fixed inflow and tributary flow realisation.      
																																								 																				
113 Merit ordered net demand curves representing efficient allocating water at a particular node in the river 
network will only need a slight change, without a full scale re-optimizing. An LP method (e.g., parametric LP 
method described in Read & George (1990)) could be used to optimise a complex network model and then 
analyse the dual price relationships. 
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5.4.1 Intra-period Tree Optimization Model Formulation  
This section sets up a context for the nodal intra-period pre-computation sub-problem. Hence, we 
present underlying assumptions of the single reservoir constrained network optimization model and the 
single reservoir nodal CDDP procedure.    
5.4.1.1 Assumptions 
We assume the catchment network has a single long-term storage reservoir (at the root) and a tree 
structure. We relax the single reservoir assumption in a later chapter and consider ways of generalising 
the tree requirement at the end of this chapter. Due to the tree-structure, each non-root node has a parent 
node, being the neighbouring node on the unique path towards the reservoir. Even though this chapter 
assumes a set of interconnected nodes radiating in a tree structure from the reservoir, we illustrate some 
limited applications of this procedure for non-tree structures within a nodal network in Chapter 6. A 
node’s parent may be either upstream or downstream, depending on how it is situated with respect to 
the reservoir.  
The costs and benefits of consumptive and non-consumptive use at different locations are assumed to 
be independent of one another. They are also independent of supplies and demands met in previous 
periods114. Any costs are convex and benefits are concave functions of water use. Non-consumptive use 
(such as a hydro power station or pumping) does not use up water, but transfers water from one location 
to another, at some cost or benefit.  Further, the optimal power generation or pumping level is not 
determined by the price of water at a single node, but by trading off the difference between upstream 
and downstream prices against the cost or benefit associated with the flow use. This can be modelled by 
adjusting the marginal water value curve passed on from one node to the next to account for this 
external cost/benefit. 
We first present a non-linear programming (NLP) nodal tree model that seeks to optimise the total 
benefits/costs of the accumulated water flows through the network. The CDDP procedure presented 
subsequently determines the optimal solution to the NLP model by re-ordering and/or adjusting 
marginal values at every node and arc. This moves the demand curves towards the reservoir. Hence, the 
CDDP operates on the dual by adjusting marginal water value curves at a node rather than specifying 
																																								 																				
114 This assumption can be relaxed by including supply/demand information in a DP state. 
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flows. We use the following single reservoir river network with a set of hypothetical consumptive, non-
consumptive and distributary demands to illustrate the single reservoir nodal CDDP procedure later in 
this chapter. Figure 5-1 illustrates a single reservoir catchment, based on the Rangitata Diversion Race 
(RDR) hydro scheme in the south island, New Zealand. 
 
Figure 5-1. A single reservoir multi node catchment topology styled on the RDR network in New Zealand. 
Consumptive, distributary and non-consumptive arc flow demands shown in the network are added for illustrative 
purposes of the algorithm.   
A reservoir node may have multiple tributary and non-tributary inflows and a set of outflows. We 
assume no significant delays regarding the flow of water across the network. First the (primal) model is 
described in terms of demands, supplies and water flows. Then the algorithm is described, which 
generates a net demand curve covering all release decisions. For this purpose, all nodal data is re-cast as 
net demands and arcs are re-oriented towards the reservoir. 
5.4.1.2 Nodal Catchment Optimisation Sub-problem 
In this section we define the catchment optimisation model used to determine the optimal net benefit 
function, 𝑁𝐵(𝑟), as a function of net reservoir release, 𝑟. The 𝑑𝑐𝑟 is derived from 𝑁𝐵(𝑟) as 𝑑𝑐𝑟 𝑟 =


































Following the notations declared in Chapter 3, let Τ = 𝑁 = 0,1, … , 𝑛 , 𝐴 	be a tree with the reservoir 
at the root node 0, and nodes, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 indexed so that child nodes (further from the reservoir) have a 
larger index than their parents. Arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 has the usual water flow direction from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗. 
The amount of inflow captured at node 𝑖 is denoted, 𝐹 ≤ 𝑓 ≤ 𝐹. However, in most general cases the 
lower bound of the tributary flows can be zero. A non-zero lower bound may be enforced in order to 
maintain a minimum in-stream flow requirement in a tributary flow path (arc) (see Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4). Tributary inflows not captured (if any) are assumed as a lost to the system. For full 
generality, 𝐶𝐹(𝑓) denotes the convex cost function associated with the capture of this flow. This 
generality allows for supply participants who incur costs or who charge for the flow injection. This 
could also be water purchased from a different catchment (e.g., traded between water authorities) or a 
desalination plant (e.g., urban reservoir system). For a typical tributary flow 𝐶𝐹 𝑓 = 0. We could 
model inflows which include upstream non-consumptive uses by allowing 𝐶𝐹 to be negative. For 
example, 𝐶𝐹L < 0 reflects non-consumptive benefits of upstream flow users directly above the 
reservoir.  
Each non-root node 𝑖 has 𝐶 > 0 units of (potential) consumptive demand, with an associated concave 
benefit function 𝐶𝐵(𝑐). Variable 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶, represents the consumptive demand met at node 𝑖.  
Variable 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐸 represents distributary flow from non-root node 𝑖 out of the system. The target 
flow is 𝐸	(≥ 0), with a convex cost function 𝐶𝐸(𝐸 − 𝑑) associated with missing the target. These 
distributary flows may be used to apply desired environmental flow requirements.  
Nodes without distributary flow, tributary flow, and/or consumptive demand would have the 
corresponding bounds set to zero. We do not account for consumptive and distributary return flows and 
assume these flows are completely lost to the system (discussed later).    
Each arc (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 has an associated variable 𝑥 representing downstream flow, within flow limits: 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋. The lower bound may be negative for a syphon (see Figure 5-1) or if pumping or some 
other upstream transfer were available.  
We refer to non-consumptive flow as flow on an arc which creates a benefit or cost to the system, such 
as hydropower production or pumping. The net benefit received from a non-consumptive arc flow of x 
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over arc 𝑖, 𝑗  is denoted by 𝑁𝐶𝐹(𝑥) (This is negative for costs incurred, for example, from pumping). 
We ignore issues such as power conversion functions and reservoir head effects in hydroelectric 
production.   
As noted in the above section, variable 𝑟, here, represents the net release at the reservoir node. We 
adjust 𝑟 to include the net flow injections at the reservoir allowing 𝑟 ≤ 0. That is, r is the difference 
between all downstream releases and any controlled or uncontrolled inflows into the reservoir. For a 
given release r, we seek to optimise the following: 
𝑁𝐵 𝑟 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥ß,y,R,	 𝐶𝐵 𝑐 − 𝐶𝐸 𝐸 − 𝑑 −à|G 𝐶𝐹 𝑓 + 𝑁𝐶𝐹(𝑥)(,)∈  [5-6] 
Subject to: 
𝑓 	+ 𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑑 + 	 𝑥, ∈ ,								∀	𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, ∈   [5-7] 
−𝑓L − 𝑥L + 	 𝑥LL, ∈,L ∈ = 	𝑟  [5-8] 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋	; 	0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶	; 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐸, 𝐹 ≤ 𝑓 	≤ 𝐹, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴  [5-9] 
The objective is to maximize the net benefit across all nodes accounting nodal tributary, distributary, 
consumptive and arc non-consumptive flow demands. Constraint [5-7] represents the nodal flow 
balance for any upstream or downstream node. Constraint [5-8] ensures upstream and/or downstream 
flows from the reservoir meet the required net release (which may be negative for a net injection). 
Finally, constraint [5-9] enforces flow capacities and demand limits. 
We avoid explicitly solving the nodal tree optimization problem as an NLP. Instead the next section 
proposes a multi-nodal CDDP procedure that could efficiently solve the intra-period problem for a 
single or a range of 𝑟 values simultaneously. We use this nodal tree formulation later to prove the multi-
nodal CDDP procedure.     
5.4.2 The Multi-nodal CDDP Algorithm 
The previous model deals directly with cost and benefit functions for the various uses and supplies of 
water. The CDDP algorithm described here, on the other hand is applied to the related marginal cost 
and benefit functions, giving the marginal value or price as a function of water flow. To clearly link the 
two, we use capital letters for cost and benefit functions, with lowercase for the corresponding marginal 
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value function. For example, 𝐶𝐵(𝑐) is the net benefit from meeting consumptive demand and 𝑐𝑏 𝑐 =
𝐶𝐵′(𝑐) is the marginal net benefit associated with this.  
Rather than solving NLP formulation [5-6] - [5-9] that seeks to optimize the water flow (quantity) 
explicitly for all possible release values across the network, the CDDP algorithm constructs 𝑑𝑐𝑟 
directly, in a single pass in the dual problem. The 𝑑𝑐𝑟 is constructed by sequentially constructing 
marginal water value curves for each node, transferring the curves towards the reservoir.  
Arc flow bounds restrict the opportunities which may be exploited at nodes. The cumulative effect of 
these restrictions is represented by a domain associated with each marginal value curve. We use the 
notation 𝑓: [𝑎, 𝑏] to denote function f restricted to domain [𝑎, 𝑏]. 
The model data is pre-processed to simplify the algorithm description. All cost and benefit functions at 
nodes are converted to net demand functions, that is, marginal net benefit as a function of the net water 
supplied115. Specifically, for each node 𝑖, the pre-processing calculates the following net demand 
functions. 
§ Consumptive demands form net demand 𝑐𝑏: 0, 𝐶  where 𝑐𝑏 𝑐 =
yâãä
yu
𝑐 .  
§ Distributary flows form net demand 𝑐𝑒: 0, 𝐸  where 𝑐𝑒 𝑑 =
yâåä
yu
𝐸 − 𝑑 . Distributary net 
demand function represents the penalty for not meeting the ecological requirements. Where 𝑑 = 𝐸 
corresponds to fully meeting the distributary requirement. In general, 𝑑 represents missing the 
target 𝐸 by 𝑑 units, that is, a flow of 𝐸	– 	𝑑.    
§ Tributary flows form net demand 𝑐𝑓: −𝐹, −𝐹  where 𝑐𝑓 𝑓 =
yâæä
yu
−𝑓 . The negative flow 
bounds here represent the amount of additional inflow to node 𝑖 not needed to meet demands from 
here, due to the amount of this supply that has been accepted. As the amount of supply accepted is 
reduced, the most expensive are discarded first. 
By convention, arcs are directed away from the reservoir (regardless of flow direction). The flow 
bounds for arc (𝑖, 𝑗) are adjusted to account for this, setting 𝑋M = 𝑋 and 𝑋
M
= 𝑋 if water flow is 
																																								 																				
115 Water supplied by a user (e.g., tributaries, desalination plant) at a node can take negative values as incoming 
flow supplies are converted to demands. 
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away from the reservoir, and 𝑋M = −𝑋 and 𝑋
M
= −𝑋 if water flow is directed towards the 
reservoir. Non-consumptive uses are similarly affected, forming net demand function 𝑛𝑐𝑓: 𝑋M , 𝑋
M
 
where 𝑛𝑐𝑓 𝑥 =
yçâæäè
y
𝑥  for arcs with water flow away from the reservoir and 𝑛𝑐𝑓 𝑥 =
− yçâæäè
y
−𝑥  otherwise. 
The algorithm can be described as alternating between applying horizontal curve addition at a node and 
vertical curve addition on an arc. That is, the quantities at nodes corresponding to each price are added, 
while on the arcs the prices corresponding to each quantity are added. Further details on these 
operations are provided below. 
The algorithm starts from the node with the largest index (which must be a leaf node). A nodal net 
demand curve (𝑛𝑏:	[𝑎, 𝑏]) is formed by “horizontally adding” all tributary flows, distributary, and 
consumptive demands (𝑐𝑓, 𝑐𝑒, 𝑐𝑏) at the node with any previously transferred demands (e.g., demand 
curve of a child node). This horizontal adding corresponds to ordering the net demands from all of these 
sources, from the most to the least valuable. The bounds [𝑎, 𝑏] give the feasible range of net supply that 
could be used to meet some or all of these net demands. Details on horizontal adding are given below. 
For the purpose of future illustrations (see Chapter 7), we use the term “net nodal consumptive demand 
curve”, 𝑛𝑐𝑏 to represent the horizontal addition of just 𝑐𝑓, 𝑐𝑒 and 𝑐𝑏 at a node. This gives a notational 
simplicity to express the local water off-take at a particular node. 
The net demand curve, (𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏]), is then transferred to the parent node by first truncating the domain 
using arc flow bounds [𝑋, 𝑋]116; then “vertically adding” any non-consumptive flow demand 
components 𝑛𝑐𝑓: [𝑋, 𝑋] to form 𝑛𝑏: 𝑆 . The vertical adding corresponds to adjusting prices due to 
additional benefits or costs arising from the non-consumptive uses. This defines a transferred net 
demand curve at the parent node. Thus, the parent node will have a net nodal consumptive demand 
curve and 𝑛𝑏: 𝑆  coming from this child node. The process is repeated until we reach the reservoir 
(node 0). 
																																								 																				
116 The truncated nodal demand curve is	𝑛𝑏: [𝑋, 𝑋] ← 𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏]		
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5.4.2.1 Description of Horizontal,+𝒉 Addition and Vertical,+𝒗 Addition  
A non-consumptive user does not consume the water. She transfers water from one node to another at 
some cost (e.g., for a pump), or to gain some benefit (e.g., for generation). The benefit or cost is in 
addition to benefits from other uses for the same unit of water. Vertical addition adjusts the value of 
each unit of water between the two nodes to account for this extra benefit or cost. For a water channel 
with a non-consumptive use, the water value is different at each end. For example, water above a hydro 
generator includes the marginal returns that can be gained from generation, while water below does not. 
This means that the hydropower benefit will add to the incentive to release water to the downstream 
node. As each subsequent unit of water is released down the channel it will be used to meet the next 
most valuable non-consumptive demand and, in addition, provide the next most valuable return from 
the lower node. The corresponding net demand functions are combined using vertical addition.   
Vertical addition is the usual point-wise addition with respect to the horizontal axis over the coincident 
domain. That is, prices are added for each water flow quantity so when 𝑣: [𝑎, 𝑏] = 𝑓: 𝑎, 𝑏 +¼𝑔: [𝑎, 𝑏] 
then 𝑣 𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑥). Vertical addition is applied here only, when the domains match (see the left-
hand graph of Figure 5-2).  
	
Figure 5-2. Vertical addition (left) and inverse addition (right) of the same marginal water value curves, f(x) and 
g(x). 
Consumptive users extract water from the system, so each unit of water flow can be used only for a 
single consumptive use. Horizontal addition allows the different competing consumptive uses to be 
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allocated in order from highest to lowest marginal value (merit ordered marginal values of water of 
consumptive use). 
 
Figure 5-3. Horizontal marginal water value curve adding 
Horizontal addition is point-wise addition with respect to the vertical axis over the combined range. 
The concept is used to construct market supply curves in standard microeconomics, see for example 
Mankiw and Taylor (2006) . It corresponds to adding the water flow demand quantities from the 
horizontal axis for each fixed price value on the vertical axis. When ℎ: [𝑠, 𝑡] = 𝑓: 𝑎, 𝑏 +>𝑔: [𝑐, 𝑑], we 
have ℎ 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑔(𝑦) for appropriate x and y. We can write h(x) as ℎ 𝑥 = 𝑓IG +
𝑔IG IG(𝑥) where this is well defined. Note the relationship between the horizontal addition result in 
Figure 5.3 and the inverse addition result in the right-hand graph of Figure 5.2, namely ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑤IG(𝑥). 
We apply horizontal addition for decreasing functions only.  
Formally, we define vertical addition as follows. 𝑣: [𝑎, 𝑏] = 𝑓: 𝑎, 𝑏 +¼𝑔: [𝑎, 𝑏] where 𝑣 𝑥 = 𝑓 𝑥 +
𝑔(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑏 . For horizontal addition, ℎ: [𝑠, 𝑡] = 𝑓: 𝑎, 𝑏 +>𝑔: [𝑐, 𝑑] has 𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑐, 𝑡 = 𝑏 + 𝑑, 
and  
ℎ 𝑥 =
𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑑 				where 𝑓 𝑥 − 𝑑 ≤ 𝑔 𝑑
𝑔 𝑥 − 𝑏 				where 𝑔 𝑥 − 𝑏 ≤ 𝑓(𝑏)
min	{𝜆|∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑎, 𝑏 , 𝜆 ≥ 𝑓 𝑦 , 𝜆 ≥ 𝑔 𝑥 − 𝑦 } 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
The vertical and horizontal adding processes are applied below in the proof. Piecewise constant demand 
curves are not a mandatory requirements to execute the CDDP procedure but efficient demand curve 
adding sub-procedures for these help to increase the efficiency of the algorithm.   
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5.4.2.2 Multi-nodal Single Reservoir CDDP Algorithm 
The following procedure constructs the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 corresponding to 𝑁𝐵(𝑟) from the previous model. In the 
algorithm below, par(i) denotes the parent of node 𝑖. 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒆	𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒	 𝑑𝑐𝑟 	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒	𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟	𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘	
𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏]	𝑖𝑠	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 , 𝑛𝑏 = 0, 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 0		∀𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑛 
𝐹𝑜𝑟	𝑖 = 𝑛	𝑡𝑜	1	𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 − 1	𝑑𝑜 
  
	𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏] ← 𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏]+>𝑐𝑏: 0, 𝐶 +>𝑐𝑒: 0, 𝐸 +>	𝑐𝑓: [−𝐹, −𝐹]	
	𝑠𝑒𝑡	 𝑗, 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑝𝑎𝑟(𝑖) 	𝑜𝑟	 𝑗, 𝑘 = 𝑝𝑎𝑟(𝑖), 𝑖 , 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟	𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠
	𝑛𝑏÷: [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
] = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒	 𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏], [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
] 		//	𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑡𝑜	𝑎𝑟𝑐	𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑠
	𝑛𝑏÷: [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
] = 𝑛𝑏: [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
]+¼𝑛𝑐𝑓: [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
]





𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡: 𝑑𝑐𝑟 ← 𝑛𝑏L: 𝑎L, 𝑏L +>𝑐𝑓L: [−𝐹L, −𝐹L]  
To ensure feasibility the 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒	 procedure pads 𝑛𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏] if 	[𝑎, 𝑏] does not cover [𝑋M , 𝑋
M
]. In 
particular, quantities higher than bi are given price zero while those below 𝑎 are given a high penalty 
value. These adjustments can be avoided by careful construction of the data. Next, we provide proof the 
above algorithm constructs the required 𝑑𝑐𝑟. 
Proof of the Multi-nodal CDDP Algorithm  
Here we show the algorithm constructs the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 corresponding to the solution of model [5-6]-[5-9] for 
all release values 𝑟. Specifically, we inductively reduce the problem to a single node, the reservoir. It is 
then simple to show that 𝑑𝑐𝑟 𝑟 = y
yY
𝑁𝐵(𝑟) where NB(r) is given by model [5-9]-[5-12].  
We next adjust and augment the model [5-6]-[5-9] to a form that better matches the algorithm and 
allows an inductive approach. 
We apply the following transformations to construct an equivalent model. For nodes: 𝑓 = −𝑓	, 
𝐶𝐹 𝑓 = −𝐶𝐹 −𝑓 , and  𝐶𝐸 𝑑 = −𝐶𝐸 𝐸 − 𝑑 . 
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Arc flow is adjusted to represent net flow away from the reservoir. For any arc with stream flow 
directed away from the reservoir arc direction and limits are maintained: ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 : 𝑖 < 𝑗, 𝑥 = 𝑥, 𝑋 =
𝑋 and 𝑋 = 𝑋.While for any arc with stream flow directed towards the reservoir arc direction and 
labelling are reversed: ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 : 𝑖 > 𝑗, 𝑥 = −𝑥, 𝑋 = −𝑋 and 𝑋 = −𝑋. The new arc set is 
labelled A'. Let 𝒲 𝑖  be the set of previously processed nodes with node 𝑖 as parent, and 𝐵𝑁 denote 
the derived benefit function from net water flow towards previously processed node 𝑗 from its parent. 
The first derivative of 𝐵𝑁 is denoted by 𝑛𝑏 in the CDDP procedure. Initially define 𝒲 𝑖 = 	∅ for all 
nodes 𝑖. We use 𝑤 for each node 𝑖 to represent the water flowing from node 𝑖 toward all previously 
processed nodes for which it is the parent, and we use 𝑞 for the water flowing towards previously 
processed node 𝑗 from its parent. Also for the moment let us assume that all users are consumptive, 
𝑁𝐶𝐵(𝑥) = 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴. 
Augmented model 
𝑁𝐵 𝑟 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝐵 𝑐 + 𝐶𝐸 𝑑 + 𝐶𝐹 𝑓 	+ 𝐵𝑁(𝑞)∈ü()à|G + 𝐵𝑁(𝑞)∈ü(L)   [5-10] 
Subject to 
−𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 + 𝑥, ∈M − 𝑥, ∈M − 𝑤 = 0,			∀	𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛  [5-11] 
𝑥L + 	𝑤LL, ∈M = 𝑟  [5-12] 
𝑤 = 	 𝑞∈ü() 	∀	𝑖 = 0, … , 𝑛 [5-13] 
−𝐹 ≤ 𝑓 	≤ −𝐹; 𝐿 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑈	; 	0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶	; 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐸	∀	𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴′ [5-14] 
𝐿 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑈	, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒲 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0, … . , 𝑛 [5-15] 
We form an equivalent decomposed model by processing the last node n and reducing the size of the 
augmented model to n – 1 unprocessed nodes. The variable 𝑥à is replaced by 𝑞à with bounds 𝑋à = 𝑋à 
and 𝑋à = 𝑋à.  
Decomposed model 
𝑁𝐵 𝑟 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥	 𝐶𝐵 𝑐 + 𝐶𝐸 𝑑 + 𝐶𝐹 𝑓 	+ 𝐵𝑁(𝑞)∈ü()àIG|G + 𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à  [5-16] 
Subject to 
−𝑓 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 + 𝑥, ∈M − 𝑥, ∈M − 𝑤 − 𝑞à,à ∈M = 0, ∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1 [5-17] 
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𝑥L + 	𝑤LL, ∈M + 𝑞àL,à ∈M = 𝑟 [5-18] 
𝑤 = 	 𝑞∈ü() 	∀	𝑖 = 0… , 𝑛 − 1 [5-19] 
−𝐹 ≤ 𝑓 	≤ −𝐹; 𝐿 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑈	; 	0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝐶	; 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝐸	 [5-20] 
∀	𝑖, 𝑗 = 1… , 𝑛 − 1, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴′ [5-21] 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑋	, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝒲 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0, … . , 𝑛 − 1 [5-22] 
Where 𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à  is determined by subproblem n as 
𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝐵à 𝑐à + 𝐶𝐸à 𝑑à + 𝐶𝐹à 𝑓à 	+ 𝐵𝑁(𝑞)∈ü(à)  [5-23] 
Subject to 
𝑓à + 𝑐à + 𝑑à + 𝑤à = 𝑞à [5-24] 
𝑤à = 𝑞∈ü(à)   [5-25] 
𝑋à ≤ 𝑞à ≤ 𝑋à; −𝐹à ≤ 𝑓à 	≤ −𝐹à  [5-26] 
	0 ≤ 𝑐à ≤ 𝐶à	; 0 ≤ 𝑑à ≤ 𝐸à  [5-27] 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑋	∀	𝑗 ∈ 𝒲(𝑛)  [5-28] 
Adding n to 𝑊(𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑛 ), where 𝑝𝑎𝑟(𝑛) is the parent node of n, the model can be rewritten in the same 
form as the augmented model but with only 𝑛 − 1 as the highest index node with flows modelled. 
Applying this iteratively to the highest index node follows the order in which nodes are visited in the 
CDDP algorithm. Eventually only node 0 remains.  
Sub-problem n is easily converted to the following general form where all Fi are concave. 
 𝐺 𝑞 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐹 𝑦|G   [5-29] 
Subject to 
 𝑦|G = 𝑞  [5-30] 
 𝑌 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑌  [5-31] 
For 𝑘 = 2 it is straightforward to show that 𝐺M: 𝑌G + 𝑌l, 𝑌G + 𝑌l = 𝐹GM: 𝑌G, 𝑌G +>𝐹lM: [𝑌l, 𝑌l] by 
considering the optimality conditions. This can be done, for example, by enumerating all 
complementary slackness cases. The result may be extended to arbitrary 𝑘 by induction. Applying the 
above result to sub-problem n gives: 
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𝐵𝑁àM : 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝐶𝐵àM : 0, 𝐶à +>𝐶𝐸àM : 0, 𝐸à +>𝐶𝐹àM: [−𝐹à, −𝐹à] + 𝐵𝑁M: [𝑋, 𝑋]∈ü(à)  [5-32] 
where the last summation is applied as horizontal addition. It follows that 𝑛𝑏 = 𝐵𝑁àM  and the algorithm 
indeed constructs 𝑑𝑐𝑟. 
Incorporating non-consumptive flow demands  
Including non-consumptive flows changes the construction of the sub problem, and the computation of 
𝐵𝑁à. Only the objective function is changed. It is now written as: 𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝐵à 𝑐à +
𝐶𝐸à 𝑑à + 𝐶𝐹à 𝑓à + 𝐵𝑁þ(𝑞)∈ü(à) + 𝑁𝐶𝐹ùÚY à ,à(𝑞à)  [5-33] 
The vertical addition in the algorithm follows since effectively: 
𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à = 𝐵𝑁à 𝑞à + 𝑁𝐶𝐹ùÚY à ,à(𝑞à) [5-34] 
The next section applies the multi-nodal CDDP procedure to the nodal network shown in the Figure 5-1 
as an illustration of the algorithm. We assume a set of hypothetical consumptive, non-consumptive and 
distributary demand curves exist at selected locations in the network.       
5.5 Illustration of multi-nodal CDDP algorithm.  
We illustrate the CDDP algorithm to construct the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 in the catchment shown in Figure 5-1. We 
assume that the catchment has no suppliers, but only consumptive users requiring water extracted from 
the catchment, and non-consumptive users gaining benefit from flow within the catchment.  For ease of 
explanation, all marginal value curves are piecewise constant over a regular grid of breakpoints. 
5.5.1 Processing the First Node  
The algorithm begins at node 7 which (coincidentally) is the only node above the reservoir. The 
relevant part of the network is shown in Figure 5-4.  
 










Up to four units of consumptive demand for water form 𝑐𝑏ÿ(𝑐)117. A distributary flow with at least one 
unit is required. A high penalty applies if this is not met. An additional unit of distributary flow is 
desirable, with a lower penalty for not meeting this. These two penalties form 𝑐𝑒ÿ(𝑑). Up to four units 
of inflow may be captured at node 7. No costs or penalties are associated with this inflow, so 𝑐𝑓ÿ 𝑓 =
0.   
Figure 5-5 shows construction of the nodal demand curve for water 𝑛𝑏ÿ(𝑞) by horizontal addition: 
𝑛𝑏ÿ: [−4,6] ← 𝑐𝑏ÿ: 0,4 +>𝑐𝑒ÿ: 0,2 +>	𝑐𝑓ÿ: [−4,0]	. This is equivalent to sorting all increments of 
consumptive, distributary and (net) tributary demand by decreasing incremental value. The resulting net 
demand curve represents the marginal benefit from upstream participants if we limit flows to the next 
downstream node. Arc flow limits will restrict the ability of the downstream node to take advantage of 
the opportunity this represents.    
 
Figure 5-5. Horizontal addition of consumptive 𝑐𝑏ÿ, distributive flow 𝑐𝑒ÿ, and tributary flow 𝑐𝑓ÿ, net demand 
curves to form a nodal demand curve 𝑛𝑏ÿ  
Arc (7,0) has a flow capacity of 3 units. As the flow on this arc is towards the reservoir, we set the arc 
flow limits to become [-3, 0]. These arc bounds truncate the nodal demand curve, as shown in Figure 
5-5 . But here there is also a non-consumptive use to take into account.  
The benefit of non-consumptive flow is accounted for by the vertical addition: 𝑛𝑏ÿ: [−3,0] =
𝑛𝑏ÿ: [−3,0] +¼ 𝑛𝑐𝑓ÿL: [−3,0]  as shown in Figure 5-6. Note that, since flow from node 7 to the 
reservoir gains additional non-consumptive benefit, the net benefit gained by using water at node 7, 
rather than letting it flow through to the reservoir, is reduced. The prices in the net demand curve 
																																								 																				
117 Suppose there are 𝑘 consumptive users at node 7. Each user will express her own bid set 𝑐𝑏 𝑐 . The nodal 
consumptive demand curve is formed by aggregating individual demand bid sets, 𝑐𝑏∈!  and then the final bid 
set 𝑐𝑏∈!  is stacked in monotone, non-increasing price order to construct the consumptive demand curve 𝑐𝑏ÿ.    
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passed through to the reservoir are also reduced. This effect is achieved by the pre-processing, which 
makes 𝑛𝑐𝑓ÿL negative, implying vertical ‘subtraction’.  
 
Figure 5-6. Vertical addition with non-consumptive flow demands 𝑛𝑐𝑓ÿL and truncating with arc flow bounds 
𝐿, 𝑈 = [−3,0]. 
5.5.2 Constructing Demand Curves for Node 4 
The next nodes processed are nodes 6 and 5. Both might be considered “downstream” from the 
reservoir.  But the processing of 𝑛𝑏" and 𝑛𝑏·, the net demand curves for these nodes, follows the 
process for node 7, because the flow direction from both is “towards” the reservoir. In this case, arcs 
(5,4) and (6,4) have no non-consumptive uses, so the net demand curves constructed at nodes 6 and 5 
can be transferred directly to node 4 after truncation for flow limits on the corresponding arcs. In this 
case, 𝑛𝑏": [𝑋"µM , 𝑋"µ
M
]  and 𝑛𝑏·: [𝑋·µM , 𝑋·µ
M
]  represent the willingness, and ability, of participants at 
nodes 6 and 5, respectively, to pay to limit flows to node 4. These curves are treated as further 
consumptive net demand curves at node 4, in addition to the local demands there, when 
determining	𝑛𝑏µ. 
5.5.3 Truncating for Siphon Flow Limits 
We follow an identical procedure for node 4 and forming 𝑛𝑏µ: [𝑋µ´M , 𝑋µ´
M
]  for input into the formation 
of nb3. Figure 5-7 illustrates processing node 3 and, in particular, accounting for arc (3, 2). This arc 
represents a syphon which allows flow in either direction. To account for the unknown flow direction, 
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the processing truncates 𝑛𝑏´ by using a domain interval with a negative lower bound and a positive 
upper bound. 
The resulting 𝑛𝑏´: [−3,3]  represents the willingness of participants to provide flow from node 3 to 
node 2 for quantities in the negative part of the interval, and the desire of participants for flow from 
node 2 to node 3 for quantities in the positive part of the interval. To put this another way, if the price 
of water were low enough, then node 3 would like to ‘buy’ water from node 2 (at prices to the right of 
the vertical axis). However, if the price were high enough, node 3 would be willing to ‘sell’ water to 
node 2 (at the prices to the left of the vertical axis). 
 
Figure 5-7. Processing node 3 and truncating across syphon arc (3, 2).  
5.5.4 Processing Upstream 
The syphon can flow either way, while the other arcs processed so far have had water flow ‘towards” 
the reservoir. But the water flow direction on arc (1, 2) is away from the reservoir. The flow limits are 
on such arcs will imply non-negative upper/lower limits on the net demand curve passed back through 
the tree, towards the reservoir. And non-consumptive uses on such arcs will add positive increments to 
the prices in those demand curves, representing the additional non-consumptive benefit from flow away 




Figure 5-8. Processing node 2 via horizontal addition (across), then arc (1, 2) via vertical addition (down) 
Node 1 is processed in a similar manner. Finally, we reach node 0, where we obtain 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for the 
reservoir (see Figure 5-9) itself by horizontal addition of the net demand curves for node 1 𝑛𝑏G  and 
node 7 𝑛𝑏ÿ . 
 
Figure 5-9. Processing nodal demand curves of node 1 and 7 to construct dcr.  
We can ‘unpack’ the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 using the ‘style coded’ demand stack labels to find out the intra-period 
optimal release schedule for the reservoir. This style code implicitly represents a set of indices such as 
individual bid tranche index, participant index, and node/arc index. The above release schedule 
indicates the demands that are met throughout the river network. Hence, each style is a local nodal 
and/or arc release decision which can be easily identified at the reservoir level. For example, the second 
left tower in the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 pack gives the locational marginal price at node 2. This means that nodal CDDP 
can be implemented to not only produce net demand curves but also help us to easily unpack final bid 
stack and read nodal release decisions.        
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The nodal CDDP procedure can be used in each period of a ‘higher level’ CDDP (e.g. deterministic 
CDDP) to form a set of 𝑑𝑐𝑟s over the planning horizon. The next section describes the methods 
employed within this high level CDDP. The stochastic version the spatial CDDP is applied to form a 
𝑑𝑐𝑟 for each hydrology state in each stage. The inter-temporal CDDP simply works in reverse recursive 
fashion to combine these resulting 𝑑𝑐𝑟 in the above.      
5.6 Using the Multi-nodal Demand Curve for Release in Stochastic CDDP Model 
This section explains how to integrate intra-period nodal CDDP procedure with the single reservoir 
stochastic CDDP model. The deterministic intra-period multi-nodal CDDP described above is used to 
construct a monotone decreasing 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for each period (week, month) assuming a particular pattern of 
tributary/distributary flows, and set of bids. In	this	setting,	CDDP	could	be	described	as	a	two-stage	
process.	 First	 stage	 employs	 a	 deterministic	 multi-node	 version	 of	 the	 CDDP	 procedure	
constructed	in	the	above.	This	constructs	a	series	of	marginal	net	benefit	curves	for	release	𝑁𝐵?s	
under	various	catchment	inflow	scenarios	which	is	described	as	the	intra	period	pre-computation	




The most general form of the stochastic inter-period CDDP described by Starkey et al., (2012) allows 
for “state-dependent (case-dependent)” net 𝑑𝑐𝑟s in each period. In order to provide a complete set of 
inputs to such a model, our deterministic intra-period CDDP would have to be run several times, 
producing a 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for each possible hydrology state or the Markov state in the intra-period problem as 
shown later in this section, that is for each tributary inflow pattern and associated bid set, for each 
period. This set of 𝑑𝑐𝑟s would then define the optimal release, and intra-period market-clearing, as a 
function of the intra-period state, and the reservoir’s marginal water value. The 𝑑𝑐𝑟s have the same 
functionality as the value derived 𝑁𝐵>,? 𝑟>,? 𝑠>,?  in period 𝑡>,?, for a release 𝑟>,?, in the primal 
version of the problem (i.e., stochastic DP). However, the dual solution of the SDP may require less 
computational effort.  
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The stochastic, inter-period CDDP will construct a beginning-of-period demand curve for storage 
(𝑑𝑐𝑠), defining the marginal water value of stored water as a function of storage level, for each inflow 
state, ℎ in each period. The hydrology state variable ℎ is defined later in this section. This works in a 
similar analogy to the SDP future value function 𝑉?FG 𝑠>,?FG  over the remainder of the planning 
horizon. The stochastic CDDP uses an approximated 𝑑𝑐𝑠 for the last period (end-of-period marginal 
values for stored water as an input), and works backwards to construct the 𝑑𝑐𝑠 for the beginning of 
each period from the 𝑑𝑐𝑠 at the end of that period, and the intra-period 𝑑𝑐𝑟 for that period, as 
determined by the nodal CDDP procedure above (or any other intra-period pre-computation technique). 
Interested readers are directed to Starkey et al., (2012) for more detail on this approach. The 𝑑𝑐𝑟′s 
could also be used (in the form of net benefit functions) as part of a convex programming approach.  
The intra-period CDDP procedure constructs 𝑑𝑐𝑟’s which give the marginal return for all possible 
releases. Having run the inter-period stochastic CDDP, we do not know what the release should actually 
be, and have not “cleared the multi-period market”, until we know the reservoir’s marginal water value. 
Similar the dcs’s constructed give the marginal return for all possible storage levels. As a result the 
final step in the process must be to identify a particular solution (at least for the first market period), 
starting from a particular storage level. So the intra-period model looks at the ‘current’ storage level and 
hydrology state to read a price for the reservoir in the first stage. The procedure reads the release and 
determines the other arc flows from the CDDP output. The stochastic CDDP can be used to find the 
multi-period solution which determines the net release for each subsequent possible storage-hydrology 
scenario for each period forward (see Dye et al., 2012; Starkey et al., 2012). This means, it finds an 
optimal release policy, over time and for each state. 
The 𝑑𝑐𝑟′s can be generated by the multi-nodal CDDP described above, assuming the tributary flows for 
the given hydrology state. Regardless of whether hydrology state ℎ  dependent bids are used in the 
multi-nodal market, the “informed” release policy described in Dye et al (2012) will be assumed here. 
Under the informed policy assumption, the reservoir manager has prior information at the beginning of 
the period regarding exactly how much water will arrive during the period so that she could plan to 
allocate it all. The reason for this choice is because the informed policy allows releases and demand 
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requirements to be directly related to the tributary stream flows observed. Under a conservative kind of 
policy assumption, user decision-making is based only on information from previous periods118. As a 
result, the end-of-period marginal value of storage function will be conditioned upon the hydrology 
conditions. Since we propose trading at the nodes making use of the current period’s tributary flows 
sometimes, the conservative release policy (Dye et al., 2012) is a less suitable candidate for our 
purpose. Moreover, the reservoir manager may apply other intermediate release policy assumptions but 
this thesis does not pursue those. 
We assume that the hydrology sequence follows a first order (or lag-one) Markov Chain119 with discrete 
state space 1,2,3, … , 𝐻  and transition matrix Ρ = 𝜌>>E  where 𝜌>>E = Prob 𝑓>,?FG = ℎM|𝑓>,? = ℎ  is 
the transition probability of moving to state ℎM from state ℎ	 ℎM, ℎ ∈ 1,2, … , 𝐻 . Following Section 
5.4.5 of Starkey (2015), we can formulate the end of the period demand curve for storage (ignoring any 
storage bounds):  
 𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠>E,? 𝑠>,? = 𝔼RZ,S|RZ,S 𝑚𝑎𝑥Y 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟>,? 𝑟?, 𝑓>,? +
>𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑠>,?FG 𝑠>,?FG  [5-35] 
The inter-period CDDP has three parts: intra-period net conditional 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟, end-of-period conditional 
𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑠 (also known as the conditional 𝑑𝑐𝑠), and net beginning-of-period expected 𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠. Demand curves 
for release are conditioned by the Markov states under the informed release policy assumption. This 
accounts for conditional inflows, tributary flows and, possibly, state dependent demand. As noted in the 
above, the nodal CDDP is constructing a set of 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟s for each hydrology state in a particular time 
period. For a stochastic optimization problem, effectively we are constructing the 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟s for the sub-
problems corresponding to multiple states in each time period in the same way as the deterministic case.         
Dye et al., (2012) illustrate the construction of beginning of period expected demand curves for storage, 
𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠. In their implementation a marginal value in the 𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠>,? is formed as the sum of the respective 
																																								 																				
118	That is, for each period the water use decisions would have to be the same for each hydrology state but the 
amount of water flowing between nodes would differ depending on the hydrology state (and corresponding 
tributary flows). This would mean any non-consumptive use on an arc could not use water flowing on the arc that 
they had not planned to use (no opportunistic use). The reservoir manager also could follow hybrid/intermediate 
policy assumptions for reservoir scheduling. However, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.	
119 A first order/lag-one Markov Chain implies that the dependence of the next period inflows on the current and 
all previous periods’ inflows is completely described by its dependence on the current period inflow. 
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marginal values of horizontally added 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟? and 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑠?FG′s in all states in the next period 𝑡 + 1, each 
offset by the realised inflows, and taking the probability weighted average of that state occurring ℎ, 
given the starting state ℎM. Their stochastic CDDP algorithm models total controllable inflows occurring 
at the reservoir in a particular time period over the planning horizon. As we have already noted earlier, 
the nodal CDDP procedure constructs the net 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟s accounting for all controllable/uncontrollable 
tributary flows across the network including the inflows at the reservoir node. The algorithm can easily 
account for this, however given the structure of the 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟’s formed in the intra-period problem it is not 
possible to account for the realised inflows simply with offsets. Instead, the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 needs to be recomputed 
for each Markov state at each stage. 𝑐𝑑𝑐𝑟>,? denotes the dependence on both period and hydrology 
state.    
Figure 5-10 sketches the conditional demand curves for release and the end of period demand curves 
belonging to three inflow hydrology states: dry, medium and wet (denoted by ℎ	 = 	1,2,3 respectively). 
Then we show the beginning-of-period marginal value function for stored water 𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑠l,? (assumed 
medium inflow state, ℎ	 = 	2 at the current period, 𝑡). Note that the algorithm also applies when the 
inflow distributions are stochastically independent (see Starkey et al., 2012 and Starkey 2014 for further 
details). In that case, irrespective of the state (e.g., dry, medium or wet) of a particular stage (e.g. time 





















𝑆 = ?̅? 	
 
Figure 5-10. Constructing the (net) beginning of period demand curve for storage for time period, t assuming 
starting at the medium inflow hydrology state, h = 2. 
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In summary, this section integrates the intra-period nodal CDDP procedure and the stochastic CDDP 
model to transform into a ‘seamless’ single reservoir nodal stochastic optimization model. But the two 
models operate independently of one another. Section 5.6 discusses the return flow benefit issue in a 
nodal water market.    
5.7 Modelling Return Flow Benefits  
Consumptive and distributary flows are assumed to be lost to the water network. In practice some of 
that water may make its way back to the water network in the same or a later period. This section 
investigates such return flows in a nodal reservoir network. This section briefly investigates some return 
flow modelling issues. However, further implementation of return flows in a CDDP will not be pursued 
in this thesis. 
An ideal hydrologic-economic model would represent all major flows. Stream flows, surface 
evaporation, ground recharge and leakage, and return flows are the main components of water balance. 
We earlier omitted incorporating evaporation losses and assumed no return flows. To model 
evaporation, leakage and return flows in time period 𝑡, coefficients of 𝑥 in equation 2-2 of the 
previous nodal tree optimization can have fractional values: 𝑓 	+ 𝛼 𝑥 = 𝑐 + 𝑑 +, ∈
	𝛼 𝑥, ∈  where 0 < 𝛼,𝛼 ≤ 1. However, return flows are difficult to model because of their 
temporal and spatial nature. The complexity depends on various physical and environmental conditions 




Figure 5-11. Temporal and spatial distribution of return flows (t - 1, t) of consumptive off-take  
Let us assume a simple return flow scenario to illustrate the issues. Figure 5-11 sketches return flows 
𝑟𝑓 G,l ,?IG, 	𝑟𝑓 G,l ,?, 	𝑟𝑓 G,´ ,?IG, 	𝑟𝑓 G,´ ,?,	𝑟𝑓 l,´ ,?IG and 𝑟𝑓 l,´ ,? arriving at downstream nodes 2 and 3 
due to the consumptive use at node 1 in the current and the previous periods. The first issue here is that 
the nodal CDDP procedure has to account for the return flow benefits of an upstream node consumptive 
use at some downstream nodes without knowing the actual consumptive off-take quantity at the 
upstream node both spatially and temporally. This is because the nodal CDDP is yet to process the 
upstream consumptive node.  
§ The return flows could positively contribute to the downstream tributaries and sometimes the 
stream flows in the current and/or in the future time periods. This leads us to re-adjust both 
intra and inter period models. It may be possible for the nodal CDDP to iteratively estimate and 
adjust the spatial return flow contributions to the downstream tributaries in the current period 
depending on the upstream consumptive and distributary off-takes.  
§ However, the stochastic CDDP cannot directly re-adjust the tributaries and the stream flow as 
in the intra-period model. Further, the estimate-and-adjustment process could draw significant 
computational resources and there could be convergence issues.    
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This shows that modelling return flows creates difficulties for CDDP. Such issues would not be present 
in an LP model, however we might expect the linkages formed within the constraint matrix to reduce 
computational efficiency.  
Finally, the decision to model these auxiliary flows has to be based on the significance of those flows in 
the final solution. As noted in the beginning of this section, we will not consider return flows in the next 
chapters of this thesis.     
5.8 Chapter Conclusions  
In this chapter, CDDP is used to decompose the optimization into a sequence of single period trade-offs 
between the benefits of immediate release and the expected benefits of storage for later release, where 
the benefit from immediate release is modelled by a demand curve for release (𝑑𝑐𝑟) in each period. 
This presupposes a tree-connected single reservoir nodal system (where water can be reallocated 
anywhere), symmetry of information, and price taking users, among other aspects. 
This chapter illustrates a nodal catchment model that can be applied to optimise usage, or to clear an 
intra-temporal market for any catchment with one reservoir and a tree configuration. To solve the 
model, we proposed a simple and efficient two-level application of CDDP. First, a multi-nodal 
deterministic CDDP, presented here, constructs aggregate demand curves for release in each period.  
Then a stochastic CDDP constructs aggregate demand curves for storage in the single reservoir for each 
period. Where multiple reservoirs occur in the same catchment, a multi-reservoir version of the intra-
temporal algorithm would also be needed. Increasing the number of long-term storage reservoirs will 
increase the complexity of the algorithm, because the “curse of dimensionality” will eventually apply to 
any DP-based technique for multiple reservoirs. We investigate such models in Chapter 8.  
Another direction for future research is to extend the model to allow non-tree networks. By holding 
parts of the network fixed and enumerating all such configurations, our model could account for non-
tree networks when the number of configurations is small (see Chapter 6). The next chapter applies the 
nodal CDDP to meet cooling and temperature control in-stream flow demands in parallel arcs assuming 
the upstream flow may be split either arbitrarily or any other suitable splitting method. This is another 




6. Representing flow mixing demands in a mixed used catchment	
Representing Flow Mixing Demands in a Mixed-use Catchment 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 discussed how CDDP could be used to optimise a multi-nodal water system, or to clear a 
multi-nodal water market in the presence of competing consumptive demands, such as irrigation for 
farming, and non-consumptive demands, such as hydro-power generation. This chapter illustrates how 
the nodal CDDP procedure designed to apply only to tree networks can be adapted to handle certain 
non-tree structures in the network.  
High temperature return flows from thermal power plant cooling can affect the downstream ecosystem. 
As a result an additional flow past the thermal station is needed to control the temperature. The mixing 
flow required can be modelled as a fixed ratio of heated to unheated water. The chapter explains how to 
extend the previous nodal CDDP procedure to incorporate flow mixing demands in a mixed-use single 
reservoir catchment. The extended model allows the addition of parallel arcs to the previous model 
discussed in Chapter 5. The parallel arcs extension could be generalised for other situations.  
An optimization model seeking primarily to maximise hydropower production typically imposes 
constraints to meet other requirements such as minimum instream flows for environmental 
requirements. These constraints lower the hydropower benefits. Increasing competition for flows (e.g., 
consumptive, urban demands), as witnessed in many places, may compromise the original operating 
targets. In addition, the environmental constraints can also impose restrictions on the stream flows. 
These constraints could enforce either a simple set of flow bounds at different locations in the network 
or more complex flow requirements. For example a thermal power plant located in close proximity to 
the river may make use of the stream flows for cooling purposes. The Huntly thermal Power Station 
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(HPS) in the Waikato region of New Zealand draws water for cooling purposes and subsequently 
discharges warmer water back into the Waikato River. Unless managed, the in-stream temperature level 
may rise so much that it affects the river ecosystem. To address this, the reservoir releases and other 
flow controls are required to regulate river flows under (1) hydropower production, (2) irrigation and 
urban water demands, (3) cooling flow demands, and (4) corresponding temperature control (mixing or 
diluting) in-stream flow demands. Devising an operating policy that accommodates all the above 
requirements can be a challenging task. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 briefly describes related previous work. 
Section 6.3 how to extend the multi-nodal CDDP procedure to handle parallel paths, with additional 
flow mixing-type constraints. Section 6.4 then briefly describes how the multi-nodal deterministic 
CDDP can be embedded into the stochastic CDDP approach described in Section 5.5 in the previous 
chapter for a longer time-horizon to set up a stochastic nodal market. Then, a numerical illustration is 
presented of the model applied to a hypothetical system styled on the Waikato river catchment. Finally, 
Section 6.5 presents a chapter summary. 
6.2 Supplying Water Mixing Demands  
Hydro-reservoir storage targets often conflict with the consumptive and other user water-supply 
demands. In-stream flows downstream depend on the reservoir release. When the downstream flow is 
used by a thermal power generator for cooling, the system planner may require additional release to 
dilute thermal power plant heated effluent flow. This mixing flow demand has to be varied throughout 
the year with respect to the tributary flows, the stream temperature, discharge water quality (based on 
actual power production), and stream ecological life (Lence et al., 1992). High temperature discharge 
occurs in addition to the ecological impacts of river regulation in a hydro-power operation (e.g., 
Olivares, 2008; Wu et al., 2011).   
Economics of water resource literature contains very few hydrologic-economic models that analyse 
thermal power mixing flow requirements. For example, Lence et al. (1992) used goal programming to 
model mixing flow requirements of thermal power in a multi-reservoir catchment for multi-periods. 
Their model seeks to “minimize deviations from specified targets for reservoir storage and for power 
generation, subject to water quality constraints”. The authors assumed a single cooling process within 
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the plant that increases the input water temperature. The water-quality constraints determine the 
allowable thermal power generation for a given reservoir level (for different hydrology scenarios and 
for different months of a year). Authors further cite the work of Shafer et al. (1981) and Yang (1991), 
who examined a similar problem assuming constant thermal power mixing demands. However, the 
literature is not rich with dynamic hydrology-economic optimization models with mixing water use as 
an objective under stochastic environment. Although the multi-nodal CDDP model discussed earlier 
could easily provide for the non-consumptive nature of in-stream flow values (e.g., arc flow bound 
penalties) or consumptive nature environmental flow values (e.g., distributary demands discussed in 
Chapter 5), the focus of this chapter is to explicitly model non-consumptive thermal power cooling and 
diluting demands using parallel arcs. Irregular releases as a result of peaking hydro operation and high 
temperature cooling return flows from a thermal power plant affect the downstream ecosystem. As a 
result an additional flow has to be released to control the stream temperature which can also affect river 
management elsewhere. A flow splitting device is used to meet a specific purpose, determining the 
percentage flow volume to be diverted into an arc.  
6.3 Intra-period Multi-nodal CDDP Model to Process Parallel Arcs 
This section presents an intra-period multi-nodal CDDP model for the extended model that constructs a 
demand curve for release 𝑑𝑐𝑟 from a long term reservoir, assuming known tributary flows, as described 
in Chapter 5. The demand curve for release provides the marginal value of the last unit released from 
long-term storage, for any release level. The constructed demand curve can be used as part of a 
stochastic optimisation over a longer time horizon, or a market-clearing model, as described below.  
The CDDP approach constructs the demand curve for release directly from bid curves, or marginal cost 
and benefit functions. It effectively works directly with the optimality conditions of an underlying 
welfare maximisation model. We recall the assumptions established in Section 5.3.1.1 regarding the 
consumptive, non-consumptive use and the marginal cost/benefit functions.  
As shown in the earlier chapter the algorithm processes from the leaf nodes in towards the reservoir at 
the root, transforming competing demands and supplies into net demand functions. These demands are 
combined with the net-demand curves for water from any arcs leading away from the reservoir to create 
a nodal net demand curve for water. A demand with larger marginal return is served before one with 
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lower marginal return. We abuse the previous notation slightly by assuming all marginal cost/benefit 
functions have already been transformed to net-demand form. Chapter 5 determines the net-demand 
curve for water by sorting the marginal net-demands from highest to lowest, which amounts to adding 
the function inverses:  
 𝑛𝑏 = 	𝑐𝑏	+>	𝑐𝑒	+>𝑐𝑓	+> 𝑛𝑏, ∈  [6-1] 
Recall that the 𝑛𝑏 terms correspond to net demands for water from child nodes. Net demand curves on 
arcs are processed from child to parent, by truncating the net-demand curve for water, 𝑛𝑏, to the arc 
bounds, to form 𝑛𝑏 as explained above. Where an arc involves a non-consumptive demand, the 
algorithm adjusts the marginal benefit from each unit of flow directly. This adjustment is accounted for 
by ‘vertically’ adding (or subtracting) the non-consumptive flow net-demand curve, 𝑛𝑐𝑓, to (from) the 
child node’s net demand curve for water, 𝑛𝑏, where the water flow is away from (towards) the 
reservoir.   
 𝑛𝑏 𝑥 = 𝑛𝑏 𝑥 +¼	𝑛𝑐𝑓 𝑥   [6-2] 
The benefits from water flowing between two nodes could be competing or complementary. Competing 
benefits are served by different flows whereas complementary benefits arise from the same flow. This 
chapter focuses on the former case with the competing benefits located on parallel arcs. The flow split 
between the arcs could be controlled by different mechanisms. A sluice gate allows the operator to split 
flows between two parallel arcs. A boom might split flows in a constant ratio, or a weir might be 
designed to produce a split that varies with the flow level. In the case of a thermal power plant, a 
movable gate could divert flows for cooling and in-stream mixing/temperature control. Environmental 
requirements would constrain the allowed split. The type of splitting decides how the arc is modelled, 
which essentially comes down to whether we perform horizontal or vertical addition.   
6.3.1 Case 1: Controlled Flow Splitting  
Under controlled flow splitting, we can select the arc that each unit of water should flow on, with no 
restriction on the balance of flows. Sometimes the parallel arcs can host competing users (e.g., an 
ecological flow arc versus a hydropower use arc). Let 𝑛𝑐𝑓G,l,G and 𝑛𝑐𝑓G,l,l denote the arc demands for 
flows on two parallel paths. Since we can choose which path for each extra increment of flow, the 
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CDDP can construct the composite arc flow demand curve by horizontally adding 𝑛𝑐𝑓G,l,G and 𝑛𝑐𝑓G,l,l 
as shown in the figure below. In other words, CDDP can handle multiple competing (non-consumptive) 
uses on arcs in just the same way as it handles multiple competing (consumptive) uses at a node120. So 
that this approach replaces the parallel arcs with an equivalent single arc and then proceeds with the 
original nodal CDDP procedure.  
 
Figure 6-1. Processing parallel arcs to provide flows for two competing non-consumptive users (e.g., cooling 
flows and in-stream mixing flows).  
This case assigns a higher marginal water value for the in-stream mixing flow because it provides an 
ecological service to the system (e.g., special type of distributary flow). The second and subsequent 
flows would only be required if the cooling flow demand was high enough. In that case the marginal 
water values for these could be carefully selected to ensure they were inserted in the correct order. 
The cooling flow, on the other hand, provides a direct economic benefit from generating using the 
thermal station. Composite arc flow demand curve 𝑛𝑐𝑓Gl represents the combined non-consumptive 
demand between nodes 1 and 2. The algorithm vertically adds this composite flow demand curve to the 
																																								 																				
120 So this method could be applied to several competing parallel arc flow users. For example, we could represent 
the cooling flow demands, mixing flow demands and instream/environmental flow demands using dedicated 




truncated nodal demand curve of node 2 to construct the nodal demand curve for flows for node 1 (as 
illustrated in Figure 6-2 below).  
 
Figure 6-2. The demand curve passes to node 1 after processing parallel arc flow demand curves. 
In the interest of simplicity, we omit considering any water quality related flow benefit (penalty) 
functions normally observed in the thermal cooling flow models121. This arc flow quality constraint 
could be a function of stream temperature, thermal flow intake, discharge and temperature standard.	
6.3.2 Case 2: Constant Splitting of Flows 
Another situation is where flow is split in a constant ratio, say, 0.25:0.75. The effect is the same as 
when the ratio defines the probability that each tiny increment would flow one way or the other. The 
resulting combined net-demand curve is found by vertically adding adjusted net-demand curves for the 
parallel arcs flows (according to the equation 6-3), as shown in Figure 6-3. Note that integer increments 
in the aggregate 𝑑𝑐𝑟 do not remain integer, once split. So steps in the aggregate curve are typically 
formed using parts of adjacent steps in the underlying curves. Here 𝛼 and 𝛼M denote the split ratios.    
 𝑛𝑐𝑓 𝑥 = 𝛼𝑛𝑐𝑓, 𝛼𝑥, + 𝛼M. 𝑛𝑐𝑓,FG 𝛼M𝑥,FG   [6-3]
122 
Suppose the split gate capacity is 5 units and the ratio of flows is 1:3 in-stream mixing flows to plant 
cooling. The two graphs (top and bottom) in the Figure 6-3 respectively illustrate the two components 
of the right-hand side of the above equation graphically. The required scaling is explained below.  
																																								 																				
121 This case involves an implicit assumption that water splitting must occur in full units of water. For example the 
first unit of water can either be used for mixing flows or for cooling flows (which would violate the ecological 
constraint). In particular, the first unit of water never produces economic benefit. Also, if the arc capacity was 5, 
the last unit would only ever be mixing flows when no additional cooling was required. 




Figure 6-3. Horizontal scaling of demand curves for constant splitting flows 𝑛𝑐𝑓Gl,G and 𝑛𝑐𝑓Gl,l denote mixing 
(grey towers) and cooling (black towers) arc flow demand curves.  
The split gate splits upstream flow 𝑥 into two parts 0.25𝑥 (in-stream mixing) and 0.75𝑥 (plant 
cooling). In order to get “1” full unit of in-stream mixing flow requires 4 units of upstream flow, 
providing 0.25×4 units of in-stream mixing flow. Each unit of upstream flow only produces 0.25 units 
of in-stream mixing flow, gaining only 0.25 of the marginal benefit of a single unit of flow. This is 
shown in the LHS graph in Figure 6-4 showing marginal in-stream mixing benefit by upstream flow. 
Similarly, the plant cooling flow requires a non-integer step of µ
´
 units of upstream flow for each unit of 
cooling flow. Each unit of upstream flow only receives 0.75 of the marginal cooling benefit (see the 
middle graph in Figure 6-4). The composite arc flow demand curve is then formed by vertically adding 
the ‘scaled’ arc flow demand curves. Doing this exactly would create non-integral steps so the marginal 
values are averaged over each whole unit of flow as shown in Figure 6-4. For example, the first unit of 
the RHS will be formed with 25% of the first in-stream mixing flow unit and 75% of the first cooling 
flow unit. 
 










In the above example, the algorithm systematically stacks the marginal value pieces (grey and black 
towers) and disregards the pieces that cannot be met, because only 5 flow units are assumed to be 
feasible for 𝑛𝑐𝑓GG.  
 This method allows the first unit to produce some cooling flows and hence economic benefit. Also, this 
second method does not require artificial prices from the mixing – the marginal benefit for mixing 
could be zero and the method would still work. 
The model might be improved by combining the two methods so there is a minimum ratio for a 
particular non-consumptive use (e.g., cooling flows only up to 75% of the upstream flows but more 
mixing flows are allowed giving independent benefits from the mixing flow arc).  
The next section describes an advanced version of the constant splitting flow method. Here, the splitting 
ratio changes based on the upstream flow level. We show a two-level variable splitting flow method but 
this could be extended for higher number of splits.  
6.3.3 Case 3: Variable Splitting of Flows 
More generally, the splitting ratio may be a pre-determined function of total (aggregate parallel) arc 
flow, 𝑥. Thus, marginal water value can be described as a monotone decreasing function of the flows. 
As in the second case, we can apply vertical addition to construct the composite arc flow demand curve, 
but the “probability weights” now vary as a function of total flow. So, 𝛼 = 	𝛼(𝑥). Let 𝛼GGG: (1 −
𝛼GGG) denote the split ratio applying up to aggregate incoming flow 𝑥; 𝛼GGl: (1 − 𝛼GGl) up to 𝑥G + 𝑥l. 
 
Figure 6-5. Modified vertical addition of arc flow demand curves under a pre-defined flow splitting control 
function. 
Figure 6-5 illustrates this modified vertical addition of ‘scaled’ demand curves. Here we assume two 
splitting ratios: 2:2 for the first 4 incoming flow units and 1:3 for the second 4. Thus, we can write the 
weighted demand curve as follows: 











 𝑛𝑐𝑓 𝑥 = 𝛼 𝑥 . 𝑛𝑐𝑓, 𝑥.𝛼 𝑥 + 𝛽(𝑥) + 𝛼FG 𝑥 . 𝑛𝑐𝑓,FG 𝑥.𝛼FG 𝑥 + 𝛽(𝑥)  [6-4] 
Note that we cannot keep the block width as an integer, even in this simple case, so numerical 
approximation would be required for integer representation. Therefore a correction term 𝛽(𝑥) is added 
to the breakpoints. Parts of the underlying 𝑑𝑐𝑟s are discarded once more, because they cannot be met. 
We present a numerical illustration of the model applied to a hypothetical system styled on the Waikato 
river catchment in the next section.  
6.4 Numerical Example and Results 
This section presents a numerical example to demonstrate how the algorithm clears the market and then 
allocates water to the cooling and in-stream mixing uses assuming that the system operator applies the 
controlled/competitive and constant flow splitting methods. We have developed a combined intra/inter-
period CDDP model of this type in MATLAB, and applied it to an example loosely based on the 
topology of the Waikato River catchment in New Zealand, as shown in Figure 6-6. We assumed that 
market participants are submitting bids for current and future time periods. The user bid functions are 




Figure 6-6. Waikato styled catchment topology with a set of selected non-consumptive users, a mixing flow user 
and a consumptive (urban) user. 
Lake Taupo plays the long-term storage role in the Waikato river catchment scheme. Downstream from 
Taupo, the Waikato river supports eight hydroelectric plants, totalling approximately 1000 MW, which, 
in this simplified framework, are assumed to have no explicit storage capacity. Instead, the ability of 
each to focus its output into peak periods is assumed to have been accounted for in determining its 
demand curve for release. For illustrative purposes, we include downstream urban, and some 
hypothetical irrigation users in the model, assuming monotone decreasing consumptive demand curves 
for water for each user. The model ignores other local power schemes, including geothermal and the 
upstream Tongariro hydro power scheme. It represents the 1435 MW Huntly Thermal Power Station 
(HPS) as a “special” non-consumptive user, because of the ecological impact of the plant, in terms of 
heated and polluted water (Chapman, 1996). The HPS contains six separate generating units including 
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combine cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and open cycle gas turbine (OCGT). According to the Huntly PS 
environmental report of 2013, the plant draws up to 40 cubic meters of flows per second (m3/s) from the 
Waikato River primarily for cooling and 98% of intake is returned. Discharge flow is approximately at 
a temperature of 8.6 C warmer than when abstracted. However, the maximum downstream river 
temperature shall not exceed 25 C, forcing the HPS to cease operating units 1-4 sometimes during hot 
days in the past. An intermediate cooling tower was added to the system to cool the return flows (e.g., 
Genesis Energy, 2013; New Zealand Electricity Department Huntly power station, 1972). The daily 
highest and lowest river flow rates are usually observed during winter and summer periods. For 
example, a peak flow rate of 915 m3/s was recorded on 25th July and the lowest flow rate 172 m3/s on 
12th April (Genesis Energy, 2013).  
 
Figure 6-7. An example of weekly inflow patterns during the planning horizon according to annual hydrology 
cycle where hydrology states h = low, med, wet (source: Appendix A5, Table A5.1)  
We assume an annual hydrology cycle with high inflows in weeks 1-5, 40-52, and relatively low in 
other weeks (increasing from September and decreasing from February/March). The hydrology cycle 
has three possible hydrology states (high, med and dry) in each week (refer to figure above), described 
by a lag-1 Markov chain. Relevant transition probabilities, for the example are assumed as: 𝜌>>E =
0.5,0.25,0.25 , 0.25,0.5,0.25 , 0.25,0.25,0.5 . 
We assumed a demand pattern that is relatively constant, state dependent and consumptive (urban use). 
The consumptive use demand curve depends on the cost of production (e.g., crop and other water 
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requirement as described by Ward and Michelsen, 2002; Gibbons, 1986 & 2013) and the hydrology 
scale 𝜃 ℎ . Non-consumptive hydropower demands vary during the year in response to the electricity 
market spot/nodal prices and hydrology scale 𝜃 ℎ  (see Figure 6-8).    
 
Figure 6-8. Urban user demands at the last node (weeks t = 1 to 52, hydrology state h = low) 
Figure 6-8 sketches the marginal values of urban water use for a 52 week planning horizon. The prices 
record a slight increase in the summer. The arc flow demand surfaces (52 weeks) for medium inflow 
state belong to all hydro users are shown in Figure 6-9.    
 




We illustrate three different cases starting from the base case (Case 1) that ignores modelling HPS in-
stream mixing flow requirement123. The second case (Case 2) assumes that HPS is submitting both 
cooling flow demand curves and in-stream mixing flow demand curves for all time periods in the 
planning horizon based on the controlled/competitive flow splitting method described in the above124. 
Hence, Figure 6-10 depicts final HPS demands (cooling and in-stream mixing) for 52 weeks for 
medium inflow hydrology state. This case is based on the daily net water abstraction given in the 
Huntly PS environmental report (Figure 13 of page 10, Genesis Energy, 2013). The third (Case 3) 
assumes that the system operator is using the constant flow splitting method to provide both cooling 
and in-stream mixing flow requirements125.    
 
Figure 6-10. HPS cooling and in-stream mixing flow demand curves (weeks t = 1 to 52, state h = medium) for 
the controlled/competitive flow splitting method 
Based upon the information given, Section 6.4.1 explains the spot market trading and the results of the 
experiment.   
6.4.1 Spot Water Market 
For the interest of simplicity, we assume only spot market trading which has some trading restrictions 
with respect to future water. The market clearing here gives us the current period release given the 
hydrology state and storage, and the reservoir consumption. Here we assume that market participants 
																																								 																				
123 The ecological cost of the water temperature rise is ignored.  
124 As we have assumed hypothetical date, the mixing flow benefits may not represent real benefit. The bid prices 
were designed to show relative behavior of the HPS. 
125 This method simply splits the quantities ignoring the marginal water values.		
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express firm bids for their future water needs (i.e., for modelled future hydrology states). Indeed we 
could incorporate other complexities into the market design such as future trading under uncertainty, 
tradable contracts and other hedging instruments.      
Figure 6-11 illustrates the conditional net 𝑑𝑐𝑟s (having negative release volumes) obtained for the first 
period of the planning horizon for the medium hydrology state, under all the case. The dotted black line 
indicates the 𝑑𝑐𝑟s for the base case (Case 1). The 𝑑𝑐𝑟 shifts up when we include mixing water demands 
(depicted by the black solid line plot). The grey coloured solid line plot denotes the demand curve for 
release of the third case (this is almost directly under the dotted black line). The curves in the latter two 
cases almost coincide with each other. 
 
Figure 6-11. Single period net dcr obtained for the three cases for medium inflow hydrology state in time period 
t = 1 (source: Appendix A6, Table A6.1).     
The algorithm forms a demand surface for release for the entire planning horizon for each hydrology 
state. For example, the figure below illustrates the demand surface for a 52 week planning horizon for 
the dry hydrology state. The bids (demands) are scaled accordingly to represent state dependent prices 




Figure 6-12. Demand surface for release for a 52 week planning horizon at low inflow hydrology state (scenario 
2). 
Figure 6-13 (A) shows the percentage arc flow volumes for the second case. The black solid line is the 
arc flow for wet hydrology state. The dashed black line and the dotted black line represent the medium 
and dry inflow states respectively. The tributary flow contribution at nodes 2 and 3 increases overall 
flow volumes on arcs 2 and 3.  
The model allocates a higher percentage flow to the HPS during the dry state, particularly when it is 
prepared to pay more, in Figure 6-13 (B). Here accounting for the cooling flow demand curve yielded a 
2% increase in net benefit for Case 2, and 10% when HPS increases her bid value two-fold. We would 
use the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 to compute the above values. This should not be taken to indicate anything about the actual 
situation pertaining in the Waikato catchment, because the data we employed were purely illustrative. 
But it suggests that this type of integrated optimisation, or market, could yield economic benefits, in 




Figure 6-13. Single period arc flows as a percentage of release recorded for Case 1 and Case 2 for all hydrology 
states (week, t =1, state, h = low, med, wet).  
We illustrated a nodal catchment model that can implicitly clear an inter-temporal multi-nodal market 
in presence of external flow uses for a single reservoir catchment with a tree configuration. We 
processed cooling and temperature control flow demands as non-consumptive uses on arcs. The multi-
nodal deterministic CDDP constructed aggregate demand curves for reservoir release in each period. 
The stochastic CDDP algorithm then constructed the aggregate demand curves for reservoir storage. 
The results demonstrate how the nodal CDDP can be extended to handle some non-tree aspects of a 
water network such as required flow splitting in parallel arcs.      
6.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has described a means to model cooling and in-stream temperature control flow demands 
represented on parallel arcs that can be processed as for normal arc flow demands. We model these 
flow requirements assuming that an upstream flow unit can be diverted to any arc of our choice, but 
other assumptions can be made.  
While applied here to an example involving hydro power production and mixing of thermal power 
station cooling water, the technique could be applied in a variety of situations in which flow mixing is 
important for other reasons, such as dilution of polluted water flows. Hydropower production too, can 
disturb river regulation causing negative environmental impacts because of their abrupt water releases 
during switching between peak and off-peak (Edwards et al., 1999). Our approach could be used to 
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impose a penalty charge for hydropower generators, rather than taxing other users in a wholesale water 
market. The results demonstrate how net benefits can be increased by accounting for the demand curve 





7. Modelling framework for analysing two-reservoir multi-nodal mixed-use catchments 
A Modelling Framework for Analysing Two-reservoir Multi-nodal 
Mixed-use Catchments 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented an integrated basin-wide planning method based on the intra-period nodal CDDP 
procedure to meet different types of ecological service flow requirements in a single reservoir 
catchment.  
The objective of this chapter is to develop an intra-period two-reservoir CDDP procedure referring to 
the multi-reservoir deterministic LP model to construct intra-period marginal value surfaces for two 
inter-connected reservoirs in a mixed-use catchment to be used in a higher stochastic CDDP model that 
forms the demand surfaces for stored water. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  
§ Section 7.2 presents the background and the research motives for the two-reservoir modelling. 
We begin by outlining computational issues that must be addressed in extending the intra-
period CDDP to two reservoirs.  
§ Section 7.4 formulates an optimization model for jointly operating two reservoirs together with 
an additional set of assumptions and definitions, deemed important to set up the two-reservoir 
models. This helps us to understand the nature of demand surfaces underlying each sub-
problem.  
§ Section 7.4 is about the demand surface for transfer for the inter-reservoir chain procedure. It 
involves several simple steps including pruning of sub-trees, process inter-reservoir nodal 
chains to form a marginal water value strip, and then create surfaces by concatenating these 
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strips using critical prices and price differences. There we present a numerical example 
regarding the construction of demand curves for transfer. We then use this example to note a 
procedure that construct the demand surface for transfer for the inter-reservoir chain.  
§ Finally, Section 7.5 concludes this chapter with a summary.      
7.2. Optimal Joint Releasing of Two Reservoirs in a Wholesale Water Market   
The objective of this section is to model optimal joint releasing of two reservoirs in a wholesale water 
market. Section 7.2.1 presents two reservoir optimization primal and dual models. With two inter-
linked reservoirs we are now faced with the following new CDDP modelling issues. 
The first modelling issue is that we are forced to construct marginal value surfaces for each reservoir 
based on the joint release or storage vector. Irrespective of the nature of the connection between the two 
reservoirs (e.g., series or parallel), in economic terms an optimal joint water release should allocate 
flows to the highest valued uses in the catchment while respecting capacities and requirements.  
For example, assume two reservoirs connected in a series have to meet a set of upstream and 
downstream demands, as in Exhibit A of Figure 7-1. These two reservoirs are linked by a unique path, 
which we will call the “inter-reservoir chain”. Subject to various flow constraints, release from the 
upstream reservoir can be used to meet consumptive demands occurring anywhere along this interlink, 
or on branches linked to it. The upstream releases could pass right down through the inter-reservoir 
chain, delivering non-consumptive benefits, to then be stored in downstream storage to meet future 
consumption demands. The release from the top reservoir could reach the lower reservoir via the inter-
reservoir chain providing the lower reservoir with the opportunity to release more water to meet more 
downstream demand. The marginal value of this met demand will depend on the downstream release. It 
will also affect the marginal value of that release and the marginal value of the top reservoir release 
which replaces it in the lower reservoir.   
Exhibit B of Figure 7-1 shows two parallel connected reservoirs. There is an inter-reservoir chain 
linking the two reservoirs, with the potential to flow to a sink (e.g., the sea) from points along the inter-
link. Obviously, there may be demands attached to the inter-reservoir chain that can be met by either 
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reservoir. The marginal value at the ‘black’ reservoir will depend, in part, on whether the release from 
the ‘grey’ reservoir is large enough to meet that demand or not. Subject to various flow constraints, an 
extra unit of water released from the grey reservoir could be used to meet demand outside this 
interlink126.  
	
Figure 7-1. Series and parallel connected two reservoirs and nodes radiating in a tree network. 
The second modelling issue is that the direction of processing is not uniquely determined, because for 
arcs in the inter-reservoir chain ‘toward the reservoir’ is different for each reservoir. In a two-reservoir 
tree structure, both reservoirs can act as the root as needed. The reservoir acting at the root is labelled 
the target and the other storage is labelled as passive.  
With these explanations, it is clear that optimising joint operation of the two reservoirs may not be as 
straightforward as it was for the single reservoir case. The following discussion in Section 7.3 provides 
us with an opportunity to explain the joint operating two-reservoir problem. The main objective of this 
section is to describe a general mathematical framework for the two-reservoir optimization problem.     
																																								 																				
126 However, the extra unit will often be used to meet consumptive demand along this interlink, or on branches 
linked to it, that would otherwise have been met by release from the ‘black’ reservoir. Thus, the net effect could 
be to increase storage in the ‘black’ reservoir. Again, the value of water in the ‘grey’ reservoir is not independent 
of the value of water stored in the ‘black’ reservoir, or vice versa. 
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7.3. Two Reservoir Optimization Model  
7.3.1. Assumptions and Nomenclature 
For now, assume two series connected reservoirs under deterministic settings. In addition to the 
assumptions set forth in chapter 3, assume that the reservoirs are located sufficiently close to each 
other, so that we may ignore any flow transportation delays between the two reservoirs. 
Indices 
𝑖, 𝑗: Denote any nodes in the two-reservoir tree, and 𝑖, 𝑗  denotes an arc belonging 
to the set of arcs A in the inter-reservoir network. 1, 2, 3, 4 … . 𝑛 − 2 , 𝑛 − 1  
are the nodes in the inter-reservoir chain. The upstream and downstream 
reservoirs are labelled as 0 and 𝑛 respectively. 
𝑘: Denotes the base node of the sub-tree(s) connected to the inter-reservoir chain 
node 𝑖. Thus, 𝑖, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐴 is the sub-tree linking arc. Here 𝐴 is the set of arcs 
in the sub-tree 𝑇.  
𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇 + 1: The operational time horizon. Period 𝑡	 = 	1 is the initial/current period (e.g., 
week). 𝑇 + 1 denotes the future periods of the planning horizon.. 
Functions and Parameters 
𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,?:  Inter-reservoir chain benefits function, in time period 𝑡. 
𝑁𝐵L,?:   Upstream nodal benefit function, in time period 𝑡.   
𝑁𝐵à,?:   Downstream nodal benefit function, in time period 𝑡. 
𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG : End-of-horizon marginal water values for the two reservoirs. 
𝑋 , :	 	 Arc flow bound/Release bounds for the two reservoirs.	
Decision Variables 
𝑐?, 𝑑?: Nodal flow off-takes in time period 𝑡. 𝑐? denotes consumptive demands and 𝑑? represents 
distributary demands  at node 𝑖.   
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𝑥? : Flow through arc (𝑖, 𝑗) in time period 𝑡 (flow injection/release from a parent node to a child 
node). 
𝑠?: Beginning-of-period volume at storage 𝑖 in time period 𝑡.  
𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,?, 𝑁𝐵L,?, 𝑁𝐵à,?, and 𝑉o 𝑠Lo, 𝑠ào  are piecewise linear convex benefit functions in their 
respective domains. The optimal intra-period net nodal chain benefit function 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? is to be 
obtained by solving an inter-reservoir chain optimization sub-problem. The net intra-period benefit 
functions of the upstream reservoir node, 𝑁𝐵L,? and the downstream reservoir node, 𝑁𝐵à,? are the 
optimal objective function values of respective sub-problems. Both 𝑁𝐵L,? and 𝑁𝐵à,? may include 
independent subtrees leading from each reservoir node where such sub-tree nodes are denoted by 
indices 𝑘 and 𝑚. Finally, the end of horizon sub-problem provides the optimal the end-of-horizon 
marginal water value function, 𝑉o 𝑠Lo, 𝑠ào  for the two reservoirs.  
Figure 7-2 depicts a generalized series-linked two-reservoir network architecture. A single link, referred 
to as the inter-reservoir chain as in the previous discussion, connects the two reservoirs. Suppose that 
sub-trees lead from both upstream and downstream reservoirs. Outflows from the upstream sub-tree 
contribute to the upstream reservoir inflows. The sub-tree radiating from the downstream reservoir node 
accepts the downstream releases. For the interest of simplicity, we assume a tree like network structure 




Figure 7-2. Details of an inter-reservoir nodal chain network  
The inter-reservoir chain optimization problem, which produces 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? , could be 
modelled as a sub-problem within the two-reservoir optimization model. This sub-problem provides the 
maximum possible inter-reservoir chain benefit given release from the upstream reservoir, 𝑥L,G? , and 
outflow into the downstream reservoir, 𝑥àIG,à? . Here we assume that the optimal solution values for the 
inter-reservoir chain optimization sub-problem are available for any release and outflow.  
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7.3.2. Two-reservoir Optimization Model (Primal Problem) 
This section formulates the two-reservoir deterministic LP optimization master problem. Then we 
decompose the above problem into three sub-problems as discussed below.  
7.3.2.1. Deterministic Two Reservoir Optimization Problem 
𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒔𝒕,𝒙𝒕
𝑵𝑻𝑩𝟏:𝒏I𝟏,𝒕 𝒙𝟎,𝟏𝒕 , 𝒙𝒏I𝟏,𝒏𝒕 +𝑻𝒕|𝟏 𝑵𝑩𝟎,𝒕 𝒙𝒌,𝟎𝒕𝑻𝒕|𝟏 + 𝑵𝑩𝒏,𝒕 𝒙𝒏,𝒎𝒕𝑻𝒕|𝟏 + 𝑽𝑻F𝟏 𝒔𝟎𝑻F𝟏, 𝒔𝒏𝑻F𝟏
 [7-1] 
Subject to, 
Storage continuity equations: 
𝑥L,G? − 𝑥,L? − 𝑠L? + 𝑠L?FG = 0		, ∀	𝑡 𝜆L,? [7-2] 
𝑥à,? − 𝑥àIG,à? − 𝑠à? + 𝑠à?FG = 0		, ∀	𝑡 𝜆à,? [7-3] 
Initial storage conditions: 
𝑠LL = 	 𝑆LL  𝛾L,?L  [7-4]  
𝑠àL = 	 𝑆àL  𝛾à,?L  [7-5]  
Storage bounds: 
𝑆L ≤ 𝑠L? ≤ 𝑆L 𝛾L,? [7-6]  
𝑆à ≤ 𝑠à? ≤ 𝑆à 𝛾à,? [7-7] 
Bounds for the relevant water channels: 
𝑋 , ≤ 𝑥,? ≤ 𝑋 , 			∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 0,1 , 𝑘, 0 , 𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 , 𝑛,𝑚 , 𝑡              𝜇 , ,? [7-8] 
The next section includes interpretations and explanations of the prices and allocations generated by the 
above model. 
Explanation (primal model): 
The objective function of the master problem seeks to maximise the intra-period benefits of two 
reservoirs (𝑖 = 0, 𝑛), the inter-reservoir chain (1: 𝑛 − 1) and future storage benefits over the planning 
horizon. 
Equations [7-4], [7-5], [7-6], [7-7] and [7-8] denote the primal constraints for initial storage levels, a 
pair of primal constraints for the storage and the relevant water channels bounds. Each primal bound 
pair 𝑆L, 𝑆L , 𝑆à, 𝑆à ,and 𝑋 , , 𝑋 ,  will have two individual dual variables that can be denoted by 
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assigning superscripts – and + to the (non-positive) dual price on the lower bound, and the (non-
negative) dual price on the upper bound, respectively. We can construct an unrestricted “composite” 
dual variable by taking the sum of these two variables. For example, from constraint equation [6-6], 
𝑠L? ≥ 𝑆L and 𝑠L? ≤ 𝑆L have the corresponding (respective) dual variables 𝛾L,?F  and 𝛾L,?F  where 𝛾L,? =
𝛾L,?F + 𝛾L,?I .  
Here, we do not set any constraints for the end-of-horizon storages but we could follow the 
formulations in Chapter 4.  
The dual variables 𝜆L,? (constraint [7-2]) and 𝜆à,? (constraint [7-3]) are unrestricted in sign. 𝜆L,? 
indicates the marginal water values at the upstream reservoir node and 𝜆à,? is the marginal water values 
at the downstream reservoir node.  
In the interests of simplicity, we ignore denoting spill127. We can further decompose the above primal 
problem into a set of single period sub-problems. Each sub-model maximises the current period and the 
future period benefits as in the DP/CDDP model. 
Suppose that 𝑉?FG sL?FG, sà?FG  denotes the accumulated optimal benefits for time periods 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 +
2, … , 𝑇 + 1 the optimal release policy for period t is given by:  
𝑉?∗ sL? , sà? = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
2,US ,3,4S
𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? + 𝑁𝐵L,? 𝑥L,G? + 𝑁𝐵à,? 𝑥à,? + 𝑉?FG sL?FG, sà?FG   
This gives the maximum system benefits / performance and optimal release 𝑥L,G?∗ , 𝑥àIG,à?∗  for any set of 
storage volumes sL? , sà?  in that period subject to appropriate constraints from above.  
The next section develops a computational routine for deriving the optimal release policy for the two-
reservoir problem based on the Lagrangian dual formulations given here.  
7.3.2.2. Lagrangian Problem 
Based on the above assumptions, the primal model ([7-1], [7-2], [7-3], [7-4], [7-5], [7-6], [7-7], and [7-
8]) is convex. We write the Lagrangian problem using Lagrange multipliers 𝜆L,?, 𝜆à,?, 𝜇 L,G ,?
F , 𝜇 L,G ,?, 
																																								 																				
127 This modelling choice is made to reduce the complexity of the two-reservoir CDDP procedure. The model 
form does not preclude spill, it just does not label it explicitly. 
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𝜇 à,àIG ,?, 𝛾L,?, and 𝛾à,?, and then consider the first order conditions to investigate the dual price 
relationships.  
ℒ 𝜆, 𝑥, 𝑠 = 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? + 𝑁𝐵L,? 𝑥,L? + 𝑁𝐵à,? 𝑥à,? − 𝜆L,? 𝑥L,G? − 𝑥,L? − 𝑠L? +o?|G
𝑠L?FG − 𝜆à,? 𝑥à,? − 𝑥àIG,à? − 𝑠à? + 𝑠à?FG − 𝜇 ,L ,?
F 𝑥,L? − 𝑋,L − 𝜇 ,L ,?
I 𝑋,L − 𝑥,L? −
𝜇 à, ,?
F 𝑥à,? − 𝑋à, − 𝜇 à, ,?
I 𝑋à, − 𝑥à,? − 𝜇 L,G ,?
F 	 𝑥L,G? − 𝑋L,G − 𝜇 L,G ,?
I 	 	𝑋L,G − 𝑥L,G? −
𝜇 à,àIG ,?
F 	 𝑥à,àIG? − 𝑋à,àIG − 𝜇 à,àIG ,?
I 	𝑋à,àIG − 𝑥à,àIG? − 𝛾L,?F 𝑠L? − 𝑆L − 𝛾L,?I 𝑆L − 𝑠L? −
𝛾à,?F 𝑠à? − 𝑆à − 𝛾à,?I 𝑆à − 𝑠à? + 𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG   [7-9]  
Suppose that the terms 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? , 𝑁𝐵L,? 𝑥,L? , 𝑁𝐵à,? 𝑥à,?  and𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG  in  
ℒ 𝜆, 𝑥, 𝑠 , are (partially) differentiable with respect to 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥à,àIG? , 𝑥,L? , 𝑥à,? , 𝑠L? , 𝑠à?  and 𝜆L,?, 𝜆à,?, 
𝜇 L,G ,?
F , 𝜇 L,G ,?, 𝜇 à,àIG ,?, 𝛾L,?, 𝛾à,?, the necessary conditions for the objective function to be a 






S + 𝜆L,?−𝜇 ,L ,?
F + 𝜇 ,L ,?





− 𝜆à,? − 𝜇 à, ,?
F + 𝜇 à, ,?
I = 0  [7-11]  
6ℒ
6ä,è











I = 00  [7-12] 
yℒ
yr2S
= 𝜆L,? − 𝜆L,?IG − 𝛾L,?F + 𝛾L,?I = 0  [7-13]   
yℒ
yr3S
= 𝜆à,? − 𝜆à,?IG − 𝛾à,?F + 𝛾à,?I = 0   [7-14] 
6ℒ
6rä
¸TU = ∇𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG +
−𝜆L,oFG
−𝜆à,oFG
= 00   [7-15]   
The next section interprets and explains the dual prices generated by the Lagrangian formulation. 
Explanation (dual model) 
Marginal benefit foregone in the subtree above the upstream reservoir is equal to the marginal water 
value of that reservoir if the bounds are not binding (see equation [7-10]). The marginal benefit from 
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release from the downstream reservoir is equal to the marginal water value of that reservoir if the 
bounds are not binding (see equation [7-11]).  
Equation [7-12] shows the interaction of the current water values of the two reservoirs, (𝜆L,? and 𝜆à,?) 
with the inter-reservoir chain and the Equation  [7-13] and Equation  [7-14] shows the interaction of the 
reservoir water values over (that is water values between the current and the previous period’s water 
values of the sub-tree at 0, and the sub-tree at 𝑛, respectively). For example, according to equation [7-
13], if the arc flow bounds are not binding, the current and the next period marginal water values for the 
upstream reservoir are equal (𝜆L,? = 𝜆L,?FG).  
Equation [7-12] shows the first order conditions of the inter-reservoir chain benefit function with 
respect to 𝑥L,G?  and 𝑥àIG,à? . For example, when the relevant primal variables are away from their bounds, 
the partial derivative of 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? with respect to 𝑥L,G?  will be equal to the marginal water value 𝜆L,?of 
the upstream reservoir. Similarly, the negative of the partial derivative of 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? with respect to 
𝑥àIG,à?  is equal to the downstream storage 𝜆à,?.   
Equation [7-15] represents the end-of-horizon marginal water values for the two storages. This values 
end-of-horizon storage volume that will be carried beyond the current planning horizon. The end-of-
horizon effects can be modelled as in Chapter 3 by specifying the bounds on end-of-horizon storage bid 
tranches and the end-of-horizon storage conditions. However, this discussion does not require detail 
modelling of the end-of-horizon effects of the two-reservoir problem. 
In order to focus our study on the implications of the release and storage variables, we rewrite the 
Lagrangian function in [7-9] to form the Lagrangian dual sub-problem by grouping storage/nodal 
continuity variables and including the bound constraints explicitly as follows: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
,r
𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? − 𝜆L,?𝑥L,G? + 𝜆à,?𝑥àIG,à? + 𝑁𝐵L,? 𝑥,L? + 𝜆L,?𝑥,L? + 𝑁𝐵à,? 𝑥à,? −o?|G
𝜆à,?𝑥à,? + 𝜆L,?𝑠L? − 𝜆L,?𝑠L?FG + 𝜆à,?𝑠à? − 𝜆à,?𝑠à?FG + 𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG    
Subject to, 
𝑠LL = 	 𝑆LL; 	𝑠àL = 	 𝑆àL; 	𝑆L ≤ 𝑠L? ≤ 𝑆L; 	𝑆à ≤ 𝑠à? ≤ 𝑆à;	𝑋 , ≤ 𝑥,? ≤ 𝑋 ,  [7-16] 
187	
	
The Lagrangian sub-problem [7-16] naturally decomposes into the following set of sub-problems, 
which separate the other constraints such as arc flow bounds and storage bounds in time periods 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇. 
The reformulation of sub-problem [7-16] creates the following sub-problems [7-17] to [7-22]. Thus, we 
could individually optimise the following sub-problems.  
The upstream reservoir (𝑖 = 0) sub-tree sub-problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑁𝐵L,? 𝑥,L? + 𝜆L,o𝑥,L?   
s. t.		𝑋,L ≤ 𝑥,L? ≤ 𝑋,L			∀		𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 [7-17] 
The downstream reservoir (𝑖 = 𝑛) sub-tree sub-problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑁𝐵à,o 𝑥à,? − 𝜆à,o𝑥à,?   
s. t.		𝑋à, ≤ 𝑥à,? ≤ 𝑋à,			∀		𝑡 ≤ 𝑇  [7-18] 
Inter-reservoir chain (1: 𝑛 − 1) sub-problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,o 𝑥L,G? , 𝑥àIG,à? − 𝜆L,?𝑥L,G? + 𝜆à,o𝑥àIG,à? 	  
s. t.		𝑋L,G ≤ 𝑥L,G? ≤ 𝑋L,G, 𝑋àIG,à ≤ 𝑥àIG,à? ≤ 𝑋àIG,à		∀		𝑡 ≤ 𝑇  [7-19] 
Reservoir storage sub-problem: 
For the inter-period upstream storage benefits:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
r
𝜆L,? − 𝜆L,?IG 𝑠L?   
s. t.		𝑆L ≤ 𝑠L? ≤ 𝑆L					∀	𝑡 < 	𝑇 + 1  [7-20]  
For the inter-period downstream storage benefits: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
r
𝜆à,? − 𝜆à,?IG 𝑠à?   
s. t.		𝑆à ≤ 𝑠à? ≤ 𝑆à					∀		𝑡 < 𝑇 + 1  [7-21]  





𝑉oFG 𝑠LoFG, 𝑠àoFG − 𝜆L,o𝑠LoFG − 𝜆à,o𝑠àoFG	 
s. t.		𝑆L ≤ 𝑠LoFG ≤ 𝑆L, 𝑆à ≤ 𝑠àoFG ≤ 𝑆à	  [7-22] 
An optimal solution to [7-17]-[7-22] under certain conditions optimises [7-1]-[7-8]. The optimality 
conditions for the full model [7-1]-[7-8] are the combination of all feasibility conditions for the sub-
problems above plus feasibility for the two storage balance constraints.  
The following section further describes the nature of the optimal solutions of each sub-problem. This 
will be later useful to explain the construction of various marginal water value curves and surfaces.  
The sub-problems [7-17], [7-18], and [7-19] seek to find the optimal releases for any dual pair 
𝜆L,?, 𝜆à,? . Note that 𝑥(𝜆) in the above sub-problems provides the optimal primal solution value based 
on the 𝜆.	In general the 𝑥(𝜆) functions associated with the above sub-problems can be used to create 
marginal water value surfaces/curves that contain the optimal releases/storages sets. In this section we 
study the conditions under which we can assure the existence feasible solutions for the above sub-
problems. For simplicity, we will consider the above solutions in periods 𝑡 = 𝑇 and 𝑡 = 𝑇 + 1. 
7.3.3. Sub-problem Analysis 
This section analyses the sub-problems given in the previous section. For simplicity, the following 
assumes unique optimal primal solutions to each sub-problem. It is straightforward to extend to cases 
involving multiple optimal primal solutions.  
Suppose that 𝑥,L∗ (𝜆L,o) and 𝑥à,∗ (𝜆à,o) give the optimal solutions of the sub-problems [7-17] and [7-
18] respectively based on the values of the coefficients 𝜆L,o and 𝜆à,o in the respective objective 
functions. The optimal solution of sub-problem [7-17] has the following structure. The demand curve 
𝑥,L∗ 𝜆L  is decreasing with 𝑥,L∗ 𝜆L = 𝑋 when 𝜆L > −
yçã2 8
yÎ,2
 and 𝑥,L∗ 𝜆L = 𝑋 when 𝜆L <
− yçã2 8
yÎ,2
. Assuming 𝑁𝐵L is differentiable, when 𝜆L is between the bounds −
yçã2 8
yÎ,2
 and − yçã2 8
yÎ,2
, 




= 𝜆L (refer to the first order conditions [7-10]). 










= 𝜆à. Using the equation [7-11], we check the boundary conditions of 𝑥à,∗ 𝜆à  with 
𝑥à,∗ 𝜆à = 𝑋 when 𝜆à <
yçã3 8
y3,4
 and 𝑥à,∗ 𝜆à = 𝑋 when 𝜆à >
yçã3 8
y3,4
. The former set of price-
quantity pairs denoted by 𝑥,L∗ 𝜆L  is the demand curve for inflows for the upstream reservoir and the 
latter set of price-quantity pairs denoted by 𝑥à,∗ 𝜆à  is the demand curve for release for the 
downstream reservoir. Obviously, this single dimension demand curve construction can be easily done 
with the nodal CDDP procedure. Details are shown in later sections.   
Sub-problem [7-19] seeks to maximise the inter-reservoir chain benefits subject to inter-reservoir chain 
arc flow constraints. Suppose 𝑥L,G∗ (𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) and 𝑥àIG,à∗ (𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) give the optimal solutions of sub-
problem [7-19] dependent on the value of scalar coefficients. 𝜆L,o and 𝜆à,o in the objective function. 
Marginal inter-reservoir benefit function satisfies 9çoãU:3:U 2,U
∗ 3:U,3∗
92,U
−𝜆L = 0 and 
9çoãU:3:U 2,U∗ 3:U,3∗
93,3:U
+𝜆à = 0 when the respective bounds are slack at the optimal solution of this sub-
problem. This observation, coupled with the [7-16] yield the following inequalities and their 
implications.  
For the upstream release flow conditions: 𝜆L <
9çoãU:3:U,S 82,U,	3:U,3∗
92,U
⟹ 𝑥L,G∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑋L,G and 𝜆L >
9çoãU:3:U,S 82,U,3:U,3∗
92,U








𝑥àIG,à∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑋àIG,à. Sub-problem [7-19] creates a region 𝑥L,G∗ , 𝑥àIG,à∗ , 𝜆L, 𝜆à  in the price-quantity 
space, which could be considered to be a demand curve for transfer. Then 𝑥L,G∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 
𝑥àIG,à∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à  are the demand surfaces for release into and receipt from the inter-reservoir chain, 
respectively. The two surfaces are monotonic as 𝜆L or 𝜆à increases. The above motivates us to describe 
the corners and interior points of the feasible region. The following conditions, 𝑥L,G∗ = 𝑋L,G when 𝜆L <
9çãU:3:U 82,U,3:U,3∗
92,U
 and 𝑥L,G∗ = 𝑋L,G when 𝜆L >
9çãU:3:U 82,U,3:U,3∗
92,U
 indicate that the 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜆à  edge of 
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the surface128 is decreasing along 𝜆L-axis (refer Figure 6-3). The first order conditions 
9çoãU:3:U 2,U∗ 3:U,3∗
92,U
= 𝜆L and 
9çoãU:3:U 2,U∗ 3:U,3∗
93:U,3
= −𝜆à implicitly describe the correlation between 𝜆L 
and 𝜆à (i.e., the bottom edge or the interior of the demand surface). This will eventually connect to a 
large flat area which indicates that 𝑥L,G∗  cannot respond to additional increase in 𝜆L because 𝜆L could get 
arbitrary high when 𝑥L,G is at its lower bound.     
 
Figure 7-3. Shape of the marginal water value surface for transfer seen at the upstream reservoir.  
Furthermore, the optimal solutions 𝑥L,G∗ 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à∗ , 𝑥àIG,à∗ 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à∗  for the above sub-problem implicitly 
define the demand surface. This is independent of the storage demand curves/surfaces referred in the 
next set of sub-problems. Since ultimately 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG,? arises from optimising an inter-reservoir chain 
sub-problem, we defer discussion of the construction of this four dimensional marginal value surface to 
Section 7.4. 
Sub-problems [7-20] and [7-21] seek to maximize the storage benefits for the upstream and the 
downstream reservoirs respectively. Like in the previous sub-problems, the 𝜆’s function as scalar 
coefficients of 𝑠’s in the two objective functions. The storage bounds will only be slack at the optimal 
solution when the marginal water values of respective reservoirs are equal between two periods: 𝜆L,? =
𝜆L,?IG and 𝜆à,? = −𝜆à,?IG. The following conditions show when the storage limits of the upper storage 
																																								 																				
128	Similarly, the	𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝜆à  edge of the demand surface	𝑥àIG,à∗ 𝜆à, 𝜆L 	 is described by the following 
conditions,	𝑥àIG,à∗ = 𝑋 when 𝜆à > −
yçãU:3:U 8
yU:3:U






are binding: 𝑠L∗? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L  when 𝜆L,? > 𝜆L,?IG and 𝑠L∗? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L  when 𝜆L,? < 𝜆L,?IG. Similarly, 
we can write the following for the downstream storage: 𝑠à∗? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆à when 𝜆à,? > 𝜆à,?IG and 
𝑠à∗? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L when 𝜆à,? < 𝜆à,?IG.  
For any 𝜆L, 𝜆à , using [7-2] and [7-3], we put 𝑠L? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑠L?FG∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à + 𝑥L,G?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à − 𝑥,L?∗ 𝜆L  
and 𝑠à? 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑠à?FG∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à + 𝑥à,?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à − 𝑥àIG,à?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à  where 𝑠L? 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 𝑠à? 𝜆L, 𝜆à  are 
between their bounds they are consistent with the optimal solutions of [7-20] and [7-21] with 𝜆L,?IG =
𝜆L,? and 𝜆à,?IG = 𝜆à,?. We will first consider the upstream storage. For any such 𝜆L, 𝜆à  we put 
𝑠L?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L where 𝑠L? 𝜆L, 𝜆à < 𝑆L. Then 𝑠L?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L is still consistent with 𝜆L,?IG > 𝜆L,?. 
Similarly, for the upper bounds we put 𝑠L?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L where 𝑠L? 𝜆L, 𝜆à > 𝑆L and 𝑠L?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L is 
consistent with 𝜆L,?IG < 𝜆L,?. For the lower bounds of the downstream storage, we set 𝑠à?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆à 
where 𝑠à? 𝜆L, 𝜆à < 𝑆à for any 𝜆L, 𝜆à . Then 𝑠à?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆à is consistent with 𝜆à,?IG > 𝜆à,?. 
Similarly, for the upper bounds 𝑠à?∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à = 𝑆L	 where 𝑠L? 𝜆L, 𝜆à > 𝑆L which is consistent with 
𝜆L,?IG < 𝜆L,?. So there will be many 𝑠L?  and 𝑠à?  that satisfy [7-2] and [7-3] respectively, and are 
consistent with the prices. According to sub-problems [7-20] and [7-21], the marginal water value 
between periods are linked and furthermore equal if storage bounds are slack. But we cannot guarantee 
that these storage volumes are in the feasible set of solution of the two sub-problems. Hence, we are 
motivated to consider sub-problem [7-22] which maximises the end-of-horizon benefit function subject 
to the end-of-horizon storage constraints of the two storages. Using this, we will find the optimal price-
volume solution set for the end-of-horizon conditions. For the upstream end-of-horizon conditions, 
when −𝜆L,o is between 
9=¸TU 2
9r2¸TU
 and 9=¸TU 2
9r2¸TU
, we have 𝑆L < 𝑠LoFG∗ 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o < 𝑆L such that 
9=¸TU r2¸TU∗,r3¸TU∗
9r2¸TU
= 𝜆L,o. The following conditions hold when the storage limits are binding: for the 
upper storage bounds, 𝜆L,o >
9=¸TU r2¸TU∗,r3¸TU∗
9r2¸TU




 when 𝑠LoFG∗ 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o = 𝑆L. For the downstream end-of-horizon 
conditions, when −𝜆à,o is between 
9=¸TU 3
9r3¸TU
 and 9=¸TU 3
9r3¸TU






= 𝜆à,o. The demand surface 𝑠àoFG∗ 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o  is decreasing along the 𝑠 axis with 
𝑠àoFG∗ 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o = 𝑆à when λà,? >
6@ATU B2ATU∗,B3ATU∗
6B3ATU
 and 𝑠àoFG∗ 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o = 𝑆à when 
6@ATU B2ATU∗,B3ATU∗
6B3ATU
> λà,?. Then the end-of-horizon sub-problem determines a set of possible optimal 
storage price-volume solutions (𝑠LoFG∗, 𝑠àoFG∗, 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) which can be passed on to the previous period 
sub-problem like in the reverse recursive CDDP. So we start from the end-of-horizon storage sub-
problem [7-22] which gives us the truncated marginal water value surface for the end-of-horizon 
storage demand surfaces 𝑠LoFG(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) and 𝑠LoFG(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o). Unlike the current period demand 
surface for storage, constructing 𝑠LoFG(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) and 𝑠àoFG(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) can be straightforward as the 
model does not have to maintain 𝑉oFG from period to period.  
When the upper and lower storage bounds are slack (i.e., 𝜆L,o = 𝜆L,oIG, 𝜆à,o = 𝜆à,oIG), the optimal 𝑠Lo∗ 
and 𝑠ào∗ for the storage sub-problems [7-20] and [7-21] can be found directly using the storage balance 
constraints: 𝑠Lo(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) = 𝑥L,Go∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ − 𝑥,Lo∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ + 𝑠LoFG∗(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) in [7-2] and 
𝑠ào(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) = 𝑥à,o∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ − 𝑥àIG,ào∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ + 𝑠àoFG∗(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) in [6-3]. So that 
𝑠Lo 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o  and 𝑠ào 𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o  are 2-D overall monotone decreasing demand surfaces. The 
beginning-of-period storage optimal solution can be denoted as (𝑠Lo∗, 𝑠ào∗, 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ) for the storage sub-
problems [7-20] and [7-21] in the price/quantity set Θ defined as: (𝑠Lo(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ), 𝑠ào(𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ ), 𝜆L,o∗ , 
𝜆à,o∗ , 𝑥L,Go∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ , 𝑥,Lo∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ , 𝑥àIG,ào∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ , 𝑥à,o∗ 𝜆L,o∗ , 𝜆à,o∗ , 𝑠LoFG∗, 𝑠àoFG∗). But the above 
discussion implies recording of quantity demands for every possible price pair which is not a mandatory 
requirement. Thus 𝑠Lo(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) and 𝑠ào(𝜆L,o, 𝜆à,o) amount to horizontal addition of several demand 
surfaces as described in the inter-period CDDP but in the two dimensional space. So that we could store 
prices as a function quantity given that we know the inter-reservoir sub-problem solutions. The nodal 
CDDP procedure can be easily applied to form the truncated demand surfaces for transfer for the inter-
reservoir chain as described in Section 7.4.    
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7.3.4. Interim Summary 
In summary, the above two-reservoir main optimization problem comes down to a set of sub-models 
that allow construction of a number of demand curves and surfaces. Constructing the 1- dimensional 
curves (e.g., 𝑥(𝜆)) efficiently are as for the single reservoir nodal CDDP procedure using the demand 
curve adding methods. But sub-problems [7-19], [7-20], [7-21] and [7-22] require finding optimal price 
and release/storage pairs as multi-dimensional surfaces. In the case of sub-problem [7-19], we could 
think of filling the price-quantity grid directly or tracking particular marginal water value contours to 
form the intra-period 4-d marginal water value surfaces. The marginal water value along a particular 
contour on the demand surface will be constant. However, sub-problems [7-20], [7-21] and [7-22] 
require merging multi-dimensional demand surfaces in abstract to form the demand surfaces for 
storages which determine the optimal 𝜆s where release and reservoir consumption demands allow the 
storage balance constraints to hold. One could consider implementing the above surface adding using 
different methods such as point wise addition of marginal water value points in the price-quantity 
space, or filling the marginal prices and quantities of one reservoir by holding the quantities of the 
other.  
Section 7.3 describes the structure and development of 4D price-quantity demand surfaces, for 
example, the demand surface for transfer characterising primal-dual solutions, 𝑥L,G∗ , 𝑥àIG,à∗ , 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à∗ , of 
sub-problem [7-19]. In addition, various projections and diagrams will be sketched to visualise and 
illustrate these marginal water value surfaces. The primal-dual nature allows us to treat the four three-
variable projections separately, for example, 𝑥L,G∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à , 𝑥àIG,à∗ 𝜆L, 𝜆à , 𝜆L∗ 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à  and 
𝜆à∗ 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à . For referencing convenience, we also define two diagrams: the ‘quantity diagram’ and 
the ‘price diagram’. The quantity diagram is a projection of price contours onto the quantity plane. The 
quantity diagram partitions the quantity plane into connected areas corresponding to fixed prices, that 
is, sets of the following form:   
𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à 𝜆L∗ 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à = 𝜆L, 𝜆à∗ 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à = 𝜆à . 
Similarly, the price diagram is a projection of quantity contours onto the price plane, partitioning it into 
connected areas of fixed quantities. 
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The above analysis helps us develop the following computational routine to construct the intra-period 
demand curve for transfer for the jointly operating two reservoirs.  
7.4. Intra-period Demand Surface for Transfer  
This section describes how to form the demand surfaces for transfer for the inter-reservoir chain. The 
process begins by pruning all sub-trees leading from the inter-reservoir nodes leaving a single nodal 
chain. Then we can solve the inter-reservoir nodal chain sub-problem to construct the demand surface 
for transfer. Section 7.4.1 sets the stage for the nodal CDDP tree reduction procedure description by 
presenting the notation and assumptions required in addition to those used in the single reservoir nodal 
CDDP procedure. Then we illustrate how to form the demand surface for transfer in section 7.4.2.     
7.4.1. Inter-reservoir Chain Optimization Model 
The inter-reservoir chain optimization sub-problem and sub-tree optimization sub-problems are 
presented in the following section. We describe a CDDP based sub-tree pruning procedure that solves 
the sub-tree sub-problems. Finally, this section develops marginal water value surfaces using the CDDP 
approach, to find the optimal solutions to the inter-reservoir chain sub-problem.  
7.4.1.1. Inter-reservoir Chain Sub-problem 
The inter-reservoir chain includes flows into/out of both reservoir nodes and the minimal set of 
connecting arcs. The remaining collection is formed by removing all arcs in the reservoir tree from the 
original (and any resulting singleton nodes). This forms a set of sub-trees independently radiating from 
each node in the inter-reservoir chain 
The following sub-problem seeks to maximise the inter-reservoir chain benefits by maximising benefits 
strictly of the set of nodes and arcs that form the chain between the two reservoirs including the 
reservoir nodes and accounting for benefits from the subtrees connected to the nodes on that chain, 
1,2, … , 𝑛 − 1, but not those connected to the reservoirs. For modelling convenience, we will assume 
that each node on the inter-reservoir chain is only connected to a single sub-tree.  
𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à = 𝑚𝑎𝑥,u 𝑁𝐶𝐵 𝑞 + 𝑁𝑆𝐵 𝑥,ä
àIG




	𝑞 + 𝑥,ä + 𝑥,FG−𝑥IG, = 0		∀𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 − 1  
𝑋,FG ≤ 𝑥,FG ≤ 𝑋,FG, 𝑋,ä ≤ 𝑥,ä ≤ 𝑋,ä, 𝑄 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄,  [7-23] 
where 𝑘 is the base node for the subtree connected to node 𝑖 on the subtree chain and the 𝑁𝑆𝐵 is the 
benefits from that subtree, defined below. Here 𝑁𝐶𝐵 𝑞  denotes piece-wise linear convex nodal 
consumptive benefit function129 which is the net sum of the local consumptive benefit functions 
𝐶𝐵 𝑐 , 𝐶𝐸 𝑑 , and 𝐶𝐹 𝑓  (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3) at any node in the chain. Other terms carry 
their usual meaning. A negative lower bound for 𝑞 is required to allow nodal tributary flows. 
Importantly, sub-problem [7-23] defines 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG and then sub-problem [7-19] seeks to maximise the 
inter-reservoir chain benefits 𝑁𝑇𝐵G:àIG. As noted in the previous section the dual version of [7-19] can 
be used to construct the marginal water value surface defined by 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 𝑥àIG,à 𝜆L, 𝜆à . 
Section 7.4.3 explains how to form the above demand surface for inter-reservoir transfer using the 
CDDP procedure.  
We can explicitly show the sub-tree benefit maximisation problem for a set of sub-trees leading from 
any node on the inter-reservoir chain. To understand this, we will consider any sub-tree 𝑇 with 𝑁 
nodes, on which consumptive, distributary, tributary and non-consumptive demands are accommodated. 
Thus subtree sub-problems is: 
𝑁𝑆𝐵 𝑥,ä = 𝑚𝑎𝑥,u 𝑁𝐶𝐵 𝑞 + 𝑁𝐶𝐹, 𝑥,, ∈ä∈çä   
Subject to, 
𝑞 + 	 𝑥,, ∈ä − 𝑥, = 0, ∈ä   
𝑋, ≤ 𝑥, ≤ 𝑋,, 𝑄 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑄  [7-24] 
																																								 																				
129 Similar to consumptive/distributary marginal benefit functions, y𝑁𝐶𝐵 𝑞
yu
= 𝑛𝑠𝑏(𝑞) denotes the sub-tree 
marginal benefit function for sub-tree off-takes. 
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Without loss of generality, (𝑖, 𝑘) denotes a single arc connecting node 𝑖 on the ‘chain’ with its subtree. 
In both cases we have not shown the time index because these sub-problems are independent over time. 
The sub-problems [7-23] and [7-24] decompose the two-reservoir tree network into an ‘inter-reservoir 
chain’ and a ‘remaining collection’ of sub-trees leading from the inter-reservoir chain nodes. 
The sub-tree sub-problems [7-24] cover the remaining collection of sub-trees. One can consider 
optimising these as pruning these subtrees to form the inter-reservoir chain. The solutions of the set of 
sub-tree sub-problems prune all the sub-trees radiating from the inter-reservoir chain nodes without 
distorting the economic benefits of sub-tree flow off-takes. The structure of [7-24] is similar to the 
nodal optimization model discussed in Chapter 5. Further, the dual of the primal sub-tree sub-problem 
defines the sub-tree net consumptive marginal water value function. Hence, we could use the single 
reservoir nodal CDDP procedure to form a nodal net consumptive demand curve for each node in the 
inter-reservoir chain. 
7.4.2. CDDP Sub-tree Pruning Procedure 
To illustrate the sub-tree reduction procedure, we use the above two hypothetical long-term storages 
within a connected water network modeled as a tree. The following descriptions accompany a set of 
examples based on the two series linked reservoirs. However, we include some hypothetical design 
features to the network to demonstrate some aspects of the method. The first illustration shows the full 
network and the node labels. Then it prunes the sub-trees in the inter-reservoir chain. Note that we will 
use this numerical example in other places in this chapter.  
Illustration 7.4. A  
Consider two series connected reservoirs and a few sub-trees radiating from the inter-reservoir chain 
nodes, as in Figure 7-4, on which the demands for consumptive and non-consumptive use in main and 
sub-trees must be accommodated. We will label the network as an upstream nodal CDDP where 𝑖 = 0 
indicates the upstream/root storage. 𝑖 is increasing as we traverse along the chain towards the leaf 




Figure 7-4. Schematic diagram of a series linked two-reservoir tree network 
The above figure includes no sub-trees radiating from the two reservoirs. 𝑇l,L denotes the main stream, 
and 𝑇l,G represents an irrigation diversion sub-tree. 𝑇L,G represents another consumptive flow off-taking 
sub-tree at node 1.  
As we have already noted in the above section, it is possible to include a compensating marginal benefit 
function 𝑛𝑠𝑏G in place of all sub-tree demand curves of 𝑇G,G to ensure that the resulting benefits of the 
sub-tree are unchanged. Similarly, we construct the local consumptive demand curve 𝑛𝑐𝑏G in place of 
local consumptive, distributary and tributary marginal costs/benefits and the marginal sub-tree benefit 
function 𝑛𝑠𝑏Gby pruning sub-tree 𝑇l,G. Hence, 𝑛𝑐𝑏l is the net nodal marginal benefit of diverting flows 
for local uses and also the different uses in the sub-tree 𝑇l,G. Note that this is not just the direct benefits 
from such consumptive use, but includes associated non-consumptive uses in each sub-tree. The sub-




Figure 7-5. Example of a pruned inter-reservoir nodal tree network  
Figure 7-5 sketches the reduced tree after separately applying the nodal CDDP procedure for each sub-
tree radiating from the inter-reservoir chain. 𝑛𝑐𝑏 accounts for both local consumptive demand curve 
𝑛𝑐𝑏  and the demand curve of the sub-tree nodes 𝑛𝑠𝑏  leading from node 𝑖. For example, 𝑛𝑐𝑏G and 
𝑛𝑐𝑏l represent the net consumptive demand curves of the inter-reservoir chain nodes 1 and 2 
respectively.  
In summary, this illustration describes how to prune any sub-tree leading from inter-reservoir chain 
nodes. The nodal CDDP simply prunes any sub-tree by forming relevant sub-tree marginal benefit 
functions and horizontally adding those sub-tree marginal functions to the respective local consumptive 
marginal benefit functions in the chain nodes. Finally, we end up with a set of net nodal marginal 
benefit functions for each node in the inter-reservoir chain.   
End of illustration 7.4 A 
7.4.3. Demand Surface for Transfer  
This section is about the construction of 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 𝑥à,àIG 𝜆L, 𝜆à  surfaces, the ‘transfer demand’ 
as described above, using the CDDP approach. Note that although we use the term ‘demand surface for 
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transfer’, certain price pairs may invoke a release from one reservoir without a corresponding receipt at 
the other, and vice versa. The inter-reservoir chain transfer benefits function is defined as the maximum 
benefit from a set of inter-linked nodes between two connected reservoirs, based on the injection and 
extraction into and out of the chain from and to the reservoirs (i.e., using the sub-problems [7-19] and 
[7-23]). 
The variable 𝑥L,G represents the injection to the chain from the upstream reservoir 𝑖 = 0. 𝑥à,àIG is the 
release flow from the chain to the downstream reservoir 𝑖 = 𝑛. Note that although 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 
𝑥àIG,à 𝜆L, 𝜆à  are written as two quantities given as a function of prices, they really define a four 
dimensional surface which maps out optimal quadruples 𝑥L,G∗ , 𝑥àIG,à∗ , 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à∗ . This set of all optimal 
primal/dual solutions to the inter-reservoir chain sub-problem can be used to construct the demand 
surfaces for storage in the reservoir sub-problem. This leads us to look for suitable methods to form the 
demand surfaces 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  and 𝑥àIG,à 𝜆L, 𝜆à  in the price-quantity space, efficiently.  
The method130 we describe here is to utilise the single reservoir nodal CDDP procedure to build up the 
surface in “strips”. Each strip corresponds to either a critical downstream marginal water value that 
induces a downstream versus inter-reservoir demand swap or a critical marginal price difference 
𝜆L − 𝜆à = 𝜀  between the two reservoirs. However, in the development that follows, we will follow 
the latter option. 𝜀 is an arbitrary discrete price which can take any value based on one or more non-
consumptive demands. A downstream critical price induces a change in the pattern of optimal releases 
according to the upstream marginal price.         
If the downstream end-of-chain marginal water value is fixed, 𝜆à = 𝜆à, a demand curve for release 
from the upper reservoir can be constructed using the single reservoir nodal CDDP procedure. This 
gives us a demand curve 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  by systematically incrementing 𝜆L to find the corresponding 𝑥L. 
Label this demand curve 𝛤¤3 which will be referred to as the demand curve for transfer (𝑑𝑐𝑡) 
																																								 																				
130 We could think of different approaches either based upon adjusting quantities to determine prices or adjusting 
prices to determine quantities, to fill the price-quantity space. A straightforward means of doing this would be to 
iterate through a grid of prices for both reservoirs recording the relevant optimal flows. Any method of solving the 
inter-reservoir chain with fixed reservoir prices would be sufficient. This effectively constructs the demand 
surface one “grid-square” at a time as described later. 
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corresponding to any 𝜀, being the set of all optimal release-water value pairs 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à , 𝜆L . Let 𝛤¤3 
denote a strip if the water value is critical for the increment, 𝜀. The release water values, 𝜆L∗ ¤3, will 
effectively relate to the upstream reservoir water values, 𝜆L, via sub-problem [6-19]. This effectively 
defines a strip of 𝑥L,G 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à 131.  
§ A strip 𝛤¤3  refers to a set of sorted marginal water values that forms a 𝑑𝑐𝑡 corresponding to 
a critical marginal water value 𝜀. 
§ A band is made up of sections bordered by two strips (i.e., critical marginal price differences).  
§ A diagonal line connects marginal water value points in two adjacent strips across a band.  
This poses the question of how 𝑥L,G 𝜆L∗ , 𝜆à  changes as 𝜆à changes. We would like to be able to 
construct a small number of these demand strips and effectively knit them together into the full demand 
surface. In order to explore the issues involved, we run through a worked example, Illustration 7.4 B. 
This will lead to a clear description of the structure of the demand surface in the section following the 
numerical example. We then outline a process for constructing the demand surface in Section 7.4.3. 
Illustration 7.4. B  
The objective of this illustration is to examine the structure of the demand surface 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  for a 
specific example, illustrating the various features and motivating possible ways to construct the surface. 
Data 
Figure 7-6 shows a two-reservoir nodal network. The storages are labelled as ‘0’ (upstream) and ‘3’ 
(downstream) respectively. There are two nodes on the inter-reservoir chain. Hypothetical non-
consumptive (e.g., 𝑛𝑐𝑓LG = 3,2,1,1 , 𝑛𝑐𝑓Gl = 6,5,4,3 ) and inter-reservoir consumptive (e.g., 𝑛𝑐𝑏G =
12,11,10,8 ) use are benefiting from the two storages. An inflow if two units are attached to node 1. 
																																								 																				
131 In addition, for each (𝑥L,G, 𝜆L∗ ) the procedure will have implicitly determined the optimal downstream reservoir 
values, 𝑥àIG,à∗ . For example, these could be reconstructed using forward simulation. It is also possible to keep 




Let the flow capacities for all arcs in the inter-reservoir chain be 𝑋, 𝑋 = 0,6 . Any extra water will be 
a loss to the system. 
	
Figure 7-6. A simple series connected two-reservoir tree network s 
Processing 
This section is about processing the inter-reservoir tree by setting different downstream water values. 
Firstly, we set the downstream water value 𝜆à = 0. This will invoke a set of marginal price tranches at 
the upstream reservoir. Figure 7-7 sketches the demand curves seen below node 2, below node 1 and at 
the upstream reservoir when the nodal CDDP is processing the inter-reservoir chain from the 
downstream to upstream. Figure 7-7-A constructs the set of marginal water value tranches at the 
upstream reservoir when 𝜆à = 0 are 11,9,6,5,0,0 . Similarly, Figure 7-7 B shows the upstream 




Figure 7-7. Downstream-upstream processing to construct the demand curves for transfer for λn = 0, λn = 2+.    
The top of Figure 7-7-A shows demand curve 𝛤¤3|L, which is piecewise constant with steps at the 
upstream critical water values 11, 9, 6, and 5. Note the two tranches to the left of the vertical axis are 
truncated. Between these critical values the release is constant. 𝛤¤3 describes the edge of the demand 
surface 𝑥L,G 𝜆L, 𝜆à  which also forms an edge strip on the demand surface. When 𝜆à = Δ, the release 
schedule/ordering is unchanged but some upstream critical prices have been raised by 𝜖. For example, 
Figure 7-7-B sketches the upstream demand curve corresponding to Δ = 2 − 𝜖. Also, Figure 7-7-C 
corresponds to Δ = 2 + 𝜖. The upstream critical water values become 11, 9, 6 + 𝜖, and 5 + 𝜖. This 
holds for any 0 < 𝜖 < 2. The ‘critical water values’ 6 + 𝜖, and 5 + 𝜖 correspond to critical water value 
differences (see below). As 𝜆à is increased from 0 to 2, a band on the demand surface is traced out. 
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So 𝜆à = 2 becomes the next downstream critical value and Diagrams A and B show the two strips 
bordering the first two bands in the marginal water value space. (This band is illustrated below in 
Figure 7-9)  The band is divided into regions where the release decisions do not change. Some borders 
between regions correspond to fixed critical upstream marginal water values e.g., 𝜆L = 11. Others 
correspond to critical upstream marginal water value differences, e.g., 𝜆L − 𝜆à = 6.  
When the downstream marginal water value reaches the next critical value (i.e.,	𝜆à = 2), the last 
consumptive bid at node 2 and the first combined reservoir/non-consumptive downstream bid take the 
same value. This means that there is indifference between which of the two demands will be met by the 
incoming flow. Slightly increasing the 𝜆à by 𝜖 (that is Δ = 2 + 𝜖), the first combined reservoir/non-
consumptive bid is valued at Δ + 6 and will take the position previously held by the last consumptive 
bid valued at “8”. This will induce a change in the bid stack order at node 2. So not only are the 
upstream marginal water values increasing, but there is a change in order of the final bid tranche (see 
Figure 7-7-B). Notice that since the swap occurs at node 2, the non-consumptive demand between 
nodes 1 and 2 is no longer associated with the consumptive bid valued at “8”. 
We continue marginally increasing the downstream critical marginal water value 𝜆à and examine how 
the upstream marginal water values change. For example, the diagrams A, B, and C in Figure 7-8 
sketch the marginal water values seen at the upstream reservoir for downstream marginal water values 
𝜆à < 2, 2 < 	 𝜆à < 3, 3 < 	 𝜆à < 4 .  
 
Figure 7-8. Marginal water values seen at the upstream reservoir for the λn = 0, 2 and 3.  
Bids with fixed heights in the final 𝑑𝑐𝑡, (denoted by lighter towers) are meeting inter-reservoir 
consumptive demands. Others (which include the striped tower sections) shift upwards as the 
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downstream marginal water values increase, and they will ultimately be passed through to the 
downstream reservoir. As already noted in the above, the bid stack ordering will be unchanged for a 
range of 𝜆às demarcated by two adjacent critical downstream 𝜆às. It is possible to use CDDP to 
generate these bands by recording the non-critical ranges and tracking them at each node in the chain. 
This gives us 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à and 𝜆L changes corresponding to the critical 𝜆às.     
7.4.3.1. Discussion 
In what follows, we sketch the above 𝑑𝑐𝑡s and their projections on to the quantity space and the price 
space, to clearly visualise the nature of the 4-D surface and then to describe it.  
The 𝑑𝑐𝑡s corresponding to the downstream water values 𝜆à = 0,1,2,3 are plotted in Figure 7-9. The 
values 𝜆à = 0, 𝜆à = 2 and 𝜆à = 3 indicate the critical downstream marginal water values and thus 
corresponding 𝑑𝑐𝑡s construct the strips or the edges of the bands. Over each band there is no change to 
the order in which demands are met over the inter-reservoir chain as the upstream marginal value is 
increased. We could say the general pattern of inter-reservoir flows is unchanged. The upstream critical 
prices which are unchanged as 𝜆à is increased over this band form square steps in this band. The 
upstream critical prices which are raised as 𝜆à is increased add diagonal steps. Along these diagonals 
the marginal water value difference is constant (refer the marginal water values ‘6’ and ‘5’ 
corresponding Strip 0 and Strip 2).  
 
Figure 7-9. Demand curves for transfer, projections of demand curves for transfer onto quantity (net receipts) 
and marginal water value diagrams.   
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These square and diagonal steps (dotted and hashed areas) can be seen in the price diagram shown in 
Figure 7-10 as edges of constant release areas. Diagram-A shows the quantity diagram of demand 
surface 𝜆L∗ 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à  along guidelines of contours of 𝜆L in the release-receipt space. As expected 
there are curve segments (i.e., 𝜆L guidelines) parallel to the upstream release 𝑥L,G and angular curve 
segments as depicted in the diagram. From Sub-problem [7-19], given a fixed 𝜆à, one can induce a 
change to 𝜆L by invoking a change to 𝑥àIG,à?  through changing 𝑥L,G? . This is illustrated in Figure 7-7 and 
Figure 7-8. Here in Figure 7-9, the angular curve segments denote the release-receipt quantity 
difference132. All solutions in the top parallelogram correspond to 𝜆à = 2 and all solutions in the lower 
parallelogram correspond to	𝜆à = 3.	In both cases, though, there is indifference between which of the 
two demands will be met by the incoming flow. 
Similarly, there will be curve segments parallel to the 𝑥àIG,à axis in case of the 𝜆à contours as shown in 
the quantity diagram projected from 𝜆à contour line of demand surface for transfer for the downstream 
reservoir (Figure 7-10-A). A curve shows an offset when the downstream water value reaches a critical 
value. Finally, in Figure 7-10-B we plot the curves in the marginal water value space (𝜆L − 𝜆à). 
The demand curves corresponding to the remainder of the 𝜆às indicate all possible order-swaps 
between inter-reservoir consumptive demands and the downstream demands as further described in the 
following. We record 𝑥L,G, 𝑥àIG,à  and 𝜆L  of all occurrences that would eventually form the marginal 
water value transfer function.  
																																								 																				
132 Angular curve segments correspond to fixed quantity differences 𝑥L,G − 𝑥àIG,à . That is, changes to the 
release 𝑥L,G are exactly matched by changes to the receipt 𝑥àIG,à corresponding to water transferred from one 




Figure 7-10. Projections of the demand curves for transfer corresponding to λ = 0, 2,  and 3onto x0,1-xn,n-1 
quantity diagram and λ0−λn. 
End of Illustration. 
As we have already noted in the above, a strip corresponds to the downstream critical marginal water 
values 𝜆à . In the development of the procedure that follows, it will be convenient to distinguish 
between a band and a strip.  
The critical water values occur as a result of the interaction between inter-reservoir consumptive 
demands and the downstream demands. These marginal price differences only arise within a band, 
forming diagonals (see grey solid lines in Figure 7-9) between constant release-receipt pairs.  
The release order changes when the downstream marginal water value is marginally above “2”. So the 
new downstream critical marginal water value creates the second band133. This means that the end-of-
chain pass through non-consumptive demand step swaps position with the inter-reservoir consumptive 
step somewhere along the new 𝑑𝑐𝑡. 
																																								 																				
133	At each step in the CDDP it is simply a matter of going through these tranches to see the least they can be 
increased before invoking a change in order. That will give the increment to the next downstream critical water 
value. In addition, there is a single upstream-downstream critical marginal water value difference for a network 
with no non-consumptive demand or consumptive off-takes between the two reservoirs; this is zero. This implies 




The 𝑑𝑐𝑡 curve segments parallel to 𝜆L-axis represent a range of increasing optimal upstream release 
units 𝑥L,G along the flat for the same 𝜆L. This means that we are trading off a marginal return of 𝜆L at 
the upstream reservoir with the same marginal return from releasing into the inter-reservoir chain. The 
horizontal flats are where there are a range of optimal 𝜆Ls for the same upstream release unit 𝑥L,G. The 
bottom of the 𝑑𝑐𝑡 with upstream marginal water value of zero (near 𝑋 bound) denotes maximum inter-
reservoir consumption and then each upward step corresponds to reduced consumption.  
𝜆L is continually changing its value along a diagonal line as shown in the 𝜆L-𝜆à projection in Figure 
7-10-B. Both bands and strips together will complete the marginal water value surface. Bands together 
with diagonals will make a quadrilateral cell grid of the marginal water value surface. The upstream 
release is unchanged within a cell but the upstream-downstream marginal water value difference can 
change (e.g., the 𝑑𝑐𝑡 corresponding to 𝜆à = 1 in Figure 7-9-A).  
Furthermore, the diagonal line 𝜆L = 𝜆à indicates sending water from the upstream storage to 
downstream storage with no interaction between the downstream bids and inter-reservoir consumptive 
bids. The rest of the diagonals are corresponding to different levels of interaction between the two.  
In summary, a strip corresponds to a downstream marginal critical value. A critical value implies one or 
more swaps are taking place between downstream and inter-reservoir consumptive demands. A band 
represents a fixed pattern of flows. It may correspond to the upstream-downstream critical price 
differences. The critical prices themselves introduce interactions between the critical price differences 
and other critical prices. Diagonal lines section the bands according to critical price differences, re-
shaping the cells into a set of small irregular patterns.  
Figure 7-10-B in the above illustrative example briefly shows the relationship between the inter-
reservoir consumptive demands and the downstream demands. Based on that, Figure 7-11 sketches a 
generic projection of the demand surface for transfer in the upstream release-downstream receipt space. 
This helps us to observe the interactions between 𝑥L,G and 𝑥àIG,à along the 𝑑𝑐𝑡s. Sometimes, it may be 




Figure 7-11. Example of a set of demand curve strips as seen in the upstream release – downstream receipt 
space for the upstream reservoir.  
There will be a unique 𝑑𝑐𝑡 projected on to the red coloured diagonal line that implies the upstream 
releases are equal to the downstream receipts when there is no inter-reservoir consumptive use between 
the series connected two reservoirs (e.g., some typical cascade hydropower systems). The rest of the 
𝑑𝑐𝑡 contours (corresponding to inter-reservoir consumptive use in the quantity diagram) will spread 
across a diagonal band indicate by the two black coloured dotted lines in the above diagram. The lower 
boundary 𝑑𝑐𝑡 is the maximum possible downstream receipts. Minimum inter-reservoir consumption 
occurs when marginal water values of the two reservoirs are very high. As noted in the above, the 
maximum possible inter-reservoir consumptive use will be attained when the lowest 
upstream/downstream marginal water values for any possible upstream release level. We could imagine 
respective 𝑑𝑐𝑡s in Figure 7-10-A is sitting “above” a diagonal and in a dimension coming out of the 
𝑥L,G − 𝑥àIG,à 	plane. So the 𝑑𝑐𝑡s are defined along a locus point within the band and sideway steps 
imply inter-reservoir consumptive swaps.  
In general, the above is applicable for the parallel two-reservoir configuration but the diagonal band 
between the two dotted lines will expand possibly covering the whole space in order to accommodate 
large consumptive use. This is because the downstream confluence normally discharges to a sink (e.g., 
sea) which has infinite consumptive use. There are a variety of ways in which we could use the above 
insights to define a process to generate the required demand surface. 
209	
	
7.4.3.2. Interim Summary    
This computational routine considers the implications associated with the critical marginal water value 
differences and the downstream critical marginal water values. We provide a nodal CDDP procedure to 
trace out the transfer surface in which each successive unit of upstream reservoir release is used to meet 
the next most attractive inter-reservoir consumptive use. If non-consumptive values combined with the 
marginal water value at the downstream reservoir are high enough, water is transferred through to the 
downstream reservoir134. This means that as the downstream marginal water value increases, some 
upstream marginal water values will shift upwards without changing their order in the bid stack. In that, 
a profile of demand curves corresponding to critical marginal price differences will be neatly stacked 
together to form a band. This implies that a large number of 𝑑𝑐𝑡s are required to accurately 
approximate the demand surface. But we may still form the surface sufficiently by storing fewer 𝑑𝑐𝑡s in 
an irregularly discretised grid space, if we could carefully select the 𝑑𝑐𝑡s corresponding to strips135. So 
the 𝑑𝑐𝑡 shape progressively changes along the 𝜆à- axis. The following description of the CDDP process 
considers strips at downstream critical marginal water values136.	
7.4.4. CDDP Procedure for the Inter-reservoir Demand Surface for Transfer 
This section presents the CDDP procedure for the inter-reservoir demand surface for transfer. To 
simplify the presentation here we assume non-negative water values and a downstream-upstream 
network configuration. Let all water value stacks be given as lists of marginal water values for each 
water unit. At the start, this procedure calls the sub-tree pruning procedure to reduce the inter-reservoir 
sub-trees and then constructs the net demand surface for transfer. 
7.4.4.1. Description 
Nomenclature: 
𝑘:  Indexes the critical downstream marginal water value incrementing iteration   
																																								 																				
134 Similarly, the reverse processing of the inter-reservoir chain will generate the demand surface for 
transfer at the downstream reservoir 𝑥L,G(𝑥àIG,à, 𝜆à).   
135 Regular discretization of the downstream marginal water values, would require us to store all 𝑑𝑐𝑡s. So we will 
only select the strips corresponding to critical water values and interpolate the diagonals. 
136 One could construct a model that considers a fine grid of critical marginal water value difference bands.	
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𝑛𝑐𝑏: Net consumptive demand curve for note 𝑖  
𝑛𝑐𝑓: Non-consumptive demand curve for arc 𝑖𝑗 	
𝑏 ∈ 𝐵: Index to represent the bid position or sequence in a bid tranche 
𝐴, 	𝐴M: Index set for keeping track of the lower reservoir water value increments. 
𝜆:   Indicates the marginal water values at node 𝑖. 
𝜆 ∈ã
: Denotes the sequence of bids at the upstream reservoir node corresponding to 𝑘th 
iteration whose 𝑏th element is given by 𝜆 
𝜀:  Critical marginal water value increment for kth iteration 
𝛤¤3Î: Demand curve for transfer corresponding to 𝜀 (marginal water value slice)   
Procedure 
Start.	
 Pre − computation	procedure:  
Reduce all sub-trees in the inter-reservoir nodal chain using sub-tree pruning procedure to 
construct a set of net consumptive demand curves 𝑛𝑐𝑏G, 𝑛𝑐𝑏l, 𝑛𝑐𝑏´ … . , 𝑛𝑐𝑏, …… , one 
for each node of the inter-reservoir chain. 
Main	procedure: 
  Initialization 
   Set 𝑘 = 0 → 𝜆à ∈ã
= 0 . 
   Set 𝛥 = 0.01 //	A	small	discrete	increment	 
   Do  
    𝑆𝑒𝑡	𝜀 = ∞       //	Set	a	finite	initial	critical	value	 
    Set   𝑛𝑐𝑏L = 𝑛𝑐𝑏à = [0] //Starting	values	of	upstream	&	downstream	nodes 
    𝜆à ← 𝛥  
    𝑛𝑏à ← 𝜆à ∈ã
 
    𝐴	 = 	 𝑏|1 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝐵  
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𝐹𝑜𝑟	𝑖 = 𝑛	𝑡𝑜	1	𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 − 1	𝑑𝑜 
𝑛𝑏 ← 𝑛𝑏+>	𝑛𝑐𝑏
𝑠𝑒𝑡	 𝑗, 𝑖 = 𝑝𝑎𝑟 𝑖 , 𝑖 	𝑜𝑟	𝑗 = 𝑝𝑎𝑟(𝑖)	
	𝐴 = ℎ 𝐴, 𝑛𝑏	, 𝑛𝑐𝑏 	//Index	set	after	horizontal	addition	of	𝑛𝑏	and	𝑛𝑐𝑏	
𝐼𝑓	𝐴 − 𝐴M ≠ ∅		𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛	//check	symmetrical	difference	𝑏 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑏 − 1 ∉ 𝐴








← 𝑛𝑏L //Updates	upstream	marginal	water	value 
𝛤¤3Î ← 𝜆L ∈ã
, 𝜆à, 𝐵  //Store	marginal	water	value	slice	 
𝜆àFG ← 𝜆à + 	𝜀	//Increment	downstream	value	to	search	next	critical	value  
𝑘 = 𝑘 + 1 //Search	next	slice 
While	𝜀 ≤ 0	 
Output:	 𝛤¤32 ,𝛤¤3U, … 𝛤¤3Î, …… 𝛤¤3Y  
𝐸𝑛𝑑 
7.4.4.2. Explanation of Main Procedure  
The nodal CDDP is applied to construct the demand curve for transfer 𝛤¤32 (initial strip/edge) 
corresponding to starting end-of-chain critical marginal water value 𝜆à|L. Here 𝑘 indexes the critical 
downstream marginal values. For a general case, as we have already noted in the above, a negative end-
of-chain critical marginal water value may be required to begin the process. But to avoid unnecessary 
complexities, we assume 𝜆à|L = 0 as the starting value. Furthermore, for the interest of simplicity, we 
imagine a small set of discrete critical downstream price increments.  
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Conceptually, the transfer surface construction can be started by creating the 𝑑𝑐𝑡 corresponding to 
maximum inter-reservoir consumption137 (𝜆à = 0 in the above illustration). The procedure will 
continually increase through the critical 𝜆à values until it generates the 𝑑𝑐𝑡 that incentivises the least 
inter-reservoir consumptive off-takes. Practically, though, the procedure could use a very large negative 
value if negative water values are allowed. 
In the following, we set the initial 𝑑𝑐𝑡 for zero downstream marginal water value. As noted in the above 
the initial 𝑑𝑐𝑡 involves some finite maximum consumptive water off-takes in the inter-reservoir chain 
between the two storages. 
The next critical 𝜆à will arise from the downstream bids
138. The CDDP procedure keeps track of 
which tranches include the downstream water value directly. The new downstream marginal water 
value will change these tranches but not the inter-reservoir consumptive bids. The next downstream 
critical marginal water value (e.g., 𝜆à|G) is found when the pattern of releases and flows change. The 
downstream critical value implies a change in the primal solution (i.e., different demands are met)139. 
At each step in the CDDP it is simply a matter of going through these tranches to see the least they can 
be increased before invoking a change in order. That will give the increment either to the next 
downstream critical water value or a smaller increase at another node marginal water values. For 
example, it can be seen from Figure 7-10 -B that an increase in the downstream marginal water value 
from 2 to 3 can allow the fifth and sixth tranches to switch order at node 2. 
																																								 																				
137 In that, there could be negative water values at the downstream reservoir. 
138 The upstream prices are depending on the downstream prices regardless of whether the downstream price is 
critical or not. 
139 The critical prices are strictly involved with the net demands in the inter-reservoir chain. One could attempt to 
construct the demand surface for transfer by incrementing the lower reservoir prices iteratively and then record 
the upper prices. However, there is a risk of omitting critical values and sometimes thin strips. The water value 




Figure 7-12. Example dcts plotted for the downstream critical marginal water values and for the upstream-
downstream critical value differences in the upstream-downstream marginal water value space   
This step repeats the process for all 𝜆às keeping a track of 𝑥L,G and 𝑥àIG,à changes. The CDDP 
progressively creates a set of 𝑑𝑐𝑡s (e.g., 𝛤¤32, 𝛤¤3U, 𝛤¤3Z,….	𝛤¤3Y), determining the critical water 
values as it goes. Then the critical upstream water values and diagonals connect the strips implicitly 
creating the bands and filling the space between 𝑑𝑐𝑡s. The critical marginal value differences in the 
bands will not invoke a change in order in those tranches but they may increase some upstream 
marginal water values (see the set of red solid curves lying between the two strips in Figure 7-12).  
Both upstream and downstream marginal water values increase gradually as we move along 𝜆à axis. 
This means that as the downstream water value increases, the marginal value of holding onto more units 
of water in the upstream reservoir must increase to make this worthwhile, and that passing them right 
through to the downstream reservoir, becomes preferred over consuming them along the way. 
The procedure stops after processing the final critical marginal water value (𝜆à!)
140. This water value is 
easy to identify since when processing the CDDP for this water value, no tranche reordering can be 
invoked at any inter-reservoir chain node by an increase in the downstream water value.  In conclusion, 
this section applied a “lower level” intra-period CDDPs, firstly to reduce the sub-trees leading from the 
inter-reservoir nodes and then to form demand surfaces for transfer for the inter-reservoir nodal chain. 
A “higher level” inter-period CDDP can be developed to find the trade-offs among the end-of-period 
demand surface for storage, inter-reservoir demand surface for transfer and the net demand curves of 
																																								 																				
140 This leads us to ask how to identify the final 𝜆à! which is the stopping rule. For any 𝜆à beyond 𝜆à! will only 
produce flat areas with no visible strips and hence no quantity swaps.    
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sub-trees leading from the reservoirs. The usual CDDP horizontally and vertically merges demand 
curves. The notion of creating a demand surface for transfer deserves consideration as it provides a 
greater insight to the intra-period two-reservoir optimization problem. However, the inter-period 
problem requires adding multi-dimensional demand surfaces and this lies outside the scope of this 
thesis.         
7.5. Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter develops an intra period CDDP framework to assess the marginal value of water stored for 
two inter-connected reservoirs in a mixed-use catchment. The two-reservoir optimization is 
decomposed into a set of sub-problems in order to study the nature of demand surfaces underlying each 
sub-problem. We deploy a “low level” intra-period nodal CDDP procedure to construct the demand 
surfaces for transfer for the inter-reservoir chain. Then a “higher level” (inter-period) CDDP could be 
used to find the trade-off between future storage demands and the current period releases to the inter-
reservoir chain and other direct sub-trees. The CDDP generates two-dimensional marginal water value 
surfaces when processing the inter-reservoir chain. So the two-reservoir problem can be 
computationally difficult to handle unless there is limited consumptive use in the inter-reservoir chain. 
That is, the computational effort depends on the size of the feasible region which depends on the 
amount of inter-reservoir chain consumptive use. Stochastic Programming appears more suitable to 






8. Explorations of multi-dimensional intra-period CDDP extensions 
Explorations of Intra-period CDDP Extensions 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes some multi-dimensional intra-period CDDP model extensions, to model time-of-
use (consumptive and non-consumptive) water allocations, and the demand curve for power for inter-
plant operation in a competitive water market setting. Although we anticipate some modelling issues 
related to time-of-use intra-period model, we believe this work contributes to the existing body of 
literature in terms of cyclic sub-period LP modelling and still explains the problem context and 
importance of time-of-use bidding in a water market.    
Section 8.2 explains the issue of transportation/release delays in a water market setting and the impacts 
of the temporary, relatively small intermediate storages. Following the developments in Chapter 3, an 
LP model in Section 8.2.1 formulates the above problem. This chapter then develops a release delay 
CDDP algorithm that constructs time-of-use demand curves for all nodes, accounting for flow delays 
but assuming “run-of-river” operations, with no intermediate storage capacity at the nodes in Section 
8.3. The following section explains the time-of-use storage delay CDDP algorithm that forms a multi-
dimensional nodal marginal value surface as a result of incremental sub-period flow arrivals under the 
intermediate storage capacity constraints. The two algorithms are then combined to construct the time-
of-use demand surface in Section 8.4. Finally, Section 8.5 provides a summary of the chapter.  
8.2. Modelling Time-of-use Demand for a Mixed used Catchment  
The notion of allocating water at different “times of use” is not discussed in the water resource 
literature. Apparently, timing of water availability for a particular use in the catchment could be as 
important as certainty of quantity and locational delivery of the resource for a successful market design. 
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Practically, the downstream consumptive and non-consumptive demands may require water in different 
time slots within a day than the flows desired by hydropower firms.  For example, a hydro generator 
typically prefers water to be released around 6 p.m., so she could dispatch more energy to meet the peak 
electricity demand. On the other hand, consumptive users will receive that water at various times after it 
is released from the reservoir, due to flow delays. It is unlikely that all will receive flows at the time of 
day that they most prefer141. So the downstream users may need to delay demands, and/or buffer 
received flows using intermediate storage facilities. Or they may be prepared to pay enough to have 
water delivered at their preferred times to influence the upstream release schedule.  
We use a generic LP optimization model to formulate the release delay and storage transfer problem. 
An LP formulation helps to clarify the situation being addressed and to highlight the issues that arise so 
as to formulate a better model and then to identify the sub-problems we could use CDDP to model. Due 
to the flow delays, release not only implies water transfers between nodes, but between sub-periods. A 
release delay (normally measured at the point of release or at the dam face) denotes the time taken for a 
release (or spill) to reach a downstream location (node). The release delay could depend on the size of 
the release (volume), state of the arcs (e.g., canals and conveyors), and the state of the river bed (e.g. 
wet, dry).  
8.2.1. LP Modelling of Release Delays and Storage Transfers using Consecutive Sub-periods 
Multi-nodal intra-period model constructs net benefit functions for aggregate release within a period, so 
that they can be used in an inter-period stochastic model for long-term scheduling of the reservoir. In 
reality, consumptive and non-consumptive users may require water in more specific time slots than 
simply “anytime within the month”, or “in a constant stream over the month”. Therefore, some users 
would prefer to be able to submit demand bids that can guarantee water at the time of highest utility, for 
them. The time-requirements are likely to follow common patterns within a period.  
																																								 																				
141 Similarly, a domestic water supplier may be required to draw water at a specific time of a day depending on 




Figure 8-1. Flow transportation delays in a single reservoir nodal network. The first release occurs in the sub-
period night, (on day d) and subsequent releases are in the day (on day d), night (on day d+1) and day (on day 
d+1),  
A release at a “night” sub-period will eventually be available for downstream non-consumptive, and 
perhaps for a consumptive use at some other node. However, the distance between nodes may cause a 
participant to receive water released at in some later sub-period (e.g., a “day” sub-period). Figure 8-1 
sketches a river chain network that shows the transportation delays associate with the two period 
releases over the planning horizon, modelling the sub-periods as in the last section. A small node 
between the two decision nodes plays the role of a chance node. The chance node splits the upstream 
release flows into two or more flows (referred to as sub-period flows). In addition, a river chain 
network can have several intermediate buffering facilities to transfer flows between the sub-periods 
(day to night and night to day). 
This section formulates a short-term nodal chain optimization with the transportation delays as an LP 
which seeks to maximise the release and the storage benefits of each node/arc in the network over a 
planning horizon (for example, see Read (1979)). This model accounts for release delays, intermediate 
storage, and, the consecutive nature of the time periods. In particular, the time horizon could be one 
month. This model seeks to maximise the net benefit based on different “times of release”. We assume 
a single long-term reservoir node (𝑖 = 0) connected to a nodal chain with intermediate short term 





𝑖, 𝑗 = 0,1,2,3, … . , 𝑛	: Nodes, where 𝑖, 𝑗  denotes an arc belonging to the set 𝐴, of arcs in the 
network. Unlike in the previous models, any node 𝑖 could allow short-term storage142.  
𝑘: Indexes the parallel arcs/delay paths connecting nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗. Ω 𝑖𝑗  denotes the set of parallel 
arcs in the network. Any parallel arc is labelled as (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘). In contrast to the previous models, the 
parallel arcs create a release delay profile from one node to the other over time. This means that a 
parallel arc delivers the water to the same location (e.g., node) but in a different sub-period. 
𝑡: indexes the sub-periods	𝑡	 = 	1,2,3, … , 𝑇. For example, we assume half-day (12-hour) releases 
over a month planning horizon (𝑇 = 60).     
Parameters 
𝜌: denotes the flow splitting weights at any arc 𝑘 ∈ Ω 𝑖𝑗  where 𝜌∈³  ≤ 1. 
𝜏: denotes the release delays as a whole number of sub-periods. 
𝑟: denotes the total release allocated over all sub-periods. 
𝑆, 𝑆: Upper and lower bounds on 𝑠?, assumed constant for  𝑡	 = 1,2,3 …	 Let the lower bounds on 𝑠? 
is 𝑆 = 0. 𝑆 = 0 indicates a node with no shot-term storage. 
Decision variables 
𝑥? : denotes the flow (or release) into an arc (𝑖, 𝑗) in the sub-period 𝑡.   
𝑠?: represents the storage transferred from the sub-period 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1 at node 𝑖.   
𝑞?: denotes the net consumptive diversions at the node 𝑖. A negative lower bound for 𝑞 is required 
to allow nodal tributary flows. 
Deterministic Multi-nodal Consecutive Sub-period LP Model 
In this chapter, as in Chapter 7, 𝑁𝐶𝐵,?(𝑞,?) and 𝑁𝐶𝐹,? 𝑥?  denote piece-wise linear convex nodal 
consumptive benefit and non-consumptive benefit functions respectively. This is the net sum of the 
																																								 																				
142 Node 𝑖 = 0 represents the long-term storage as in the previous chapters. But, here the inter-period (weekly) 




local consumptive benefit functions 𝐶𝐵 𝑐 , 𝐶𝐸 𝑑 , and 𝐶𝐹 𝑓  at any node 𝑖. To avoid modelling 
difficulties, here we assume that the form 𝑁𝐶𝐵,?(𝑞,?)	implicitly accounts for all consumptive demands 
are specified by sub-period. This means that there are no demands based only on the total quantity and 




 denote the piecewise linear or piecewise step 
monotone non-increasing current sub-period release marginal benefit and the end-of-horizon marginal 
















Net nodal flow injections: 
𝑠? = 𝑠?IG − 𝑞? + 𝜌  	𝑥
?I\äèÎ − 	𝑥? 				∀	𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡  [8-2] 
Storage bounds: 
𝑠? ≤ 𝑠? ≤ 𝑠
?			∀	𝑖, 𝑡 [8-3] 
Arc flow capacity bounds: 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑥? ≤ 𝑋			∀	𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 [8-4] 
Reservoir release:  
	𝑥L?? = 𝑟,				∀	𝑟 [8-5] 
8.2.1.1. Explanation 
The objective function seeks to maximize the current period release benefits and future period benefits 
across all nodes over the planning horizon. We assume set target end-of-horizon values 𝑉oFG 𝑠oFG  for 
the intermediate storages in the network. Further, these intermediate storage targets may not adequately 
account for flows in transit.  
Constraint [8.2] represents the flow balance at node 𝑖 in time period 𝑡. The nodes represent either 
temporary storages or simple flow off-takes for consumptive and/or distributary uses. Different 
																																								 																				
143 Same is true for non-consumptive demands. 
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proportions of upstream arc flows belonging to different time periods contribute to the incoming flows 
to any node 𝑖 are denoted by:  𝜌𝑥
?I\äèÎ
∈³  . To avoid modelling difficulties, here we ignore 
flow delays prior to period 𝑡 = 1 but flows arriving during the modelled time horizon (i.e., when,	𝑡 −
𝜏 ≤ 0).	 
Constraint [8.3] denotes the upper and lower bounds of the storage, 𝑖. 
Constraint [8.4] is the arc capacity upper and lower bounds of arc (𝑖𝑗).   
This LP model could be transformed into a parametric LP problem by setting the release, 𝑟 belonging to 
different values in the constraint [8.5] to obtain a set of sub-period intermediate storage/transfer 
solutions across the network. But, we will not explore this further. 
The number of sub-periods is a potential issue for both LP and CDDP implementations needing to 
model the sub-period sub-problem repeatedly in each period. Assuming no delays, the multiple short-
term storages under the above consecutive sub-period formulation act almost similar to the multiple 
long-term storages in the previous models. Ignoring the short-term storage, the network becomes no-
tree as a result of release delay paths (see Figure 8-1). However, there is still well defined partial 
ordering of node-sub-period pairs that would allow the construction of demand curves for water 
constructed from consumptive and non-consumptive demand curves and previously constructed 
‘downstream’ demand curves for water. 
Modelling Cyclic Sub-periods  
As mentioned in the previous section, too many sub-periods might make the previous model 
impractical. To keep the number of sub-periods small each sub-period modelled does not need to 
represent an unbroken time interval. Instead they represent a regularly occurring set of periods of time 
with similar demand characteristics. For example, two sub-periods might represent days and nights 
within a month. Effectively all of the ‘daytimes’ within the month are combined into a single sub-
period and all of the ‘night times’ into another.  
Ideally, a user might prefer the system to allow her to specify demand bids for more precise sub-periods 
(hours for example). For example, a hydroelectric generator may bid high for flows around 6 to 8 pm in 
line with the daily electricity production schedule. But it is unrealistic to assume that participants will 
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provide different bids for each hour in some future month, or that a market would clear on that basis. 
More detail may be required for trading closer to real time, but a distinction between night and day, and 
perhaps between weekday and weekend, is probably all that can be realistically expected.     
Thus, while the method we describe here can be generalized to handle more sub-periods, our discussion 
here only considers two equal (discontinuous) sub-periods, or more exactly time-of-use bidding 
intervals, (day and night) within a planning period and for several planning horizons (e.g. monthly or 
weekly). We assume that users provide (possibly indicative) demand bids for each sub-period. But it is 
important to understand that the relationship between these sub-periods is not to be considered 
“consecutive”, but “cyclic”. The day sub-period represents all daytime hours in the week, and the 
daytime release level determined for the (generic) “day”, is assumed to occur at a constant rate over 
those daytime hours.  Thus some of that release will arrive downstream during the (generic) “day”. But 
some will arrive during the (generic) “night”, rather than in “the next night”. And that is equally true of 
releases scheduled for the generic “night”. We will simplify the problem slightly by assuming each 
market interval to be self-contained, and ignore carryover from the last night of one market interval to 
the first day of the next. This is a very good approximation if the market interval is a month, but 
potentially less good if it is a week. It is still consistent, though, with assuming that the system is likely 
to operate according to a stable cyclic pattern that only shifts slowly from week to week.   
The impact of delay means that a pre-determined proportion of the daytime release from one node will 
arrive as a daytime flow at the next downstream node, with the remainder arriving as a night-time flow. 
For example, a delay of 4 hours implies a 2/3: 1/3 split. Imposing this ratio restriction has a similar 
effect to assuming that a randomly chosen unit of “daytime release” has a pre-determined probability of 
arriving downstream as day-time versus night-time flow. To formulate the cyclic sub-period LP model, 
we change the arc flow variable period index and the storage variable period index to modulo formats 
as follows: 
𝑡: Indexes the sub-periods	𝑡	 = 𝐷, 𝑁.  






Deterministic Multi-nodal LP Cyclic Sub-period Model 
Unlike in the previous model, an end-of-period value function is no longer required. It is effectively 
assumed to be the same as the first period value function and to be in equilibrium. The day-night cyclic 
period release marginal benefit function is:   
𝑚𝑎𝑥
r,,u
𝑁𝐶𝐵,{ 𝑞,{ + 𝑁𝐶𝐵,ç 𝑞,çà|G + 𝑁𝐶𝐹,{ 𝑥{ + 𝑁𝐶𝐹,ç 𝑥ç  [8-6] 
Subject to: 
Net nodal flow injections: 
𝑠ç = 𝑠{ − 𝑞ç + 𝜌ç 	𝑥{ + 	𝑥ç − 𝑥ç 				∀	𝑖, 𝑗   
𝑠{ = 𝑠ç − 𝑞{ + 𝜌{ 	𝑥{ + 	𝑥ç − 𝑥{ 				∀	𝑖, 𝑗   [8-7] 
Storage bounds: 
𝑠? ≤ 𝑠? ≤ 𝑠
?			∀	𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝐷, 𝑁 [8-8] 
Arc flow capacity bounds: 
𝑋 ≤ 𝑥? ≤ 𝑋			∀	𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 = 𝐷, 𝑁 [8-9] 
Reservoir release:  
	𝑥L?? = 𝑟,				∀	𝑟, 𝑡 = 𝐷, 𝑁 [8-10] 
In the following, we attempt to develop a range of CDDP computational routines to solve the above 
cyclic sub-period optimization problem. 
8.3. CDDP Modelling of Release Delays 
This section is about developing a sequence of CDDP computational routines which step-by-step 
attempt to develop a full version including short-term storage. The sequence of CDDP developments in 
this section assumes no short-term storage, fixed storage and dynamic storage for the purpose of 
avoiding modelling difficulties. However, developing a CDDP beyond the leaf node is not practical due 
to the dimensionality problem of the sub-period solutions. But, we have continued to develop the sub-
period CDDP models despite being unsuccessful as they provide useful insights about time of use of 
water to modelers and river-chain operators. 
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The CDDP algorithm which accounts for this effect is essentially the same as a stochastic CDDP 
algorithm, in which we use the “probability” weighted average of downstream time-of-use nodal 
demand curves to construct the upstream demand curve for water.  (To simplify the discussion, we are 
assuming, here, that we are dealing with a simple chain downstream from the reservoir, so that each 
child node is downstream from its parent). So the 𝑑𝑐r processing can always be considered as occurring 
‘up’ an arc, from the child (downstream) end to the parent (upstream) end of the arc. Also, for the 
purposes of discussion, all non-consumptive use on an arc is assumed to occur at the parent end of the 
arc, and hence prior to any delay).  
Assuming no short-term storages, we repeatedly process the nodes in the expanded time-of-use nodal 
network to produce time-of-use demand curves for release. Figure 8-2 illustrates the order in which we 
process “time-of-use bids” (day bids in grey and night bids in black), working towards the reservoir.  
 
Figure 8-2. Time-of-use bids to represent release flow delays in a single reservoir nodal network. 𝒊𝑫 and 𝒊𝑵 
denote a day-time (e.g., grey colour), and a night-time node (e.g., black colour).  
8.3.1. A Nodal CDDP Procedure with Release Delays  
We assume a nodal tree network with 𝑛 nodes similar to the previous cases. Let 𝑖 denote any node in 
the network. We start labelling the nodes from the reservoir node (𝑖 = 0). The leaf node is labelled as 




script nodes, arcs and demands to represent their association with any sub-period (e.g., 𝑖{, 𝑖ç denote 
day and night nodes, 𝑛𝑏{, 𝑛𝑏ç denote the day and night nodal demand curves). 
 
Procedure  
This procedure contains 6 steps starting at Step A.0 and ending at Step A.6.  This constructs the demand 
curve for release from the reservoir that is determined by horizontally adding the day and night demand 
curves for flow at the reservoir. Then the reservoir can meet the demands of the most valuable uses first 
regardless of whether they arise from day or night releases. Note that the current development is limited 
to a single nodal chain. 
Step A.0 
The algorithm starts at the leaf node of the chain, 𝑖 = 𝑛. All nodes other than the reservoir node are 
split into a day and a night version with the day node arbitrarily processed first. 
Step A.1 
First, the CDDP algorithm “horizontally adds” the daytime demand curves for outflow from node 𝑖, 
consumption at node 𝑖, and tributary flows into node 𝑖, to produce a net demand curve for daytime 
inflow into node 𝑖 from its parent, in the normal CDDP fashion (see Figure 8-3). Night-time curves are 
processed similarly, but separately. 
 






























Dark shaded (black background) bid patterns in the upper part of the diagram show the night demands, 
while the day demands are illustrated by light shaded (white background) patterns in the lower part. The 
day demands are high priced compared to the night demands.     
Step A.2 
Construct demand curves for day (then, separately, for night) flow into the parent end of arc (𝑖, 𝑗), 
ignoring any non-consumptive uses at the parent end. Here, 𝑖 denotes the child node.  
§ First, the arc flow capacity truncation [𝐿,	𝑈,] is applied to the time-of-use demand curves. 
This restriction occurs at the child node end. 
§ Second, the delay on the arc is accounted for by taking the probability weighted average of the 
child end day/night demand curves. Given the day-to-day splitting weight 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 (and, 
symmetrically, the day-to-night splitting weight is 1 − 𝜃), we can form time-of-use demand 
curves for flows out of the parent end of the arc as follows. 
𝑛𝑏{ = 𝜃. 𝑛𝑏{ +	 1 − 𝜃 𝑛𝑏ç	, 𝑛𝑏ç = 𝜃. 𝑛𝑏ç +	 1 − 𝜃 𝑛𝑏{	 [8-11]	
    
Figure 8-4. The time-of-use demand curves at any day and night sub-period node. 𝟎 ≤ 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏 denotes the sub-
period flow splitting weights. 
The ‘new’ probability weighted day demand curve is constructed by vertically adding probability 
weighted day and night demand curves. So every day bid now has a night marginal value component 






















Non-consumptive use is assumed to occur at the point of release, and hence accounted for after the 
probability weighted parent-end demand curves have been formed. Non-consumptive uses are 
accounted for using vertical addition of the parent-end net demand curve and the non-consumptive 
demand curve. This is done separately for both the day and night nodes. 
Step A.4 
Unless we have reached the reservoir node, the CDDP algorithm then returns to Step A.1, to combine 
these day/ night demand curves for the parent’s parent node. Relabel 𝑖 as 𝑖	– 	1 then return to Step A.1. 
Otherwise, we proceed to Step A.5 
Step A.5 
Finally, we process the reservoir node (𝑖	 = 	0), which is assumed to have full control over release 
timing. Thus the demand curve for release from the reservoir is determined by horizontally adding the 
day and night demand curves for flow at the reservoir. That is, the reservoir can release to the most 
valuable uses first regardless of whether they arise from day or night releases. 
End of procedure. 
Section 8.3.2 presents a numerical example to demonstrate the above procedure. 
8.3.2. Numerical Example of CDDP Procedure with no Intermediate Storages 
This section constructs the demand curve for release in the presence of arc flow delays using the above 
time-of-use CDDP procedure. The procedure is applied to an example loosely based on the topology of 
the Waikato River catchment in New Zealand, in which Lake Taupo plays the long term storage role 
(see Figure 8-5). Some hypothetical data is used to analyse the network release delay problem. 
We perform a set of experiments to show how different assumptions of flow splitting methods impact 
the final 𝑑𝑐𝑟s. Scenario 1 assumes that there are no release delays. Scenario 2 assumes that there are 
flow delays between nodes, and hence that there is a variable contribution of upstream sub-period 




Figure 8-5. Topological arrangement of the Waikato catchment depicting hydro-electric users and a downstream 
urban use. 𝑺𝑸 denotes the size of each storage. (source: Read, 1979) 
Downstream from Taupo, the Waikato River supports eight hydroelectric plants, totalling 
approximately 1000 MW, which, in this simplified framework, are assumed to have no explicit storage 
capacity. We include downstream urban uses in the model, assuming monotone decreasing 
consumptive demand curves for water. Suppose that consumptive and hydropower users submit 
separate bids for day and night water use. Other local power schemes, including geothermal and the 
upstream Tongariro hydro power scheme, are ignored. The release delays (for scenario 2) are shown in 
Table 8-1. This uses actual flow delays between nodes to determine the sub-period flow splitting 
weights (using 12-hour sub-periods).  
Table 8-1 Release delays in hours with reference to upstream nodes and relevant sub-period flow 
splitting weights. An empty cell represents no release flow delays between the two nodes.   
Description TAUP ARAT OHAK ATIA WHAK MARA WIP ARAP KARA 
Delay (hrs) 0 1.5 7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 2.5 2.0 
Splitting weights  - 0.1:0.9 0.5:0.5 - - - - 0.75:0.25 0.75:0.25 
Source: Read (1979)  
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This section illustrates how the 𝑑𝑐𝑟 changes when the procedure applies variable time-of-use flow 
splitting weights (scenario 2) based on the information given in the above table. Figure 8-6 contains the 
two 𝑑𝑐𝑟s constructed with no release delays (scenario 1, grey curve) and variable (scenario 2, black 
curve) time-of-use flow splitting weights assumptions.  
 
Figure 8-6. Example demand curves for release for scenario 1(no release delays) and scenario 2 (release delays) 
represented by the variable time-of-use weights.  
According to Figure 8-6, the time-of-use 𝑑𝑐𝑟 represented using the variable time-of-use flow splitting 
weights generally records relatively low marginal water values. In the absence of modelling of release 
delays, prices for low release volumes can be a relatively higher and some of the high release volume 
prices can be lower. This provides a good case for us to model release delays properly.           
The variable splitting method described above models the release delays simply by taking the weighted 
average of the two sub-period demand functions. This approach cannot explicitly model short-term 
storages. Section 8.3.3 uses a calibrated flow splitting weight as a function of upstream incremental 
flows to represent the flows shifted between sub-periods using short-term storage. The method provides 
some degree of control to the system operator to meet specific time-of-use demands (if she is chosen to) 
with the upstream release flows in a particular sub-period.  
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8.3.3. A CDDP Procedure with Fixed Intermediate Storages (An Incremental Flow Splitting 
Method) 
The flow splitting methods discussed so far only model the release delays. However, the flows in transit 
may also be stored in temporary buffers in the network, and thus deliberately shifted to be available in a 
more attractive sub-period. Using CDDP this storage cannot be modelled directly without the curse of 
dimensionality causing a problem. This section describes a flow splitting rule that adjusts the delay 
times/ splitting proportions (e.g., based on historical data) to account for short-term storage without 
modelling these buffers directly. The objective of this section is to investigate how to efficiently and 
flexibly use a flow splitting rule to model the flows in transit. As a result the system operator could 
sometimes divert upstream release flows in a particular sub-period to meet more valuable time-of-use 
demands in the other sub-period assuming an intermediate storage. 
 
Figure 8-7. Arrival of flows into day and night nodes in different sub-periods  
One of the simplest rules is to store some percentage of arrivals (initial flows) in a particular sub-period 
for the next sub-period use and use the remaining arrivals to meet the demands of that sub-period (see 
Figure 8-7). Suppose, the night period transfers water to the day period using the intermediate storage 
up to some pre-specified storage limit. Any remaining water is released in the current ‘night’ period and 
day period normally would not use the intermediate storage. This leads us to ask how to prioritise the 
type of sub-period node. A rule for any sub-period arrival flows can be formed to show the flow 
apportionment as 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑥, 𝑆  where 𝑥 denotes the arrival flows in a particular sub period and 𝑆 
represents the maximum flows to be transferred to the next sub-period. To avoid modelling difficulties, 
one could assume that the priority is given to flow transfer over the release for all nodes and all sub-
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periods. Figure 8-8 depicts a linear rule that stores the night arrivals 𝑥 up to 𝑆 and remaining arrivals 
will be allocated for the current night-time demands.  
 
Figure 8-8. Linear rule to allocate flows in the night sub-period node 
This approach uses two different sub-period delay/apportionment functions where each could be 
calibrated using the historical data. The day-time apportionment function first allocates water for day 
release (to meet the most valuable day demands) up to some pre-specified level, 𝑋. Water beyond this 
level is stored (for night use) up to some maximum storage level, 𝑆. Any remaining water is again 
allocated to day release (to meet the least valuable day demands).  
Suppose that 𝑥 denotes the arrival flows in a particular sub-period. The flow splitting weights 𝜌 𝑥  are 
defined as a function of the arrival flows.  
𝜌(𝑥) =
1 𝑖𝑓	0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋
𝑋 𝑥 𝑖𝑓	𝑋 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋 + 𝑆𝑥
(𝑥 − 𝑆𝑥) 𝑥 𝑖𝑓	𝑥 > 𝑋 + 𝑆𝑥
	
This means the water staying the same sub-period is 𝑥𝜌(𝑥) and the water stored to the other sub-period 
is 𝑥(1 − 𝜌 𝑥 ). That means, 
𝑥𝜌(𝑥) =
𝑥 𝑖𝑓	0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋
𝑋 𝑖𝑓	𝑋 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋 + 𝑆
(𝑥 − 𝑆) 𝑖𝑓	𝑥 > 𝑋 + 𝑆
	
And, 
𝑥(1 − 𝜌 𝑥 ) =
0 𝑖𝑓	0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋
𝑥 − 𝑋 𝑖𝑓	𝑋 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋 + 𝑆




Obviously, the system operator could use past data and her experience to calibrate 𝜌. Conversely, the 
calibration process could suggest several splitting stages for either 𝜌. Even though it has defined a set of 
linear splitting rules, the final solution for the two sub-period incremental arrivals flows for a node 
would be non-linear. The best split depends on the relative sizes of the flow split between the sub-
periods. This method may not suitable in the CDDP because the expected arrival split between sub-
periods will depend on the split choices made both above and below a node. However, a simple but 
hard splitting method to allocate/store the flows arriving in different sub-periods may not provide 
sufficient flexibility to the system operator to meet the time-of-use demands efficiently. Therefore, in 
the following section we introduce a relatively dynamic incremental flow splitting weight function.       
8.3.4. Time-of-use Demand Curve for Release with Intermediate Storages     
The main objective of this section is to develop CDDP computational routines to construct the time-of-
use nodal demand curves considering the intermediate storing of water and release delays. The CDDP 
ends up forming a 2-dimensional marginal water value surface for the leaf node. Thus, this section does 
not get past processing the leaf node.	  
The effect of these intermediate storages in a hydro-catchment is illustrated using a series of nodes (see 
Figure 8-9). Two sub-periods are modelled: day and night. The RHS tree represents the processing 
direction (against the stream flow direction, towards the reservoir).  Horizontal (checked) arrows 
between the sub-period nodes (day-night) represent the net storage transfers (see figure below). Each 




Figure 8-9. Temporary flow buffering facilities in a single reservoir nodal catchment network and the time of 
use nodal tree processing.  
Step 1 explains how to construct the composite time of use demand curves for different day and night 
upstream release combinations, and the step 2 subsequently forms the marginal value surface for the 
intermediate storage. Finally, step 3 describes how to construct the above marginal water value surfaces 
if a flow splitting method is applied to imply release delays using the extended time-of-use CDDP 
procedure.  
The next section describes how to construct the composite nodal time-of-use demand curve firstly 
ignoring the storage upper bounds and later when storage capacity limits are binding.   
Let 𝑥{ and 𝑥ç represent upstream sub-period releases. 𝒟 denotes the composite nodal time-of-use 
demand curve. 𝛿Ú denotes the upper bounds of the intermediate storage 𝑖.  
8.3.5. Constructing the Demand Curve for Release from the Time-of-use Demand Curves  
Let 𝑛𝑏{,à, 𝑛𝑏ç,à represent the day and night demand curves for water at the node 𝑛 (a leaf node). 
Ideally, all flows from upstream would be available to meet both  𝑛𝑏{ and 𝑛𝑏ç. But in the real world, 
there are limits on what can be transferred via intermediate storage to the more desirable sub-period 
(typically, day). With unrestricted intermediate storage at node n, node n–1 would see a net demand 
curve formed by combining the day and night demand curves for node n. Let 𝒟à = 𝑛𝑏{+>𝑛𝑏ç	 denote 
the intermediate storage unrestricted cumulative time-of-use demand curve for flow at a node 𝑛 formed 
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by horizontally adding time-of-use demand curves for flows (see Figure 8-10). For example, if  𝑛𝑏𝒟,à 
and 𝑛𝑏ç,à denote day and night sub-period demand curves at the last node 𝑛 respectively, inverse 
addition of these demand curves will produce the composite time-of-use demand curve for flows 𝒟à at 
node 𝑛.     
 
Figure 8-10. Composite time-of-use demand curve for flows representing day and night demands of node 𝑛. 𝐷à 
denotes the full bid stack when the intermediate storage constraints are not binding.  
With no delay between nodes 𝑛 − 1 and 𝑛, each step of the combined net demand curve could be met 
with a flow in the sub-period of that demand, or with a flow in the other sub-period which is stored until 
needed. For this unrestricted case the marginal value is read directly from 𝐷à based on the combined 
day-night flow. The upstream net-demand curves will be the same for day and night. 
8.3.6. Constructing the Marginal Water Value Surface: Corner Solutions 
When the intermediate storage has a restrictive capacity (e.g. 𝛿àÚ), we may not be able to represent 
the composite day-night demand curve as a merit ordered stack of day and night demands. Storage 
capacity constraints together with sub-period upstream release determine how many demands to be met 
during that sub-period, or stored for the next sub-period.  
Suppose 𝑥{ = 0,1,2,3 … . , 𝑥ç = 0,1,2,3, …  denote any day and night upstream releases. Upstream 
release flows in a particular sub-period (e.g., day with 𝑥{) are in principle allocated to meet the time-
of-use demands in that sub-period (e.g., day). Suppose there are relatively high demands in the other 
sub-period (e.g., night). The day release flows could meet some of that sub-period’s demands via the 
intermediate storage. This sub-period flow transfer continues until the upper capacity bound is 
constrained. 𝒟à denotes the updated composite demand curve subject to the upper storage bounds 
𝑥{, 𝑥ç ≤ 𝛿àÚ for any incremental sub-period arriving flow (an arriving flow enters into an arc in any 
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For example, let us arbitrarily assume an intermediate storage capacity of 𝛿Ú = 4 units. We will 
show how to construct the updated demand curves 𝒟, for each successive upstream sub-period 
incremental flow. To begin with we assume all flows arrive in a single subperiod, day or night only.  
 
Figure 8-11. Time-of-use demand curves with incremental day / night incoming flow arrivals. 
Let us consider the demand curve 𝐷à in in the first row of Figure 8-10, which repeats the composite 
𝑑𝑐𝑟 of Figure 8.9, and consider how we might utilise day-time arrivals. The first three day arrival units 
meet the high (day) demands (hashed rectangles). The fourth incoming unit is allocated for the first 
night bid (solid black rectangle) and will be transferred via the intermediate storage. We continue the 
process of either meeting day demands or transferring flow units to meet night demands until the 
transfer reaches the upper storage bounds. Beyond this no storage transfer is feasible because the upper 
storage constraint is binding. Thus, any upstream day flows can only be used to meet day-time 
demands, or spilled, as shown in the LHS diagram, in the second row of Figure 8-12: the “𝒟 𝑞|0  
demand curve for daytime arrivals, assuming night-time release of 0”. The RHS demand curve diagram 
is constructed similarly, showing the “demand curve for night-time arrivals, assuming daytime release 
of 0”. These curves represent the corner solutions of problem. That is the initial row and column 
marginal water values.  
The demand curves constructed here assume no flow in the other sub-period. To account for flows in 
both sub-periods the algorithm next systematically constructs marginal water value curves considering 
sub-period incoming releases one at a time starting with the corner solutions.  For the interest of clarity, 
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we further explain this step using a numerical example. To set the platform, the following executes the 
previous step to create numerical values attached to a set of composite time-of-use marginal water 
values.  
8.3.7. CDDP Procedure for Filling-in and Corner Solutions 
This section presents the time-of-use CDDP procedure that finds corner marginal water values and the 
filling-in marginal water values of a nodal demand surface. 
Notation 
𝑖 = 0,1,2,3 …: Integer	
𝑟{, 𝑟ç:  Flows releasing from an arc in a sub-period (day, night) 
𝑟Ú:  Maximum release in a cycle. 
𝑛𝑏{, 𝑛𝑏ç: Day and night marginal water values  
𝑥{, 𝑥ç:  Arriving inflows into an arc in a sub-period (day, night) 
𝛿{ç, 	𝛿ç{: Day-night and night-day transfer storages 
𝛿Ú:  Maximum intermediate storage 
Initialization  
Form	𝒟	using	𝑛𝑏ç	&	𝑛𝑏{  
Set	𝑥ç = 𝑥{ = 0	, 	𝛿ç{ = 𝛿{ç = 0, 𝑖 = 0  
Beginning	of	procedure 	
While	𝑖 < 	 𝛿Ú + 𝑟Ú 	Do  
  If	𝒟 𝑖 	is	𝑟{	then  
   𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑥ç, 𝑖 ← 𝒟 𝑖  
   𝛿ç{ = 𝛿ç{ + 1 
   If	𝛿ç{ ≤ 𝛿Ú	then 
      𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑥ç, 𝑗 ← 	𝒟 𝑗 	for	𝑗 ≤ 𝑖	 
   Else		𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑥ç, 𝑗 ← 	𝑛𝑏{ 𝑗 	for	𝑗 > 𝑖 or	𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙  
   𝑥ç = 𝑥ç + 1 
  Else	𝒟 𝑖 	is	𝑟ç 
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𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑖, 𝑥{ ← 𝒟 𝑖  
   𝛿{ç = 𝛿{ç + 1 
   If	𝛿{ç ≤ 𝛿Ú	then 
      𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑗, 𝑥{ ← 	𝒟 𝑗 	for	𝑗 ≤ 𝑖	 
   Else		𝑚𝑤𝑣 𝑗, 𝑥{ ← 	𝑛𝑏ç 𝑗 	for	𝑗 > 𝑖 or	𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙  
   𝑥ç = 𝑥ç + 1 
  End	if  𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1 
 End	do 
End	of	procedure. 
The next section is about a numerical example for constructing the marginal water value surfaces for 
the two sub-period release flows at the leaf node 𝑛.	
8.3.8. Numerical Illustration of the Time-of-use CDDP Procedure 
This section explains how to find corner solutions and filling-in solutions of the demand surface for the 
leaf node using the above CDDP procedure assuming hypothetical data. This section assumes no 
release flow delays.  
8.3.8.1. How to Find Corner Solutions?  
To start with, the algorithm constructs the composite time-of-use demand curve for an unrestricted 
intermediate storage with the assumption that there is no delay. Suppose a set of consumptive (e.g. 
urban use) day and night demands for flows are attached to this node. The third row of Figure 8-12 
forms the composite time-of-use demand curve by re-arranging the prices of the first (night demands) 
and second (day demands) rows in their merit order.  
The composite time-of-use demand curve 𝐷à is constructed from individual sub-period bid stacks 
shown by two free standing night and day price lists (rows 1 and 2). Row 3 contains composite time-of-
use marginal water values ignoring any storage upper bounds. Row 4 and 5 denote the net sub-period 




Figure 8-12. Constructing the composite time-of-use demand curve for flows and the day-night transfer 
schedules. 
The storage transfer schedule is prepared assuming all upstream flows arrive only in the night (see row 
number 4). That is, we determine the storage required to meet the demand in the order shown in row 3 
if all flows arrive at night. In this example, the first three night-time incoming flow units will be 
transferred to the intermediate storage to meet the three highest value daytime demands, valued at  
1024, 512 and 256. The fourth increment meets the first night-time demand, valued at ‘200’. The next 
three flow units also meet the night-time demands, valued at 180, 160 and 140 respectively. Now the 
algorithm comes to the next cell ‘128’ which is a day-time demand. So the 8th flow increment will be 
transferred to the storage.  
Similarly, the fifth row shows the net day-to-night transfer schedule assuming all upstream releases 
occur during the day. Once more, the first three day demands are met by the incoming flows and the 
fourth unit is transferred to meet the first night demand. Subsequent flow increments (e.g., 2, 3, and 4) 
will be transferred to meet the rest of the night-time demands, valued at 180, 160, and 140 respectively. 
The algorithm completes the two rows (4 and 5) in a similar manner to construct the net night-day and 
net day-night transfer schedules.  
8.3.8.2. How to find fill-in solutions? 
Generally, the procedure has to (1) consider different sub-period release combinations and (2) the 
storage capacity bounds when deciding the net sub-period transfers (or storage balance). Let us now 
assume an upper bound for the intermediate storage. Suppose that the maximum capacity of 
intermediate storage is 𝛿Ú = 4, and that upstream release in each sub-period starts with 0 flow units, 
and could incrementally increase to a maximum flow of 11 units. The time-of-use CDDP now 
computes the 2 dimensional night-to-day and day-to-night flow transfer schedule for different sub-
1024 512 256 200 160 140 128 120 100 80 64 60 40 32 20 16 8 4 2 1180 0
1 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 10 113 11
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period releases. This is shown in Figure 8-14. For the example, the first row (which partly corresponds 
to the 5th row in Figure 8-12) can be interpreted as night transfers when the only upstream flows arrive 
during the day time. However, this transfer of flows is stopped beyond the 7th day arrival unit because 
the storage constraint becomes biding. The net day-night transfers are shown by negative integers in 
Figure 8-13. Thus, all the day time arrivals beyond 7 units are allocated for day demands in the 
composite demand curve 𝐷à and 16
th unit onwards will be spilled (see row 1). Further, the second row 
of Figure 8-13 denotes night transfers when arrivals are occurring in the day-time but given one unit of 
night flow. The second iteration 𝑖 = 2 corresponds to the construction of the second row if the release is 
to meet a day demand.  
 
Figure 8-13. Storage balance diagram 
The CDDP procedure systematically fills all the cells in the storage balance (volume) matrix based on 
the composite demand curve 𝐷à. Positive values (in hashed and dotted cells) represent the night to day 
transfers and negative values (in shaded cells) indicate the day to night transfers. We have not 
illustrated the storage balances beyond 16 units arriving in either sub-period, as any arrivals beyond 15 
units will be spilled. Procedure increments 𝑖 to its next integer value to construct remaining rows in the 
matrix. 
By carefully observing the transfer volume patterns, we could identify a more efficient method to fill 
these points without simply repeating the above procedure. That is, the composite demand curve 𝐷à is 
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not needed to fill the cells once the storage constraint binds. At that point the algorithm only has to use 
respective sub-period demand curve to complete the remaining cells in the matrix (see Figure 8-14).      
 
Figure 8-14. Efficient construction of the storage schedule 
So that we could use the same approach to construct the time-of-use marginal water value surfaces for 
the intermediate storage.  
Figure 8-15 illustrates the marginal demand surface matrix 𝜑à. Conceptually, the procedure has to 
construct two marginal water value surfaces for each sub-period node. However, the two surfaces 
coincide perfectly on each other because both surfaces are constructed from the same composite 
demand curve 𝐷à. That is the procedure constructs the same marginal water value surface regardless as 
to whether it is constructed by row or column. The grey coloured cells denote night bid prices and 
uncoloured cells denote day bid prices. The algorithm systematically selects appropriate marginal 
values from the composite time-of-use marginal water value set (see Row 3 in Figure 8-12) for 




Figure 8-15. Time-of-use marginal water value matrix for incremental night and day flow arrivals at node 𝑛. 
In the example, the cell (4, 8) in 𝜑à interprets the marginal water value corresponding to the 4
th 
incremental day-time flow arrival, given the 8 units of night-time arrivals subject to storage capacity 
limits. The first row and first column of the matrix represent the highest possible day and night sub-
period demand curves, respectively. In both cases, the first three upstream day flows meet the demands 
(day) ‘1024’, ‘512’ and ‘256’, and the fourth to seventh units meet the highest valued night-time 
demands transferred. In the daytime arrival case, the capacity constraint 𝛿Ú = 4 is then binding and 
no more units could be transferred. As a result, any further day flow arrivals could only meet daytime 
demands. Similarly, in the case of no day releases (see column 1), night arrivals beyond 8 units can 
only meet night-time demands. The night-time flow arrival increments 1, 2, 3 and 8 are transferred to 
the storage to meet the day-time demands valued at ‘1024’, ‘512’, ‘256’ and ‘128’ respectively. In the 
example, the cells or the grid points 4, 0 , 4, 1 , 4, 2 , … . . (4, 22)  in 𝜑à indicate the set of night 
time marginal water values or the night-time demand curve given 4 units of day-flows subject to the 
storage bounds. 
The next step explains additional processing step requires if a flow splitting method is used to represent 
the release delays. Hence the algorithm has to employ an interpolating technique to compute each 
marginal water value.  
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8.3.9. CDDP Procedure with Release Flow Delays and Intermediate Storage Water Values  
This step explains how to construct the marginal value surface for intermediate storage of water, 𝜑à 
using a suitable day-night flow splitting ratio that represents release delays. This simply combines the 
weighted marginal water values of the above demand surface and the current surface as they occur at 
different points in the process. Then the following is described for the sake of completeness. 
For example, applying a symmetrical day-to-day and day-to-night transfer weight (e.g. 0.5:0.5) could 
be computationally simple and straight forward compared to other weights. Suppose transfer weights 
take the ratio of 0.75:0.25. For example, high day release (12, 0) is split to 9 (day) and 3 (night) 
arrivals. The night flow arrivals meet night demands ‘200’,’180’ and ‘160’ respectively. Four day 
arrivals can be transferred to meet night demands ‘140’,’120’,’100’ and ‘80’ and remaining day arrivals 
meet day demands from ‘1024’ to ‘64’. Similarly, release combination (16,0) is split into (12,4) and 
computing 𝜑à 12,4  may not straight forward as in the previous case because the two corresponding 
sub-period marginal water values are not equal. The last marginal water value values of the day, and the 
night sub-periods are ‘8’ and ‘60’ respectively. Hence, the algorithm updates the marginal value using a 
simple interpolation technique: 𝜑à 16,0 = 0.75	𝜑à 12,4 + 0.25	𝜑à 9,4 = 21. Assume a unit 
increment of day arrival from (12,0). According to the flow splitting rule, this extra unit is formed from 
0.25 night flow units (e.g., 𝜑à 9,4 ) and 0.75 day flow units (e.g., 𝜑à 10,4 ). So the uses numerical 
techniques to determine the new marginal water value: 𝜑à 13,0 = 0.25	𝜑à 9,4 + 0.75	𝜑à 10,4 =
39. Each and every point of the marginal value surface for storage delays 𝜑à could be computed step 
by step for incremental day/night arrivals. 
8.3.10. Processing Upstream Nodes and Arcs 
The CDDP version developed in the previous section constructed a two-dimensional net demand 
surfaces at node 𝑛 using a one-dimensional composite demand curve. The CDDP algorithm would then 
proceed to pass these demand surfaces up to node 𝑛 − 1. The day and night marginal water value 
surfaces would first be adjusted by the non-consumptive demands between the nodes 𝑛 − 1 and 𝑛. Then 
the algorithm processes the time-of-use consumptive/distributary demands (if any) at node 𝑛 − 1. With 
that, the procedure now has the two marginal water value surfaces (probably different to each other) for 
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the two sub-period nodes 𝑛 − 1 . Unlike in the situation for node n, the procedure now has to deal 
with two different marginal water value surfaces rather than a single 1-D composite demand curve to 
compute the sub-period flow transfers if there is an intermediate storage. Therefore the upstream 
processing (beyond node 𝑛) is likely to be computationally complicated and expensive because the 
CDDP procedure has to deal with a series of 2-D surfaces for each sub-period node on its way to the 
reservoir node.  
In summary, these two dimensional constructions seem overly complex when the outcome sought is a 
one-dimensional demand curve for release from the reservoir. The time-of-use CDDP approach could 
require additional computational resources with the power of the number of sub-periods and nodes to 
produce large amounts of useful (or sometimes redundant) hypothetical nodal solutions regarding 
optimal trade-offs within the system. The value of such detailed insights to the final outcome appears 
questionable, and so the CDDP approach does not appear to be tractable or useful in this circumstance.  
A parametric LP can be solved without having to deal with multi-dimensional curves as in the above 
CDDP problem. The computational effort is restricted as there is just a single parameter to adjust. Thus, 
a parametric LP could be a suitable candidate to solve this problem efficiently to produce the required 
single dimensional demand curve, as explained by Read and George (1998). Thus, the cyclic sub-period 
approach could be useful for an LP144.     
8.4. Chapter Conclusions 
The first part of this chapter, formulated the release delay and storage transfer problem using a 
deterministic LP model assuming the run-of-river type hydropower plants with relatively small and 
temporary storage facilities. An intermediate storage stores water for the next sub-period use but not 
beyond that. The LP deals with time-of-use demands and release delays. A cyclic sub-period LP model 
seems practically appealing over the sequential sub-period LP model. Then we develop some CDDP 
computational routines to address the intermediate storage and release delay issues. Unfortunately, 
these developments were ultimately unsuccessful. Main concern was the dimensionality problem of the 
sub-period solutions and subsequently, the amount of computational resource usage compared with 
																																								 																				
144 On the other hand, the modeller could increase the number of sub-periods (e.g., hourly, 6 hourly) within a short 
planning horizon (e.g., two days, one week) and then use the results to construct 𝑑𝑐𝑟s for the CDDP model. 
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other convex optimization techniques. However, the time-of-use CDDP development does provide 




9. Conclusions and perspectives 
Conclusions and Perspectives   
9.1. Introduction 
In this thesis we investigate market-based mechanisms to allocate storable surface water among 
competing users in a single or two-reservoir mixed-use catchment. Here, we outline a summary of our 
research, following the order of the thesis chapters and highlighting the implications of key 
developments, possible model extensions, and areas for further research.     
9.2. LP/SLP-based Water Market Clearing Models   
Chapter 3 developed a market clearing formulation to manage hydrology dependent surface water 
supplies, where consumptive and/or non-consumptive use occurs in a network, with storage. 
Participants bid, presumably reflecting their marginal use values, are assumed to be cleared by a 
benefit-maximizing optimization, such as Linear Programming (LP) or stochastic Linear Programming 
(SLP). With an SLP, one could make the system modelling as complex as desired, and could also make 
participant bids conditional on a spectrum of hydrology (e.g. reservoir inflow with rainfall events in the 
catchment, temperature), and/or economic factors.  
Section 3.3 lays out a deterministic multi-period LP primal/dual centrally coordinated water market 
clearing model. This helps us to present a price analysis and discuss issues such as allocating costs and 
payments associated with shared resources and impacts of uncertainty. The aggregated net demand 
curve reflects the maximum quantity that each participant is willing to supply or consume, at a 
particular marginal cost/benefit. In Section 3.5, we were able to formulate centrally coordinated market 
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model (primal and dual) that clears water under uncertainty, based on marginal water values expressed 
by participants.  
Using the price analysis in Section 3.3.3, we were able to show how the resource constraints included in 
the LP/SLP models affect market prices. The above creates both locational and temporal price 
differences, and causes the market to accumulate a “settlement surplus” of rents associated with 
resource constraints such as storage bounds, arc flow bounds and inflow. Hence, the market design 
should include mechanisms to deal with the prices associated with these constraints. 
Finally, Chapter 3 used a Shapley value-based method to apportion infra-marginal benefits between 
multiple non-consumptive users on the same arc in the water market context. We were able to show that 
the method minimises incentives for some users to take advantage of their physical positioning in the 
network relative to users who are prepared to pay more to increase flows. But, detailed investigation of 
gaming issues lies outside the scope of this thesis.	
9.3. Water Hedging Instruments 
Chapter 4 focuses on market arrangements to manage surface water supplies, where consumptive 
and/or non-consumptive use occurs in a network, with storage under uncertain inflows referring to the 
dual LP/SLP models formulated in Chapter 3. Constraints and bounds create price differences between 
locations, and time periods, and cause the market to accumulate a “settlement surplus” of rents 
associated with resource constraints. Chapter 4 then draws on the Financial Transmission Right (FTR) 
concepts developed for electricity markets to outline a general structure of financial hedging 
instruments. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of hedging has not previously been studied in the 
water market literature. We describe a range of financial products, based on a typical spot physical 
water market clearing, that hedgers would be free to trade in secondary markets or in an integrated 
market. A specific hedging instrument is developed for each component in the reservoir system, and we 
examine the extent to which these financial instruments can be supported by the revenue collected by 
the market manager as “settlement surplus”, as FTRs are supported in electricity markets.   
First, a Financial Inflow Right (FIR) is priced as a Financial Water Right, which is a generic kind of 
market trading instrument. An FIR gives a right to a proportion of future inflows and this leaves the 
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holder facing the volume uncertainty. An FIR provides the holder the rights to water expected to flow 
into a storage reservoir. Fixed volume FIRs expose the SO if the expected inflows do not realise. An 
index-based FIR provides the holder the right to receive a volume of inflows (or FWRs), with that 
volume being proportional to the inflow received. So the holder faces the volume risks herself, and the 
SO does not. The participants would be required to hold FIRs together with the other system capacity 
rights such as FSRs and ACRs to meet their trading requirements. 
Second, a Financial Storage Right (FSR)/Financial Storage Option (FSO) can be used to hedge against 
temporal price risks associated with the supply system constraint rents. Financial Storage Rights (FSRs) 
refund inter-temporal storage marginal price differences and could be in the form of an obligation-
inclusive right or an option.  
The obligation inclusive FSRs would protect participants against exposure to supply system rent 
uncertainty. Deterministic FSRs could be funded by storage capacity congestion rents. In the case of 
stochastic FSRs, we were only able to show revenue adequacy in expectation. For stochastic FSRs, 
though, the expected future revenue adequacy is only met for the conditional expected residual FSR 
pay-out requirement, over the future market horizon145. Moreover, it is possible to issue fresh FSRs, at 
any given time, up to the unsubscribed reservoir capacity for the any future period in the remaining 
market horizon. If one could write off/up losses/gains on existing FSRs, expected future revenue 
adequacy is met for the portfolio of new and residual FSRs. Theoretically, this implies that the SO has 
the same assurance of expected future revenue adequacy for its portfolio of new and residual FSRs, as 
if she was starting fresh. In reality, though, the SO has less opportunity act in such a purely rational 
manner. Instead, the FSR issuance policy may be significantly impacted by the gains or losses 
accumulated to date. But, detail analysis of this issue lies outside the scope of Section 4.3. 
Fixed volume FSRs proposed in Chapter 4 are fundamentally incompatible with indexed based FIRs. 
Unfortunately, a combination of the two will not fully insulate holders from the impact of inflow 
uncertainties. Section 4.3.3 quotes Read (2016), who suggests that this is only what we should expect, 
because the owner of physical storage capacity could not expect any greater certainty than that provided 
																																								 																				
145  Where the conditional expectations of both rents and pay-outs are taken at the same event node. 
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by these hedging instruments. “True” marginal water value is not actually known at the time these FSRs 
are settled. Read proposes the “retrospective” storage rights (RSRs) to cover the implications of the 
incompatibility between FIRs and FSRs. The RSR valuation and settlement can be deferred until the 
end of the horizon, when all uncertainty has been resolved. As a result, SO would not be exposed to 
risks. This implies that the actual water value at any node along that path will also be known, depending 
on whether storage actually did reach its bounds.  
Section 4.3.3.2 also explores the concept of FSR-option contracts, representing a right to store water, 
with no obligation to do so. Again, this is more akin to the rights implied by ownership of physical 
storage capacity. But, detailed investigation of such concepts lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
Finally, like in the case of supply system rents, the SO collects transmission/distribution system rents 
associated with arc capacity constraints, in the settlement surplus. Section 4.4 focuses on distribution 
system rents and rights. Instead of using node-to-node FDRs similar to FTRs, this section proposes Arc 
Capacity Rights (ACRs). An ACR could be defined as analogues to the Flow Gate Right (FGRs) in 
electricity markets. ACRs could be applied to hedge against the flow congestion price risks, for an arc 
in the network.  
In the absence of loop flow problems, ACRs are equivalent to node-to-node rights between adjacent 
nodes and a series of ACRs could construct a “node-to-node” right. Section 4.4 discussed the 
implications of ACRs in the context of three scenarios.  
§ Consumptive benefits only scenario: The settlement surplus can only fund node-to-node ACRs 
up to the minimum of the arc capacities, in the relevant direction. The negative rents are 
associated with minimum flow requirements in the forward direction.  
§ Non-consumptive costs and consumptive benefits scenario: The ACR hedges against both the 
capacity constraint rent risk and the variation in the marginal non-consumptive cost. In general, 
the revenue adequacy is met because it is unlikely to have any “environmental” flow 
requirement in the pumped channel.  
§ Non-consumptive benefits and consumptive benefits scenario: The revenue adequacy is met 
provided that the SO has not issued too many ACRs. In both cases, the revenue adequacy may 
be improved by setting the strike price to a higher value but, it cannot be guaranteed for 
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contract volumes outside the physical flow range without knowing the offer prices. Section 
4.4.3 also recommends the possibility of using put/non-standard exotic option ACRs to handle 
situations such as minimum in-stream flows, linked to both electricity and water prices, perhaps 
packaged into obligation-inclusive ACR rights.  
Lastly, while Chapter 4 considered a mix of rights that could be created and traded independently, they 
could also be combined to form “slice of system” rights that give proportional shares of inflow, storage, 
and release capacity, allowing development of a “swing option” based virtual reservoir management 
approach, as described by Barroso et al., (2012). This method creates contractual mechanisms and then 
improves the level of competition when the incumbent parties will be reluctant to accept the solutions 
produced by a central optimization. 
The contractual mechanisms developed in this chapter deserve consideration by policy makers as these 
mechanisms provide a wide range of choices to enhance the benefits of competition in multi-used hydro 
catchments. 
9.4. Intra-period Single Reservoir Nodal Market Clearing Models 
The contribution of Chapter 5 is the development of new intra-period market clearing pre-computation 
models for allocating water among consumptive and non-consumptive uses located over a tree 
structured water network. Unlike the previous CDDP developments reported in the literature, the 
presented intra-period CDDP procedure determines the optimal solution by re-ordering and/or adjusting 
marginal benefits at every node and arc across the network. This moves the demand curves towards the 
reservoir and finally constructs the demand curve for release (𝑑𝑐𝑟) for a single reservoir multi-nodal 
mixed-use catchment.  
The nodal CDDP developed generates a relatively large amount of market information at user, node and 
arc levels that can be used to backtrack the entire process (if required) to investigate price changes 
across space and time from the point of market clearing. The strength of this approach is the ability to 
incorporate the underlying complex reservoir network system components into the optimization model, 
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while preserving the simplicity of the market clearing algorithm. So market models could be 
implemented in any single reservoir multi-use catchment146.     
The intra-period CDDP pre-computes the whole intra-period 𝑑𝑐𝑟, for use in higher level optimisation 
and/or simulation models, unlike an SLP which only produces a solution for the current start point. It 
decomposes the optimization into a sequence of single period trade-offs between the benefits of 
immediate release and then to be used in the stochastic CDDP to determine the expected benefits of 
storage. So it could be easily plugged into the single reservoir stochastic CDDP model, to construct the 
beginning-of-period 𝑑𝑐𝑠 for a single reservoir network system, under different release policy 
assumptions.  
In combination, the intra-period and inter-period models provide a set of market mechanisms to trade 
storable surface water in the present, through a spot market, and also to determine how much to store 
for the future, in a stochastic environment. By way of contrast, current “smart” markets, e.g. for 
electricity, are typically cleared using deterministic optimization models (e.g., Linear Programming 
(LP)). Long-term inter-temporal storage and inflow uncertainty are typically ignored because there is 
no inter-temporal storage within the market infrastructure. But water systems are different, in this 
respect, and participants are likely to want at least indicative future water allocations to be produced by 
inter-temporal market clearing models. In that context dealing with uncertainty becomes a major issue 
for market clearing. That is, this thesis has chosen the storage to be included within the market147.  
Finally, in Section 5.7, we were able to deploy the intra-period CDDP procedure to iteratively estimate 
and adjust the spatial return flow contributions to the downstream tributaries in the current period 
depending on the upstream consumptive and distributary off-takes.           
																																								 																				
146 As discussed in Chapter 3, the intra-period CDDP optimises a single reservoir water network and this can be 
used for clearing a market generating a large amount of useful market information. This produces all of the 
information required in the inter-period CDDP sub-problems without re-optimising or parametric programming of 
the CDDP applied over space rather than time. This motivated us to develop intra-period CDDP procedure even 
though an LP-based method can easily model multiple reservoirs and a non-tree network. 




9.5. Single Reservoir Nodal CDDP Model for Environmental Applications 
Chapter 6 shows how to adapt the intra-period multi-node CDDP algorithm, using node/arc level 
manipulations, to address uses with water-mixing requirements.  
If water is returned to the river after being used for cooling a thermal power plant, cooling and 
temperature control flow demands may be represented as parallel arcs assuming that an upstream flow 
unit can be diverted to any arc of our choice (e.g., controlled splitting). But other types of flow splitting 
methods such as constant, and variable are discussed. 
In some cases, recreational, environmental and power generation, benefits may all arise simultaneously 
from the same flow. We observe that the controlled flow splitting method could be applied in a variety 
of situations in which flow mixing is important. When the flow is split in a constant ratio, where the 
splitting ratio is defined as the probability, each tiny increment would flow one way or the other. The 
resulting combined net-demand curve is found by vertically adding adjusted net-demand curves for the 
parallel arcs flows. The splitting ratio could change based on the upstream flow level. So the above 
method can be extended for higher number of splits.  
The novelty here lies mainly in the application of an offer based flow splitting method to the issue of 
diverting environmental flows in a water market context. Better estimated offer curves, or well 
calibrated splitting devices, could give the policy maker precise control, over how the environmental 
flows are diverted. The offer based flow splitting technique could be applied in similar situations such 
as dilution of polluted water flows. We were able to demonstrate how net benefits can be increased by 
accounting for the demand curve for cooling water, across all hydrology conditions and time periods.       
9.6. Two-reservoir CDDP Model 
In Chapter 7 the intra/inter period CDDP framework is extended to assess the marginal value of water 
stored in two inter-connected reservoirs in a mixed-use catchment. As before, optimization of the 
jointly operated two-reservoir system is decomposed into a set of sub-problems in order to study the 
nature of demand surfaces underlying each sub-problem.  
§ A “low level” intra-period CDDP constructs the demand surface for “transfer” on the inter-
reservoir chain, which is constructed in the preceding step by reducing the sub-trees leading from 
the inter-reservoir nodes applying the single reservoir nodal CDDP developed in Chapter 5.  
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§ Then a “higher level” (inter-period) CDDP could determine the trade-off between future storage 
demands, the current period (net) releases to the inter-reservoir chain, and other direct sub-trees.  
Firstly, the inter-reservoir chain sub-problem seeks to maximise the inter-reservoir chain benefits by 
maximising benefits strictly of the set of nodes and arcs that form the chain between the two reservoirs 
including the reservoir nodes and accounting for benefits from the subtrees connected to nodes but not 
those connected to the reservoirs. The scale of this problem depends on the number of inter-reservoir 
nodes and the number of sub-trees leading from them.  
Secondly, the inter-reservoir chain transfer problem provides the maximum possible inter-reservoir 
chain benefit given release from the upstream reservoir, and outflow into the downstream reservoir. The 
scale of this problem can significantly increase if a large number of inter-reservoir consumptive 
demands are to be processed. A CDDP solution method constructs the demand surface for transfer in 
“strips”, where each strip corresponds to either a critical downstream marginal water value that induces 
a downstream versus inter-reservoir demand swap, or a critical marginal price difference between the 
two reservoirs. 
Finally, the notion of CDDP curve adding could be performed implicitly via a contour based approach 
that produces the demand surface for storages.  
Price-quantity manipulation in four dimensional spaces sometimes makes it challenging to illustrate 
how the above two methods form respective demand surfaces. Having said that, the above concepts 
could be better understood as “strip” based demand surfaces for transfer, and as projected ‘manifolds’ 
of the demand surfaces on to different planes.  The notion of creating the demand surface for transfer 
deserves consideration as providing a greater insight to the intra-period two-reservoir optimization 
problem. We note that a contour based demand curve adding method has been developed, and could be 
improved further, to allow some higher level understanding of the two-reservoir trade-off future storage 
demands, the current period (net) releases to the inter-reservoir chain, and other direct sub-trees.   
On the other hand, to achieve the most efficient implementation of two-reservoir CDDP, issues such as 
generating non-critical contours, consistently tracking guidelines for contours containing areas, 
degenerate solutions, keeping track of accurate demand surface approximations, and stochastic 
implementation require further research. 
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9.7. Multi-dimensional Intra-period CDDP Extensions 
Chapter 8 explores multi-dimensional CDDP extensions to deal with intra-period time-of-use bidding, 
and the modelling of transportation/release delays in a water market setting, and temporary, relatively 
small, intermediate storages.  
However, developing a CDDP beyond the leaf node is not practical possible due to the dimensionality 
problem of the sub-period solutions. We have continued to develop the sub-period CDDP models 
despite being unsuccessful progressing beyond the leaf node due to the dimensionality issues of the 
sub-period solutions, as they provide useful insights about time of use of water to modelers and river-
chain operators.  
By way of contrast, an equivalent LP formulation could solve the short-term nodal chain optimization 
problem with transportation delays, without having to deal with dimensionality issues. We were able to 
develop the cyclic sub-period LP to model the time-of-use demands and release delays.  
The release delay CDDP procedure creates time-of-use demand curves for all nodes, accounting for 
flow delays but assuming “run-of-river” operations, with no intermediate storage capacity at the nodes. 
The release delay CDDP procedure builds up a multi-dimensional nodal marginal value surface by 
considering incremental sub-period flow arrivals under the intermediate storage capacity constraints. 
We also construct a time-of-use demand surface.  
Our conclusion is that the developments in this chapter have failed to show a significant promise, in 
terms of efficiently solving the time-of-use release and storage delay problems and it consumes 
considerable computational resources in implementation. Therefore, it is not recommended that this 
method is pursued further due to the growing complexity of multi-dimensional time-of-use models, not 
to mention the large amount of information (sometimes redundant) it generates.  
9.8. General Conclusions and Research Directions 
One major contribution of this thesis is the development of a range of financial instruments that can be 
used to hedge risk due to hydrological or economic uncertainty, and could either be traded in a centrally 
coordinated water market, or in secondary markets. We have also developed intra-period nodal CDDP 
models in this thesis to perform offer-based constrained water allocation among price-taking 
consumptive, non-consumptive and environmental users located at the nodes and arcs across a tree 
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structured network, in a single reservoir catchment. And, we have shown how to extend that nodal 
CDDP to construct the demand surfaces for catchments with two reservoirs.  
Further extensions have been studied, but with only mixed success. Dimensionality issues preclude 
development in some directions, and the most efficient implementation approach is unclear in others. 
We are motivated, though, to explore avenues to use the stochastic CDDP to model/simulate how a 
market responds to stochastic inflows influenced by el niňo-la niňa weather patterns. This might be 
modelled, perhaps, by assuming a hidden Markov chain. We also note that, while the current model 
includes hydro generators among its non-consumptive users, the electricity market price is still treated 
as external. A fully integrated electricity-water market model with a constrained river network model 
could be usefully investigated in the future.  
Finally, our study also suggests broad research directions such as market power issues in a water 
contract market, issues of auction design, trading water under uncertainty, locational and temporal 
management of storages, infrastructure investment, and asset ownership issues. Future research might 
investigate this by using both standard oligopoly models and simulating the market assuming self-
learning users. Such models could, perhaps, be based on the works of Newbery (2012), and Krause & 
Andersson (2006). An agent based method could be used to simulate market behaviour using our 
proposed models by iteratively modelling individual bids/bid adjustments. Such methods could study 
issues such as gaming, and risk aversion in spot/forward and derivative markets. Further, this could 
extend to investigate issues such as asset ownership regimes (private, public, and joint) and ownership 
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Appendix V  
Table A5.1. Weekly inflow patterns 
 Number of weeks 
Hydrology 
state 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Low  48 60 60 48 40 56 40 40 48 36 60 32 48 
Medium 72 64 64 48 40 60 72 60 52 40 64 44 52 
High 84 80 80 60 72 60 72 72 64 72 64 48 64 
 Number of weeks 
Hydrology 
state 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Low  40 32 32 28 28 20 30 36 36 12 16 24 12 
Medium 44 44 36 40 32 24 40 36 36 16 16 28 16 
High 48 48 40 48 40 40 48 40 40 20 32 32 20 
 Number of weeks 
Hydrology 
state 
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Low  8 8 8 8 8 12 8 12 8 12 24 20 12 
Medium 8 12 12 12 8 16 8 12 8 16 28 28 12 
High 16 16 16 16 12 20 12 16 12 20 32 28 16 
 Number of weeks 
Hydrology 
state 
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
Low  8 16 20 32 44 56 20 36 44 36 60 68 64 
Medium 12 20 24 48 48 64 24 40 48 40 72 72 72 






Table A6.1. Marginal water values for Scenario-1 and Scenario-2	
No. of weeks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Scenario-1 83 67 59 57 54 53 52 52 50 50 49 48 48 
Scenario-2 65 62 50 49 44 43 42 41 40 40 39 39 39 
 
No. of weeks 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Scenario-1 47 47 47 47 46 46 46 46 45 45 44 43 43 
Scenario-2 38 37 37 37 37 36 36 35 35 35 35 35 35 
 
No. of weeks 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Scenario-1 43 43 43 42 42 42 42 42 41 41 41 40 40 
Scenario-2 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
No. of weeks 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
Scenario-1 40 40 39 39 39 38 38 36 36 36 36 35 35 
Scenario-2 33 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 31 31 30 30 
	
